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ABSTRACT
The thesis is a social psychological study of beliefs about women artists and
women's art. It is argued that the work of women artists is systematically
undervalued in society and it is also argued that people's beliefs about women
artists, and their attitudes towards women's art, are stereotypical. People are
shown to have stereotyped beliefs about women artists and it is argued that
stereotypes comprise the cognitive component of people's attitudes towards
women's art. An argument is then presented that the origins of stereotypes can be
found in social identity and personal identity. The conclusion is drawn that
people's social identities and personal identities influence their views on women
artists and their attitudes towards women's art, as represented by the stereotypical
belief component of those attitudes. The results of an analytic survey are then
presented in support of this claim. The survey findings show that two social
identity factors, feminism and gender, and one personal identity factor, sex-role
categorisation, influence people's beliefs about women artists and women's art.
Having established that people's views on women artists and their work are
.stereotypical, the thesis then moves on to consider what effect this has on the
sense of self of a group of arts professionals. An argument is presented that, in
order to accomplish this task, it is necessary to replace survey methodology with
discourse analysis techniques. Analyses are then presented of a set of interviews
with arts professionals and those involved in promoting women's art. The results
of these analyses show that the subjects are able to employ discursive accounts in
order to preserve a positive sense of identity in the face of possible challenges to
their sense of self In the final chapter, some concluding comments are offered on
the advantages associated with adopting a mixed-methodology approach of this
kind.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO
WOMEN'S ART
1.1 Introduction
This thesis was inspired by a general interest in women as artists and in how they
are viewed by others. The study which evolved has two facets. On the one hand,
there are the beliefs about women artists and women's art held the public, by
practising artists and by arts professionals, including administrators and educators.
On the other hand, there is the effect which these beliefs have on the identity and
sense of self of those involved in promoting women's art. While women artists and
women's art have been the subject of academic study, the most significant
contributory disciplines have been art history, sociology and, more recently,
cultural studies. These disciplines have demonstrated that it is possible to name
individual women who have made their mark across the wide spectrum comprising
the diversity of arts and cultural forms. However, historical, sociological and
cultural studies have had less success in explaining how women's art is understood
by the general public and by the arts establishment. There have been studies of
women artists and women's art which have drawn upon psychological perspectives
such as psychoanalysis (pollock, 1988; Wolff, 1981), however psychological
studies which utilise contemporary innovations in social psychology are not readily
identifiable. This is, perhaps, surprising given the potential for social psychology
to contribute to an analysis of public responses to cultural forms and the artists
who create them. The present thesis aims to fill this analytic gap, and begins with a
commentary on women artists and women's art.
1.1 Women artists
In a review of the place of women in the arts, Wolff(1981) has argued that art and
literature should be seen as historically and socially situated. Specific historical
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periods and sets of social relations particular to them, she argues, foster the
development of ideologies. This means, according to Wolff, that ideologies
surrounding artistic production and the artist are in effect historically and socially
constructed. Works of art, themselves, must then constitute manifestations of
culture, or as Wolff describes them, 'repositories of cultural meaning'. Wolff's
claim is that both cultural analysis and the sociological study of the arts have been
effective in identifying sexism in society and how this has impacted upon cultural
and artistic products and their reception.
The idea that art is intrinsically linked to social phenomena such as biased social
relations is also presented by Greer (I979). Greer points to the apparent
contradiction between the interest aroused by major exhibitions of women's art
throughout the 20 century and the subsequent lack of response from the arts
establishment. She cites, by way of illustration, the Exposition Retrospective d'Art
Feminin held in Paris in 1906 which, at that time, appeared to enjoy considerable
acclaim. However, Greer's view is that the arts establishment has been, and
continues to be, reluctant to address art which deviates from normal practice and
claims that women's art falls into this category. This reluctance is at least in part
because there would be a need to direct resources into associated research and
areas of scholarship without any guarantee of return commensurate with this
investment. On the other hand, Greer comments on the fact that works of art can
constitute 'small repositories of enormous value' and that this value is determined
more by authenticity and rarity than by aesthetic criteria. However, in an artistic
version of Catch 22, while the level of survival of women's 'portable paintings'
certainly meets the criterion of rarity this, according to Greer, is in itself insufficient
to guarantee high value status. Irrespective of authentication, women painters tend
to be relatively unknown. Thus their work meets a necessary, but not sufficient,
set of value criteria, in that it is rare, but held to be the output of minor artists.
Greer confirms, in spite of this, that there has been evidence of an interest, albeit a
'desultory'interest, in women artists and women's art since the influential writings
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of Vasari in 1598. According to Greer, it is difficult to perceive any underlying
rationale for the selection of those women artists whose work attracted his
attention. In addition, Vasari's observations were judged by Greer as somewhat
'gallant' and without critical and evaluative substance. Vasari's treatment of
women artists and their work was therefore markedly different from his treatment
of male artists and their work. In Greer's opinion, Vasari's approach to the
treatment of women artists and their work set a precedent which was upheld by art
historians who followed. Classical references to women artists and their work are,
therefore considered unreliable by Greer who suggests that 'inclusions and
omissions are at least part a consequence of commentators' condescending
attitudes.' For example, Mechteld toe Boecop, according to Greer, received scant
recognition in Houbraken's early eighteenth century work which constituted an
extensive study of Netherlandish painters and paintresses. This is somewhat
surprising, as Mechteld toe Boecop was already well established as a 'paintress'
when Houbraken was writing. However, that she was a 'paintress' who had earned
her reputation from large scale religious works of art, normally the province of
male artists, perhaps explains Hourbraken's reticence.
The idea that women artists and women's art have been unfairly regarded by the
arts establishment is a theme developed by Pollock (I988), who suggests that art
history, in common with most academic disciplines, contributes actively to the
production and perpetuation of a gender hierarchy. In accord with Greer, Pollock
adopts the position that women artists are either omitted from art history or are
subject to particular forms of representation. Modernist art history, she argues, is
'ideologically predisposed' to towards a limited vision of what constitutes art and
artistic merit. Pollock's resolution of the mistaken impression that there have been
no women artists of note lies in the process of the historical recovery of women
who were artists. Like Greer, Pollock is able to point to examples of women
artists who were transiently recognised in their own milieu but whose reputations
diminished with time. Berthe Morisot (1854-96) and Mary Cassatt (1844-1926),
3
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for example, were considered important members of the Impressionist School.
However their names are not widely known today.
Chadwick (1990) echoes some of Pollock's concerns that women's art is
undervalued partly as a result of ideological considerations. Utilising post-
structuralist analyses of discourse and power, Chadwick has suggested that part of
the 'invisibility' of women artists stems from the fact that social power hierarchies
are structured in such a way that it has been men who control the extent to which
the contributions of women are seen or recognised. The difficulty this presents,
Chadwick argues, is that if the situation of women artists is problematic for
structural reasons, then so long as the relevant social structures remain in place, the
problematic status of women artists and women's art will endure:
'As an academic discipline, art history has structured its study of
cultural artefacts within particular categories, privileging some forms
of production over others and continually returning the focus to certain
kinds of objects and the individuals who produced them'
Chadwick, 1990
Chadwick, like Greer, identifies women artists, namely Marietta Robusti and Judith
Leyster, whose treatment by arts historians demonstrates how male-oriented art
history has contrived to render the work of women artists 'invisible'. Similar
claims are made by Spender (1988) in respect of women's literature and by
Chambers (1988) in respect of women's contributions to popular culture.
Chambers suggests that one reason for the problematic status of women artists is
that women's advances in popular culture are often perceived as threatening to the
more established male-centred institutions.
Some art historians and cultural theorists, however, suggest that the position of
women artists is not entirely static. Lippard (1976) claims that women are being
offered more opportunities to work as artists, but that this has had little effect on
their status in the arts establishment and in art histories. More recently, Isaak
(1996) has suggested that the last decade has seen a variety of feminist and
postmodernist critiques of art history and art criticism which has, in turn, caused
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art critics to adopt more positive view towards women's art. However, she claims
that despite this, there is still a sense in which women's art is regarded as marginal.
Lucie-Smith (1994) has also suggested that in recent years, the position of women
artists has improved. This, he notes, is in part a consequence of women artists
concentrating on crafts such as weaving and stitching. As opposed to the high
status fine arts, craft activities have always been perceived as appropriate for
women because of their association with domestic skills rather than artistic genius.
What unites many of these disparate studies is the perception that women as artists
suffer a form of institutional bias. Biases of this sort represent informal barriers in
organisations which prevent members of minority groups, in this case women, from
attaining higher levels of position or status. (Jeanquart-Barone and Sekaran, 1996)
Of course, responsible bodies such as national arts councils have explicit policies
which purport to circumvent such difficulties. However, Hutchison (1982) has
argued that, in practice, implementation of arts council policies often results either
in obvious biases or in more subtle forms of discrimination.
Institutional biases of the sort identified by Hutchieson (1982), when they apply to
women, can been characterised as resulting from male-centred assumptions which
lie at the heart of organisational structures. (Ramsay and Parker, 1992) This
suggests that the bias against women artists reflected in the work of art historians
may exist today as subtle forms of institutional prejudice. The fact that
discrimination may arise in subtle or indirect ways is especially problematic for
women artists, because social psychological studies of prejudice have shown that
subtle prejudice can be more acceptable to people than blatant prejudice. For
example, Vrugt and Nauta (1995) argue that in the Netherlands women, in
common with ethnic minorities, experience subtle forms of prejudice. They cite the
example of objections to positive discrimination for the admittance of women to
prominent positions on the basis that affirmative action of this type would favour
women over men in cases where men held better qualifications. In their study of
helping behaviour, Vrugt and Nauta revealed that, unlike men, women occupying
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subordinate roles received more help from male subjects than women in
supervisory roles. Vrugt and Nauta concluded that men tend to have more positive
attitudes towards women in 'traditional' gender roles than towards women in less
'traditional', supervisory positions. Moreover, these effects arose among subjects
who had provided no evidence of stereotype bias in responses to an initial
questionnaire. Vrugt and Nauta conclude that subtle prejudice may exist even in
the absence of overt prejudice and may be more sociallyacceptable.
1.3 Rationale for the present thesis
A number of theorists have, then, suggested that women's artistic products can be
viewed as systematically undervalued as a result of having been produced by
women. They argue that the relatively low status of women artists should be
understood as a form of social bias. A consequence of this viewpoint is that
responses to women's artistic products can usefully be viewed as socially
conditioned responses, rather than as 'neutral' aesthetic responses. If this is so,
then the first task in providing a social psychology of women's art is to explain
where people's views on women's art come from. This involves discovering
whether there is a social psychological explanation which can shed light on the
societal devaluation of women's art revealed by art theorists and historians. A
second task is to investigate the consequences such devaluing views have for the
sense of self or identity of arts professionals who are responsible for promoting
such art.
In pursuing these two tasks, different research questions arise as attention is turned
from one task to the other. As far as views on women's art is concerned, the
question centres on discovering whether there are social psychological factors
which might influence people's views on women artists and women's art. If
responses to women's art are, as art historians and theorists argue, devaluing
because they are socially conditioned, then there should be some evidence of this
social conditioning in the perceptions of women's art of both the public and arts
professionals. When attention turns to the second task, a further research question
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anses: the issue of how arts professionals maintain a positive sense of self as
promoters of women's art, given the perceived social devaluation of women's art.
If women's art suffers from a devaluing of its product, then this poses the question
of whether and how those with responsibility for the arts preserve a positive social
identity. In particular, involvement with women's art poses a potential identity
problem for arts administrators. On the one hand, as promoters of art, they can be
expected to wish to avoid any appearance of prejudice against the art of women.
On the other hand, if women's art is generally under-valued, thus representing a
greater promotional difficulty than other forms of art, then they can be expected to
display an awareness of the undesirability of promoting the art of women. This
raises the question of whether such ambivalence occurs in the way mediators of art
understand such forms of art and the sense of self they derive from working with
such forms of art.
This thesis, then, explores how women's art is understood, by examining the way
people's views on women's art are socially conditioned. To accomplish this, the
exclusive focus of Chapters Two and Three is on social psychological theory.
Chapter Two presents reviews of recent research in the areas of stereotype theory
and attitude theory. Social stereotypes, viewed as the cognitive component of
attitudes, are depicted as an explanatory mechanism which accounts for views on
women's art.
Chapter Three then presents a discussion of the origin of such stereotypes. Two
sources of stereotypes are considered: those which are based on group-
membership and those which are based on the individual. It will be seen that there
is evidence to support the view that some stereotypical beliefs derive from, or are
influenced by, membership of large scale social groups. However, it is also the
case that other stereotypical beliefs are acquired through an individual's early
socialisation experiences, and the example focused on here is sex-role
categorisation. The argument will be that the cognitive component of attitudes,
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stereotypical beliefs, can be understood in part as an outcome of the twin forces of
social group stereotyping and gender stereotyping.
Chapter Four presents the application of these theoretical insights in the context of
an empirical study of beliefs about women artists and women's art held by the
public, by practising artists and by arts professionals including administrators and
educators. The analysis in Chapter Four focuses on the question of whether the
data can be explained by reference to a mixture of social group stereotypes and
individualistic sex-role stereotyping. The data in Chapter Four are taken from a
survey with a sample of 484 university students and a sample of 37 arts
professionals
Chapter Five explores the question of whether stereotypical beliefs have an impact
on the sense of self of those who are responsible for the dissemination of women's
art. After a review of the discourse analytic approach to analysis of self and
identity, interview data are presented which reveal that the arts professionals
interviewed employ a number of discursive strategies in order to maintain a sense
of self as unbiased. Data in Chapter Five are taken from some 20 in-depth
interviews with arts professionals who have been involved in promoting women's
arts.
Chapter Six pursues the issue of sense of self among arts professionals and arts
promoters in contexts which involve 'identity problems' other than defending
oneself against possible claims of prejudice. The first deals with apparently
inconsistent identity claims. The second deals with re-negotiations of identity
following the break-down of a group whose aim was to promote women's art.
Data in Chapter Six are taken from some 18 in-depth interviewswith former group
members.
Chapter Seven provides a summary statement of the main findings in the thesis and
draws together conclusions from the study as a whole. It also provides a critical.
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reflection on the perceived limitations of the present study and makes
recommendations for future research.
1.4 Conclusion
This chapter began by describing a study of women as artists which has two facets:
people's beliefs about women artists and women's art and the effect which these
have on the sense of self of those involved in the arts professions. Theorists across
a range of disciplines such as art history, sociology of art and cultural studies
subscribe to the belief that women's art is undervalued in our society. It has been
emphasised that social psychology can contribute to an understanding of where
such beliefs come from. Accordingly, Chapters Two and Three now move on to
discuss social psychological theories of stereotypical beliefs and their origins.
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STEREOTYPES AND ATTITUDES: STEREOTYPICAL BELIEFS
AND THEIR ROLE AS THE COGNITIVE COMPONENT OF
ATTITUDES
1.1 Introduction
Chapter One acknowledged the potential of social psychology to contribute to an
analysis of people's beliefs about women artists and women's art and the effect
which these beliefs have on the identity and sense of self of those involved in
promoting women's art. This chapter is oriented towards the first of these facets
and provides a conceptual underpinning, derived from social psychology, which
deals with the notion of beliefs in general. Section 2.2 begins this task by
presenting reviews of recent research in stereotype theory. The argument is then
presented, in se~tion 2.3, establishing that stereotypical beliefs comprise the
cognitive component of attitudes, and that both stereotype theory and attitude
theory benefit from this. Thereafter, an exposition of attitudes and attitude theory
is provided. A summary and conclusions are presented in section 2.4.
1.1 Stereotype theory
A central goal of social psychology is to explain and predict the ways in which
people behave in interaction with one another. Stereotypes have been proposed as
one important determinant of behaviour, and so have become a focus of attention
for social psychologists. A relatively common understanding of 'stereotype' is a
more or less shared belief about the characteristics or attributes of a group or
category of people. The stereotyping process can be considered as one in which
'target' groups are identified by observable features such as skin colour, ethnicity,
physical appearance, age or sex. Of course, other features such as religion,
political affiliation or. other social affiliations can sometimes be equally 'observable'
by means of overt signs such as modes of dress. Stereotyping is a process in which
10
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the stereotyping individual or group ascribes psychological characteristics to these
overtly observable 'target' groups. The attributed characteristics are typically
taken by those who research stereotypes to be trait terms. However it is also
argued that stereotypes can include other sorts of features such as beliefs about
others' attitudes (Judd, Ryan, and Park, 1991; Asuncion and Mackie, 1996). The
model suggested is that a representation of a group, identified by means of a label
such as 'woman' or 'black', becomes associated with specific traits or
characteristics such as impulsiveness or laziness. Stereotypes sometimes derive
from a pair of category representations such as 'male' and 'female', sometimes
from multiple category representations, such as 'Asians', 'Blacks' and 'Whites'
and sometimes from continuous variables such as age or physical attractiveness.
The use of stereotypes to explainbehaviour can be traced back to Lippman (1922).
In 'Public Opinion' he described stereotypes as selective, self-fulfilling and
ethnocentric. He saw stereotypes as offering only a partial view of the world, in
that they were usually incomplete and biased. He pictured them as 'blind spots'
which prevented objective reasoning. He viewed their over-generalising process as
unfortunate and yet necessary, since they made a complex world simple. Katz and
Braly (1933) conducted a study of prejudice employing the notion of stereotypes.
Using the checklist method, they studied the way students assigned 5 traits taken
from a list of 48 to a number of social groups. They found high levels of
agreement among students. They reported, for example, that 75% of students
characterised Negroes as lazy. They viewed this sort of finding as evidence for
erroneous 'public fictions' about other groups. Subsequent work on stereotypes
tended to concentrate on this notion of error or bias in stereotyping. Thus,
stereotype studies in the 1930s and 1940s also claimedto show that, as a picture of
reality, stereotypes are almost completely misleading. This led to work which
collected 'objective' accounts of social groups with the aim of disseminating such
information in order to counter biased stereotypes. (Bogardus, 1950; Fishman,
1956).
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In the 1950s, work on stereotypes as biases or errors, which cast the stereotype in
a negative light, continued. This was in part because most stereotype research
addressed questions relating to prejudice. In 1950, for example, Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford argued, from a psychoanalytic perspective, that
stereotyping is a particular form of error of thought which intolerant people are
prone to make. However, around the same time, a number of theorists including
Asch (1952) began to argue that insofar as behaviour is influenced by group
membership, stereotyped views of people, which represent them in terms of group
memberships, are likely to be valuable. More group-centred accounts of
stereotypes were also produced by Fishman (1956) and Vinacke (1956) who
argued that stereotypes are responses to intergroup relations. However, unlike
Asch and Vinacke, Fishman argued that this was still an irrational response, in that
individualswere succumbing to the powers of suggestion of the group. In some
senses, Allport's The Nature of Prejudice (1954) represented a blend of the more
positive view of stereotypes of Asch and Vinacke and more traditional, negative
views, since Allport characterised the categorisation role of stereotypes as a
necessary form of thought in the same way as Lippman. However Allport still
considered stereotyping as problematic because of its tendency to over-exaggerate
features of social groups. His explanation rested on ideas similar to those of
Adorno, that normal people categorise via stereotypes 'usefully', but prejudiced
people categorise 'irrationally'.
In the 1960s a more positive view of stereotypes was supported by a number of
studies which, following Bogardus (1950) sought to compare 'objective'
descriptions with stereotype content and reported that the mismatch between
reality and stereotype was not as great as previously claimed. This led Triandis
and Vassiliou (1967) to suggest that there is a 'kernel of truth' to stereotypes in
that part of the stereotype deals with the world 'correctly'. This concern with a
kernel of truth lessened in the 1970s. This was in part due to worries about the
'objectivity' of the objective measures of groups. It was also due to a switch in
interest away from stereotype content to a concern with stereotype processes.
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This concern with process came to be identified with what was termed the social
cognition approach.
Social cognition has been defined as the study of how ordinary people think about
people (Fiske and Taylor, 1984). Two dimensions of this approach are the study
of categorisation and the study of schemata. Through categorisation, the content
of experience can be ordered or 'made sense of. An aspect of experience is dealt
with by establishing the extent to which it can be subsumed within a category.
These categorised experiences are organised through schemata, which represent
the categorised information in a structured or hierarchical way. What separates
out social cognition from other forms of cognition, according to Fiske & Taylor
(1984), is that the objects of social cognition are social, and are often members of
one's own or other groups. Social cognition also has a social origin in that it may
be created or reinforced through social interaction. In addition, social cognition
represents forms of thought which are assumed to be shared within a given group
or society. However, although social cognition theory emphasises the uniquely
social aspect of social stereotypes, its explanations of the origins of social
stereotypes and of their structure and function remain firmlycognitive in tone.
The prime motivation for the use of stereotypes according to the social cognition
tradition is the need to simplify a complex social environment. The social
cognition account of the origin of such simplifying stereotypes is based on the
suggestion of Hamilton and Gifford (1976) who argued that stereotypes are an
outcome of 'illusory correlation', in which two stimuli which co-occur are
erroneously inferred to be correlated. They presented subjects with statements
about people who were described as belong either to group A or group B.
Statements about group B people were less frequent, and therefore more
distinctive. The statements either attributed socially desirable or undesirable
actions to each person. Socially undesirable actions were less frequent, and thus
also more distinctive. The ratio of desirable to undesirable actions was constant
across groups A and B, and there was no correlation between group membership
13
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and desirability. Hamilton and Gifford's finding was that subjects over-estimated
the frequency of undesirable actions by minority (group B) members, in that the
ratio of desirable to undesirable actions was estimated to be greater for group A
than groupB. The basic idea here is that relatively infrequent stimuli are more
noticeable or distinctive than frequently occurring stimuli, and so are more readily
'encoded'. It follows that where a pair of such infrequent stimuli occur, both will
be relatively easily encoded. Cognitively, we tend to pay particular attention to
both stimuli and come to infer the existence of a link between them: thus
constituting an example of illusory correlation ..
The current status of the illusory correlation thesis is ambiguous. Research
continues to demonstrate the occurrence of illusory correlations (for example
Acorn, Hamilton and Sherman, 1988; Kim and Baron, 1988; Stroessner and Heuer,
1996). However, other research has shown that an illusory correlation may not
arise if the minority group is the self (Pryor, 1986) or if the majority and minority
group labels have pre-existing social meaning for the subjects (McArthur and
Friedman, 1980). It has also been suggested that if the descriptions of majority and
minority group members is of attitudes held by them, rather than behaviours
performed by them, then the effect of the illusory correlation may change. In a
modification of the original Hamilton and Gifford study, Spears, Van der Pligt and
Eiser (1985) demonstrated that it is only when the minority attitude is the same as
the subject's own attitude that the illusory correlation appears. In addition, the
theoretical explanation for the effect in terms of stimuli being more noticeable or
distinctive has also been challenged. Fiedler (1991), for example, has attempted to
explain illusory correlation data in terms of information loss which arises from
processing types of information which have different frequencies of occurrence.
Moreover, Asuncion and Mackie (1996) have suggested that stereotype
development may arise from affective factors rather than from mere infrequency of
incidence itself, in a form of classical conditioning. Asuncion and Mackie note
research which demonstrates that meeting new groups often induces negative
14
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affect, and hypothesise that this could become associated with the group itself,
rather than with the unfamiliarity of the group to the subject.
The status of stereotype origin is, therefore, not a settled issue within social
cognition theory. In contrast, the social cognition theorist's understanding of the
structure of stereotypes is more straightforward. Stangor and Lange (1994)
provide an influential model for the structure of stereotypes by suggesting that
stereotypes consist in 'associative networks' which are abstract knowledge
representations in memory such that group or category labels are associated with
the stereotypical characteristics of that group. Stangor and Lange associate, with
this model, a process of 'activation' in which ascription of a category label occurs
after the stereotyper has noted an observable feature such as skin colour. This
'activation' of the label then 'spreads' to other, associated characteristics. Stangor
and Lange differentiate between availability and accessibility of stereotype
characteristics. 'Availability' refers to a subject agreeing, if asked, that the
stereotype characteristic belongs to the labelled group. 'Accessibility' refers to the
strength of activation of the representation which the label names relative to other
representations. 'Accessibility' also refers to how strongly the characteristic is
associated to the labelled representation, relative to other characteristics. The use
of the label depends on perceptual salience and perceiver variables. Perceiver
variables include features such as recency and frequency of activation. Among
these perceiver variables, Stangor and Lange show that there are individual
differences for the accessibility of labels. They also argue that the perceived
informativeness of the label affects whether it is activated. A further determinant is
the complexity of the task at hand. As the task becomes more complex,
stereotypes which are especially useful in its simplification are activated. Also, the
nature of the task may 'demand' specific categorisations (Stangor, Lynch, Duan,
and Glass, 1992).
Although this picture of the' structure of stereotypes as associative networks has
become influential, debate remains over the precise cognitive processes which
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underlie such 'social cognitive' association networks. Three aspects of cognitive
processing have generated particular research interest: the nature of the cognitive
processes underlying stereotyping, the extent to which stereotyping is automatic;
and the influence on stereotypes of counter-stereotypical information.
Underlying Processes. Macrae, Bodenhausen and Milne (1995) have suggested
that social judgements often involve multiple categorisations. Nevertheless,
stereotype theory suggests that stereotypes are used cognitively to simplify the
social world. This means that there must be some cognitive process which
facilitates selection of one of the multiple categories available as salient. Macrae et
al (1995) argue that both excitatory and inhibitory cognitive processes are
involved. Their experiment involved three experimental conditions. Subjects were
presented with brief videotapes showing a Chinese woman: applying makeup,
'Woman' stereotype activated condition; using chopsticks, 'Chinese' stereotype
activated condition; reading, the control condition. Subjects then performed a
lexical decision task involving gender-stereotypical trait terms and Chinese
stereotypical trait terms. The results showed that subjects in the 'Woman'
stereotype activated condition recognised gender-stereotypical trait terms more
quickly than did control subjects who in tum performed better than 'Chinese'
stereotype activated subjects. Similarly, 'Chinese' stereotype activated subjects
recognised Chinese stereotypical trait terms more quickly than did control subjects
who in tum performed better than 'Woman' stereotype activated subjects·. These
results support the suggestion that both excitatory and inhibitory processes were in
play, since the cross-stereotypical condition produced slower rates of recognition
than either the homogenous stereotype condition or the control condition.
Macrae et aI (1995) demonstrate, therefore, that the most basic cognitive processes
associated with stereotyping are more complex than previous research had
suggested. At the level of higher cognitive processes, a similar picture emerges.
Biernat and Kbrynowicz (1997) separate out two different consequences of
stereotyping. These are that social stereotypes may lead to assimilative
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judgements, or alternatively that they may lead to contrastive judgements. An
example of this distinction can be drawn from consideration of gender stereotypes.
The authors report that women are stereotypically expected to earn less than men.
Accordingly, a given level of income may, in the case of women, be interpreted, via
assimilation, as an index of lower financial success in comparison with men. On
the other hand, the same level of income may be interpreted as an index of
relatively high financial success in contrast with men earning the same level of
income. Biernat and Kobrynowich suggest that whether assimilation or contrast
occurs depends on whether the judgement rests on 'broad based' inferences about
the target group or on assessment of the target's minimum standing on the
attribute.
Hamilton and Sherman (1996) point to another way in which the cognitive
processes involved in stereotyping are affected when the stereotype 'target' is a
group, rather than an individual. They claim that while perceivers do tend to
consider individuals more coherent as entities than they do groups, it is this
perception of 'unity' or 'entitativity' which produces important effects on the
stereotyping process, rather than the individual/group distinction per se. If, for
example, perceptions of unity or entitativity are consistent in the case of individuals
and groups then the outcomes of stereotypical information processing are also
consistent. If, however, perceptions of unity or entitativity are inconsistent then
the outcomes of information processing will also differ. Hamilton and Sherman
suggest that perceivers do not expect groups to display the same unity as the
personality of an individual. For example, spontaneous inferences involving
illusory correlations are more likely to be made in judgements about individuals
than about groups. It follows that the cognitive processes associated with
stereotyping are influenced by the extent to which the stereotype target is seen to
have high or low entitativity.
Another aspect 'of stereotypes which can influence underlying. cognitive processes
is whether the stereotype is positive or negative from one's own perspective. Steel
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and Aronson (1995) have suggested that in situations where a negative stereotype
is applicable, one faces what they term a stereotype threat. 'Stereotype threat'
refers to situations where one is at risk of confirming that a negative stereotype
applies to oneself Where the stereotype involves a socially important property,
such as intellectual ability, the threat consists in the fact that confirmation of the
negative stereotype can be disruptive enough to impair intellectual performance.
In one of their studies, Steel and Aronson (1995) asked Black and White college
students to perform in a difficult verbal test. The test was performed in one of
three conditions: the subjects were told that the test was diagnostic of ability,
'Diagnostic' condition; the subjects were told that the test was a laboratory tool
for studying problem-solving, 'Non-diagnostic' condition; a third composite
condition. The diagnostic condition represented a stereotype threat. The results
showed that Black subjects performed significantlymore poorly in the stereotype
threat condition than in the non-stereotype threat condition. The authors conclude
that the pressure represented by stereotype threat functioned as a form of
evaluation anxiety which led to impaired performance.
Automatic Stereotyping. Bargh, Chen and Burrows (1996) note that research in
social cognition has shown that some cognitive phenomena are automatic in
nature. For example, attitudes may become activated automatically in the mere
presence of the attitude object. Bargh et al suggest that behavioural responses to
the social environment can be automatic in the same way. They demonstrated that
subjects whose concept of rudeness was primed were more likely to behave in a
rude fashion. Similarly, subjects whose concept of being elderly was primed
walked more slowly away from the experimental laboratory than did control
subjects. This implies that, for some stereotypes, both the perceptual phase of
stereotyping (i.e. activation of stereotypes) and the behavioural phase are
automatic.
The work of Bargh et al seems to point to a greater level of automaticity being
involved in stereotypical thought than might have been supposed. Lepore and
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Brown (1997), on the other hand, present data which seem to suggest that
stereotypes are less prone to automatic triggering than previously supposed. In
consequence, Lepore and Brown question the extent to which stereotype
activation and resultant prejudice must necessarily be viewed as an automatic
process. They distinguish between two types of 'automatic stereotype activation'.
In the first, a stereotype trait (or characteristic) is primed directly and in the second
the relevant category is primed. Take, for example, the case of gender stereotypes
in which the category label 'woman' is stereotypically associated with the trait
'caring'. In the first type of stereotype activation, the 'caring' trait is directly
primed. In the second type of stereotype activation, the category label 'woman' is
directly primed.
The distinction between the two types of stereotype activation is important, Lepore
and Brown (1997) claim, because it affects the extent to which automatic
stereotyping may arise among prejudiced and non-prejudiced people. Previous
research (Devine, 1989) appeared to demonstrate that both prejudiced and non-
prejudiced people automatically activate the same, negative stereotype of Black
people, but that non-prejudiced people then suppress the associated behavioural
consequences. Lepore and Brown suggest instead that prejudiced and non-
prejudiced people alike undergo automatic stereotype activation if a stereotype
trait is primed, but that they differ if the stereotype category label itself is primed.
In their study, subjects were primed with either negative trait words or category
labels. They found that negative stereotype activation was similar across
prejudiced and non-prejudiced subjects when negative trait words were used as
primes. However, they also found that when category labels were used as primes,
only prejudiced subjects displayed activation of the negative stereotype. The
conclusion drawn was that the relationship between stereotypes, categories and
prejudice is more flexible and less characterised by automaticity than supposed by
earlier stereotype research. This finding offers some support for the previous
findings derived by Fazio, Jackson. Dunton and Williams (l995) who also
criticised Devine's claim that all people have racist stereotypes which are
19
Chapter Two
automatically activated. Instead, Fazio et al suggest that only certain types of
people match the 'automatic stereotype activation' description.
Counter-Stereotypical Information. According to Maurer, Park and Rothbart
(1995), research in stereotyping and stereotype change has revealed that it is
commonplace for perceivers to view groups in terms of the group's constituent
subsets rather than as a whole, a process known as sub-typing. Sub-typing is a
cognitive mechanism which allows for the preservation of stereotypes rather than
the disconfirmation of stereotypes. When a counter stereotypical group member is
encountered, sub-typing allows that counter-stereotypical example to be set aside
as an exception to the stereotyping rule. Sub-grouping, as distinct from sub-
typing, refers to a process in which members of a group are sub-divided into
smaller meaningful sub-groups. For example, the group 'women' might be sub-
divided into occupational sub-groups. When a counter stereotypical group
member is encountered, sub-grouping results in a weakening or disconfirmation of
the original stereotype. Maurer et al (1995) argue that either sub-typing or sub-
grouping may arise in connection with stereotypical judgement. If sub-typing
occurs, the consequence is that stereotyping is preserved. If sub-grouping occurs
then the consequence is a greater perceived variability among members of the
original group. Maurer et aI, therefore, suggest that, in the presence of counter-
stereotypical instances, a stereotype will be retained if the counter-stereotypical
group can be viewed as a single set of exceptions. However, if a number of
different subsets are perceived within the super-ordinate group then the presence
among these of one counter-stereotypical sub-group may not result in stereotype-
maintaining sub-typing. Instead, one is likely to perceive the super-ordinate group
as relatively variable and to accept that this relative variabilitymay encompass the
counter-stereotypical examples, thus leading to a less stereotypical view of that
super-ordinate group.
Maurer et aI explain that the effect of counter-stereotypical information depends in
part on informational structure: that is, the effect depends on whether the counter-
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stereotypical instance is dealt with by means of sub-typing or subgrouping.
However, other researchers have suggested that the efficacy of counter-
stereotypical information may have more to do with informational content. Wilder,
Simon and Faith (1996) discuss stereotype change in terms of Hewstone's (1989)
attribution model and note that stereotypes are often unaffected by counter-
stereotypical information. There are at least four reasons for this. One's own self-
image is linked to beliefs about other groups. One may resist change in order to
preserve 'public face' by avoiding appearing to have been wrong. The counter-
stereotypical information may be attributed to 'unusual' causes. In the special case
of unfavourable stereotypes, negative beliefs may be cognitively more difficult to
change than positive beliefs. In a related vein, Huici, Ros, Carmona, Cano and
Morales (1996) note that stereotype disconfirmation displays an asymmetry
between positive and negative traits. Disconfirmation of positive traits is more
readily generalised to groups as a whole than disconfirmation of negative traits.
This asymmetry also applies to pre-existing attitudes. Negative attitudes are more
powerful than. positive attitudes in mediating information which disconfirms
positive stereotypical traits. The authors conclude that disconfirmation and
subsequent stereotype change is influenced by the valence of the disconfirming
information and by the valence of existing attitudes.
What these studies of underlying processes, automaticity and counter-stereotypical
information reveal is that even if social cognition theorists adopt a single model for
stereotypes, such as Stangor and Lange's (1994) associative network model, there
is still active debate about the cognitive processes associated with that model. The
picture is made more complex because social judgements are not always
stereotyped. For example, Fiske and Neuberg (1990) argue that there is a
continuum of impression formation which varies from stereotyped judgements at
one end to judgements about discrete behaviours of individuals at the other. Even
when judgements are stereotypical, there is debate about just how 'shared' or
consensual the stereotypes are. Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) argue that many
important stereotypes are unique, individual beliefs, and more recently Stangor,
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Sullivan and Ford (1991) suggest that individual stereotypes exist and may differ
from the prevailing, consensual beliefs. In a similar vein, Asuncion and Mackie
(1996) claim that the shared status of the stereotype is a variable feature of
stereotypes which is only determined, for a given stereotype, by empirical study.
In summary, then, the social cognition account of the origin of stereotypes via
illusory correlation turns out to be more complicated than early theorists predicted.
However, social cognition research has provided a relatively clear model for
stereotype structure. However, many of the cognitive processes associated with
that model remain open to debate. This debate includes questions about underlying
processes, automaticity and the effect of counter-stereotypical information. A
common theme in this debate is the extent to which an individual's attitudes are
involved in the stereotype under investigation. This raises the question of how to
understand the relationship between stereotypes and attitudes which is discussed in
the following section as a preliminary to a discussion of attitude theory.
2.3 Attitude theory
The preceding section discussed the fact that people formulate beliefs about others
in a stereotypical fashion. Stereotypes were regarded as social phenomena which
condition the wayan individual will think about other people. To this extent, the
notion of the stereotype is much narrower than that of the attitude, since attitude
theory deals with beliefs about people and beliefs about other aspects of the social
world such as objects and events. Attitude theory is also broader than stereotype
theory in another sense. Within the context of social behaviour, it is necessary to
provide an explanation of how stereotypical beliefs act on the subject as impulses
or motivations to behave in one way or another in respect of the 'target' of the
stereotyped beliefs. Standardly, the explanation offered of this within stereotype
theory is that beliefs become associated with evaluations such as good or bad and
favourable or unfavourable. Indeed, since many studies of stereotypes are studies
of prejudice, it might be assumed that evaluation, as a motivational force, would be
central to stereotype' theory. However, with current stereotype research the focus
is more on stereotype processes than stereotype content and the emphasis is on
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cognitive components such as 'informational structures' rather than evaluative
components. Attitude theory, on the other hand, regards the issue of evaluation as
crucially important.
Recent research has acknowledged a close relationship between the concepts of
stereotype and attitude which reflects the differences in scope of stereotype theory
and attitude theory. Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson and Gaertner (1996) note, in
terms of prejudiced attitudes, that stereotypes can be thought of as representing the
cognitive component of attitudes towards other groups of people. Stangor and
Lange (1994) note that it is a 'commonly proposed assumption' that stereotypes
represent the cognitive component of attitudes. They also argue that, since
stereotypes represent beliefs about social groups, they should predict prejudicial
attitudes. Howitt, Billig, Cramer, Edwards, Kniveton, Potter and Radley (1989)
suggest a similar linkage by suggesting that the negative evaluations in prejudicial
attitudes are related to negative stereotypes. Dovidio et al (1996) even go so far
as to claim that stereotypes and attitudes, although not identical, are not always
conceptually completely distinct, in that, within some conceptual definitions,
stereotypes and attitudes are seen to share important similarities. This drawing
together of the two concepts is especially vivid in the work of Eagly and Mladinic
(1989). They define an attitude as 'a tendency to evaluate an entity with some
degree offavour or disfavour' and then claim:
'Evaluation can be expressed in various types of responses ... often
grouped into three classes - cognition, affect and behaviour. The
cognitive class encompasses the thoughts that people have about an
attitude object . . . It is the cognitive class that is relevant to
understanding stereotypes. When an attitude object is a social group,
this cognitive class of responses is synonymous with the stereotype
about that group. '
(Eagly and Mladinic, 1989)
The examination of social judgements in terms of stereotypes and attitudes
therefore allows the researcher to consider people's beliefs and to place them
within an evaluative, attitudinal framework. This allows beliefs to be viewed as a
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motivation for behaving in a given way. Stereotype theory thereby benefits from
attitude theory in that it acquires an explicit evaluative, motivational component.
Attitude theory also benefits from interaction with stereotype theory. Firstly, given
the claim here, that the cognitive component of attitudes can be regarded as a set
of stereotypical beliefs, the findings on stereotype structure and stereotyping
processes reported in section 2.2 will also apply to the cognitive component of
attitudes. Secondly, attitude theory's traditional account of attitude origin and
attitude change can be improved upon. In section 2.2 it was demonstrated that the
illusory correlation account of stereotype origin is questionable. However, in
Chapter Three it will be shown that social identity theory and gender schema
theory offer two powerful models for the social origin of stereotypical beliefs. If
the cognitive component of attitudes is regarded as a set of stereotypical beliefs,
then the findings on the social origins of stereotypical beliefs set out in Chapter
Three can also be applied to the cognitive component of attitudes. This social
orientation is a valuable addition to attitude theory since attitude theorists have
tended to focus on the processes of attitude development and attitude change
largely in terms of asocial cognitive processes such as: classical conditioning
(Kuykendall and Keating, 1990), information processing (McGuire, 1989), and
persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).
Thus the benefits to be derived from examining social judgements by viewing them
as the joint outcome of stereotypes and attitudes are twofold. The attitudinal
theoretical component brings an explicit element of evaluation which many
accounts of stereotypes lack. The stereotype theoretical component brings a
clearer understanding of belief structures and processes and also brings an
explicitly social view of the origins of attitude judgements which many accounts of
attitudes lack.
An example of this joint stereotyping/attitude approach is the study carried out by
Smith, Fazio, and Cejka (1996) on how people respond to individuals and objects
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which can be categorised or stereotyped in multiple ways. Earlier research
(Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio, 1992) has confirmed that when people have highly
accessible attitudes towards specific individuals or objects these individuals and
objects become a focus for attention When they are present in a visual field. The
accessibility of attitudes, in tum, depends on the relative strength of associated
evaluations of the individual or object which, having been retained in the memory,
are then activated. Smith et al suggest that just as visual fields may contain
multiple individuals or objects, multiple potential categorisations of individuals and
objects exist in the memory. They demonstrate that categories towards which
people have highly accessible attitudes are preferentially applied to multiply
categorisable objects. Smith et al (1996) point out that although accessible
attitudes of this sort are often extreme attitudes, accessibility and extremity of
attitudes need not always co-occur.
A basic definition of 'attitude' is that an attitude is an evaluation of something
about which an individual has some knowledge. The utility, for social psychology,
of the attitude construct is that attitudes are aspects of an individual's makeup
which predict and explain behaviour. It is, therefore, somewhat embarrassing for
attitude theory that early attitude research demonstrated that there is little or no
relation between verbal expressions of attitude and behaviour. A classic
experiment demonstrating the lack of relationship between expression of attitude
and behaviour was conducted by LaPiere (1934) who wrote to 251 restaurants and
hotels, asking 'Will you accept members of the Chinese race as guests in your
establishment'. 92% of the 128 responses were negative. Having said that,
LaPiere and a 'personable and charming' young Chinese couple had travelled the
country six months previously and actually received courteous treatment at all but
one of these establishments. Faced with an actual couple who defied their
stereotypes, the proprietors had apparently laid aside their racist attitudes.
Similarly, Kutner, Wilkins and Yarrow (1952) carried outa study in which two
white men entered a restaurant and were then joined by an African-American
woman. In the 11 restaurants visited, the woman was never' refused admission
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Later, all 11 restaurants received a letter asking for table reservations for a mixed
race group. 17 days later, none had replied. Telephone requests were then made
and only five restaurants reluctantly gave reservations. Subsequently, Wicker
(1969) reviewed several dozen attitude studies and found a general trend showing
only a weak link between attitude and behaviour.
According to attitude theory, then, attitudes can be thought of as relatively stable
phenomena which cause behaviour and so can be used to predict behaviour.
However, early research has drawn a simple attitude-behaviour link into question.
For example, even prior to Wicker's 1969 study, Triandis (1967) had suggested
that attitude studies which fail to predict behaviour usually obtain measures only on
the affective dimension. As a consequence, attitude theorists have begun to revise
their conceptions of how attitudes function. Brewer and Crano (1994) and Crano
(1997) have suggested that the attitude-behaviour relationship is mediated by self-
interest or vested interest. However, a more common amendment has been the
suggestion that behaviour does not map exactly onto expressed attitude because
attitudes are more complex than initially supposed.
Two influential but competing re-statements of attitude theory are Hovland's 3
Factor model (Hovland, Janis and Kelley, 1953) and Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of
reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; 1980). In Hovland's model, an attitude
represents an element of psychological make-up which is directed towards, or is
about, some thing. The attitude has affective, cognitive and behavioural
components. The general idea of this model is that attitudes influence intentions
and thereby cause behaviour. Each of these three components of the attitude -
affect, cognition and propensity towards behaviour • represent different forms of
response, either overt or covert, to stimuli previously encoded as an attitudinal
object which can be measured by separate dependent variables.
The affect component comprises feelings, moods, emotions or even responses of
the affective nervous system to the attitudinal object. Where an attitude towards
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an object is positive, the behaviour is positive. Where an attitude towards an
object is negative, the behaviour is negative. For example, positive attitudes might
induce feelings of hope while negative attitudes might induce feelings of despair.
Overt affect might be measured through verbal statements of like or dislike while
covert affect might be measured by physiological measures which reflect affective
states such as heart rate or pupil dilation.
The cognition component comprises linkages between the attitudinal object and
possible properties or characteristics. For example, if the attitudinal object is
'Mercedes' then possible properties or characteristics might include 'elegant' and
'sophisticated' or 'noisy' and pollution-creating'. Where an attitude towards an
object is positive, the cognition is positive. For example, if the object of the
positive attitude is a Mercedes car, then the cognition might be that Mercedes cars
are elegant and sophisticated. Where an attitude towards an object is negative, the
cognition is negative. For example, if the object of the negative attitude is a
Mercedes car, then the cognition might be that Mercedes cars are noisy and
pollution creating. As in the case of the affect component, overt cognition might
be measured through verbal statements, although in the case of the cognition
component these statements would be statements of belief Covert cognition might
be measured by psychological assessments using perceptual response measures
such as reaction times.
The behavioural component comprises either expressed intentions. to behave
towards or the actual behaviour towards an attitudinal object. Where an attitude
towards an object is positive, either the expressed intention to behave or actual
behaviour is positive. Where an attitude towards an object is negative, either the
expressed intention to behave or actual behaviour is negative. For example
positive attitudes might be associated with behaviour which fosters or supports the
object while negative attitudes might be associated with behaviour likely to hinder
or oppose that object. Thus, if the attitudinal object is performance art then a
positive attitude might mean either stating the intention to attend or even attending
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a performance art presentation while a negative attitude might mean either
indicating the intention not to attend or actually avoiding attending a performance
art presentation. Overt intention to behave and actual behaviour might be
measured by direct questioning and observation. Covert intentions to behave
might be measured by physiological measures which reflect action orientations
such as states of arousal.
This emphasis on the three attitudinal components has been adopted, albeit with
caveats, by Eagly and Chaiken (1993). They argue that the notion of evaluation,
which is common to all three components, is separable from the more restricted
idea of affect. This allows for a situation in which someone could evaluate an
attitudinal object positively without experiencing positive affective responses.
Their caution in respect of the tri-partite nature of attitudes stems from research on
inter-correlations among affect, cognition and behaviour measures. Ostrom (1969)
found that correlations between different measures of any single component were
higher than correlations among the three components. Later, Breckler (1984)
examined correlations among clusters of beliefs and affective states and argued that
if there really are three components to an attitude, then measures of these three
separate components ought not to correlate too highly. In a study of responses to
the actual presence of a live snake, he found that there was a reasonable statistical
fit of data measuring affect, cognition and behaviour to the three component
model, although he went on to argue that the three component model did not
adequately account for a sufficient amount of variance in his findings. Partly in
response to this, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) reject the three-component view as a
viable model for attitudes. However, they nevertheless claim that it is important
for the attitude theorist to continue to attend to the distinctions among what they
describe as the 'three classes of evaluative response'. Their use of 'class' rather
than 'component' emphasises their move away from the stronger claim that
attitudes have three distinct components towards the weaker claim that:
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the assumption that these responses can be divided into three
classes implies ... the testable hypothesis that correlations between
responses in the same class are higher than correlations between
responses in different classes'.
(Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)
That there will be some overlap between classes is guaranteed by the fact that
cognitive, affective and behavioural responses share a common underlying
evaluative component. However, the differences are sufficiently great, Eagly and
Chaiken argue, to mean that the uni-dimensional model offered by theorists such as
Fishbein should be rejected.
The Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; 1980) response to the attitude-behaviour gap and
the ambiguous results returned by research which does emphasise the three
component view of attitudes is quite different. They claim that:
'On closer examination, we see that the multi-component view of
attitude cannot provide an adequate explanation of the low attitude-
behaviour relation. . .. Whether our measures are based on statements
concerning beliefs, feelings, intentions or behaviours, the results will be
much the same. It follows that separate assessment of all three
components is unlikely to lead to improved behavioural prediction.'
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980)
Rather than contrast different modes or forms of evaluation, Fishbein and Ajzen
emphasise the difference between general and specific attitudes and behaviours.
Ajzen and Fishbein note that most attitude studies use relatively specific indices of
behaviour but relatively general indices of attitude. They argue that there is no
direct relationship between someone's general attitude towards some issue and
their performance of any specific behaviour.
These ideas form the basis of Fishbein and Ajzen' s theory of reasoned action
(1975; 1980). Fishbein and Ajzen describe the theory in the following terms. An
attitude just is the index of the degree to which a person likes or dislikes an object.
This is determined by the person's salient beliefs about the object. For example, a
person might have general beliefs about 'the church' but will also have specific
beliefs about 'attending the church'. These latter, specific beliefs are more salient
to the question of whether that person will actually attend church. This example
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highlights the emphasis Fishbein and Ajzen place on the relationship between
specific attitudes leading to specific behaviours.
Fishbein and Ajzen stress that it is crucial, for accurate prediction of behaviour,
that belief expressions match attitude to a given behaviour in terms of four
characteristics: action, target, context and time. Suppose a subject has a generally
positive attitude towards new cars. In terms of the theory of reasoned action, this
knowledge has little predictive value in relation to the question: will the subject buy
a new Audi car from Appleyard Motors within the next six weeks. This is because
the crucial information in terms of action (buying a car), target (an Audi car),
context (buying a car at a specific dealer) and time (buying a car within the next
six weeks) cannot be derived from the general attitude.
Once a specific belief has been established, two further items of information are
required for attitude measurement: belief strength and belief evaluation. What the
theory of reasoned action advocates is a multiplication of the strength of each
belief by the evaluation placed on the expected outcome contained within the
belief. Suppose someone believes that buying an Audi car means owning a safe,
elegant yet costly car, then those beliefs, together with associated strengths and
evaluations, could be set out in the following way:
Belief
safety
elegance
costly
Total of strength x
evaluation
Belief Strength
(0 - +3)
+2
+3
+3
Evaluation
(-3 - +3)
+3
+1
-1
Row Total
(Strength x Evaluation)
+6
+3
-3
+6
Once this multiplication is performed for each one of the salient beliefs associated
with the intention to behave in a given way, the likelihood that the person will
behave in accordance with his or her attitude can be derived by taking the sum of
all of the strength x evaluation indexes pertaining to the relevant beliefs. In this
sense the theory of reasoned action is an expectancy-value theory. It stresses the
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importance, not only of the expectancies represented by the subject's either
strongly or weakly held beliefs about the consequences of a specific behaviour. but
also of the evaluations which that subject places on those expected outcomes. In
the theory of reasoned action, it is assumed that predictive power is further
increased by focusing on modal beliefs (those which are most commonly held
among all subjects).
The theory of reasoned action also takes into account the importance of subjective
norms. 'Subjective norm' refers to the subject's perception of how significant
others would view behaviour consistent with the subject's attitude together with a
motivation to comply with those views. Moreover, in a fashion analagous to
measurement of the individual's attitude, assessment of a person's subjective
norms must match the intention to behave in a given way in action, target, context
and time. Thus, for example, the intention to take a holiday abroad this summer
would be correlated with subjective norms such as 'My husband and children think
that I should take a foreign holiday this summer'. The inclusion of consideration of
subjective norms indicates another way in which early attitude studies might have
generated the attitude-behaviour mismatch. It might be the case in those earlier
studies that attitude measures reflected something true about subjects' attitudes,
but that the intention to behave which those subjects formed was determined in a
large part, not by their attitudes, but by their subjective norms.
So, the theory of reasoned action demonstrates on two counts why earlier attitude
studies displayed the attitude-behaviour gap which Wicker identified. Firstly,
beliefs and attitudes must correspond in the manner described, in that they agree in
action, target, context and time elements. Secondly, the impact on behaviour of
social norms must also be taken into account as described above.
Although Fishbein and Ajzen are able to point to a number of studies which
. .
support the theory of reasoned action, other researchers have been more critical of
its success. The theory has tended to make use of bipolar evaluative scales
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(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980). However it has argued that attitudes should often be
understood, not in terms of a uni-dimensional, bipolar model, but in terms of a
multi-dimensional, uni-polar model. Studies of political liberalism and
conservatism have shown that the sorts of characteristics which liberals associate
with their political standpoint differ in kind from those employed by conservatives.
Thus liberals might endorse such notions as individual freedom, tolerance and
social equality, while conservatives endorse social stability, the maintenance of
religious values and individual initiative. The difficulty this poses for the theory of
reasoned action is that liberals and conservatives might not demonstrate opposite
evaluations of the same characteristics. Rather, they display a form of indifference
to the characteristics deemed important by members of the other group. Liberals
and conservatives appear to operate on quite separate dimensions and with specific
characteristics each of which was evaluated in a uni-polar and positive way.
The importance of polarity itself has also been questioned. Stangor and Lange's
model of stereotypes described in section 2.2, portrays the link between stereotype
label and stereotype characteristics in associative terms. Fazio (1986; 1989) has
suggested that the structure of attitudes might also be made up of associations. If
attitude beliefs cluster in associated networks of nodes, there may be no sense in
the idea that the consequent attitude can be thought of in terms of a good/bad
polarity.
Moreover, Eiser (1986) has argued that the theory of reasoned action's emphasis
on modal beliefs which on average predict intentions, may be problematic. He
points to the fact that while some modal beliefs may be commonly held by all
subjects within a study, these may be outweighed by personally salient beliefs. And
the difficulty is just that these personally salient beliefs will differ from one person
to the next. Thus, for example, voting behaviour might be well predicted bya
modal belief about whether the next government will draw the u.K. closer to
European union. It might be less well predicted by non-modal beliefs about
whether that government will withdraw the U'K. from the Common Agricultural
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policy. However, such beliefs will be highly personally salient for voters who earn
their living from agriculture and thus very important in predicting the voting
behaviour of farmers. For example, Van der Pligt, Eiser and Spears (1987) report
that in the context of expected consequences of nuclear power developments,
personally salient beliefs are better predictors of attitude than personally non-
salient beliefs. This becomes even more complex because people with different
attitudes will find different aspects of an attitude object to be salient (Budd, 1986).
Moreover, salience also arises in the transition from attitude to behaviour. Recent
research (Posavac, Sanbonmatsu and Fazio, 1997) has drawn attention to the fact
that the attitude-behaviour link is determined in part by the range of decision or
action options from which the eventual attitude-driven action may be drawn.
Posavac et al suggest that whether a behaviour turns out to be attitude consistent
depends, in part, on the salience of that action among the possible alternatives.
Differential salience among attitudes and behavioural options therefore represents a
complicating factor in the attitude-behaviour link and another feature which affects
this linkage is the question of attitude strength. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) suggest
that strong attitudes, defined as those which are resistant to change and are
persistent over time, are those which are most likely to be predictive of behaviour.
This definition has received empirical support. Zuwerink and Devine (1996), for
example, have demonstrated that, in connection with attitudes to allowing gay
people to enter the military, those whose attitudes were high in personal
importance proved more resistant to counter-attitudinal persuasive arguments.
However, Bassili (1996) points out that measures of attitude strength in recent
research have displayed a wide variety of understandings of the attitude strength
construct, and have included measurement of such different features as
accessibility, affective-cognitive consistency, importance and intensity. On the
other hand, in an attempt to cope with the diversity of possible definitions of
'attitude strength', Pomerantz, Chaiken and Tordesillas (1995) have argued, on the
basis of factor analytic studies, that the different aspects of attitude strength can be
represented by two factors: Embeddedness (the extent to which an attitude
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displays linkage with the individual's value system) and Commitment (the extent to
which the individual feels committed to upholding position implied by the attitude).
Another criticism of the theory of reasoned action stems from Bentler and
Speckart's consideration of past behaviour (1979). They devised a test of the
theory by looking at students' usage of alcohol, marijuana and 'hard drugs'. They
gathered information across a span of time and discovered that past behaviour had
an influence not only on intentions to behave in a certain way, but on behaviour
itself Moreover, attitudes also seemed to have a direct effect on behaviour
without being mediated by intention. In a similar vein, Fredericks and Dossett
(1983) found direct links between past behaviour and subsequent behaviour. It is
partly in response to findings about the importance of past behaviour that Ajzen
modified the original theory of reasoned action to account for previous experience
and controllability. The newer theory allows for the fact that people are aware of
differing levels of subjective ease associated with performing different actions. The
new theory, the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985), nevertheless retains
many of the features of the original theory. Behavioural prediction has been shown
to be improved (Madden, Ellen and Ajzen, 1992; McCaul, Sandgren, O'Neill and
Hinsz, 1993), although Bagozzi and Yi (1989) have found evidence that non-
volitional impulses could affect behaviour unmediated by intention.
It seems then, that neither the Eagly and Chaiken (1993) three-component
approach to attitudes nor Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of reasoned action (1975;
1980) represent complete explanations of the findings of current attitude research.
In particular, issues involving polarity, modality, salience and attitude strength
measurement are still to be completely resolved. However (with the possible
exception of Fazio's model) it does seem that there is a clear distinction to be
drawn between beliefs, on the one hand, and evaluations of those beliefs on the
other although their precise inter-relationship is not yet fully determined.
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The complexity of relationship between cognitive beliefs and evaluations has
recently been emphasised by Wilson, Hodges and Lafleur (1995). They point to
previous research (for example Johnson, MacArthur and Wright 1991, Wilson and
Craft, 1993) which demonstrates that when people start thinking about their
attitudes, sometimes those attitudes change. Wilson et al (1995) suggest that this
is because they review the original attitude on the basis of what they currently
remember about the attitude object and they may not remember everything which
determined their original attitude. As a consequence, when they begin to
concentrate on what they do remember about the attitude object, attitude change
can occur. Wilson et al (I995) also suggest that attitude change is more likely to
occur when remembered information is judged to be pertinent or relevant, and that
this is more likely to occur when attitudes are analysed rather than in cases of
simple information recall. In their study demonstrating this effect, Wilson et aI
showed that when people were asked to think about why they felt the way they did
about a target person this led to attitude change, with the direction of change
determined by how positive or negative the thoughts accessible in memory actually
were. They conclude that their findings support Miller and Tesser (1986, 1989)
who distinguished between the cognitive and affective components of attitudes and
suggested that thinking about reasons leads to bias in favour of cognition over
affect. So attitudes can be thought of as a mix of cognitive and evaluative
elements, although the precise relationship between those elements may depend on
the context in which consideration of the attitude becomes an issue.
2.4 Summary and conclusions
The goal set out at the start of this chapter was to identify a social psychological
perspective from which the social status of women artists and women's art might
fruitfully be viewed. The suggestion was that an understanding of this status could
be informed by an understanding of people's beliefs about women artists and their
work. In pursuit of such understanding, the present chapter set out to describe
how contemporary social psychology accounts for beliefs. It has been argued that
some beliefs can be construed as stereotypes. According to contemporary
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stereotype theory, stereotypical beliefs can be viewed as mental 'short-cuts' in
which the mere identification of someone in terms of a group categorisation label is
enough to 'trigger off' a set of associations which ascribe to the stereotype target a
set of traits and predicted behaviours. The actual processes involved in
stereotyping are, however, more complex than earlier theorists predicted. It is now
acknowledged that these processes may include excitation and inhibition at basic
levels, as well as assimilation and contrastive effects, together with estimations of
entitativity, at higher processing levels. There is also debate as to how 'automatic'
such processes are, and about the extent to which stereotypes are open to revision
by counter-stereotypical information.
Contemporary theory has also begun to establish a close linkage between
stereotypes and attitudes. Early attitude theory considered attitudes to be a
combination of cognitive and evaluative elements. However 'attitude-behaviour
mismatch' findings encouraged theorists to produce a more complex picture of the
attitude concept. The three-component view isolated affective, cognitive and
behavioural elements, which may be regarded as generating related but not
identical predictions. The uni-dimensional expectancy-value model typified by the
theory of reasoned action proposed that attitude studies must match levels of
generality of attitude and predicted behaviour to ensure predictability. Fihbein and
Ajzen (1975; 1980) also noted that attitude influences on actual behaviour are
mediated by social norms. Recent studies have questioned the theoretical
relevance of polarity and modality and have suggested that attitude measurement
and behavioural predictions are also affected by attitude strength and past
behaviour. Despite these theoretical difficulties, the claim that attitudes involve
belief and evaluation components is still retained in contemporary attitude theory.
This has led to an interest in the extent to which attitudes and stereotypes are
related, since stereotypes just are beliefs about groups of people.
In the context of the present study, this indicates that people can be assumed to
have developed stereotypical beliefs about women which may influence their
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attitudes towards women artists and their work. To address the question of where
these stereotypical beliefs come from, it is necessary to have a prior understanding
of why people, in general, hold the stereotypical beliefs which they do. The
question of where stereotypical beliefs come from is pursued in Chapter Three.
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ORIGINS OF THE STEREOTYPICAL BELIEF COMPONENT OF
ATTITUDES: GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL SOURCES
3.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter, it was argued that stereotypical beliefs can be thought of
as the cognitive component of attitudes. It follows that an explanation of attitudes
can be advanced in part by understanding how relevant stereotypical beliefs arise.
The social cognition programme, addressed in Chapter Two, has suggested that
the origin of stereotypes can, to some extent, be thought of in purely cognitive
terms, notably in the cognitive processes which make up the illusory correlation.
However Chapter Two also demonstrated that recent research on stereotypes has
shown that some stereotypes have a shared, collective aspect while others are
associated with individual makeup. In following this train of thought, the present
chapter explores two different routes through which people may come to acquire
stereotypical beliefs about the social world. The first route traces the influence of
social groups upon the individual and demonstrates how some stereotypes can be
seen as the outcome of acquiring a group-based social identity. The second route
examines how people may have a particular stereotyped view of the world which
results from a more individualistic property of the self: sex role stereotyping.
3.2 Stereotypes, Social Groups and Social Identity
It can be argued that individual human beings are socially constituted as a
consequence of the social groups to which they belong. Individuals appear unique
partly because each individual possesses a unique biography of group
memberships. Social groups can be characterised in a variety of ways that
highlight their similarities to and differences from other groups. Membership size,
group practices, beliefs and many other features may be compared. However it is
more useful to limit the number of significant dimensions thereby providing the
basis for a taxonomy of groups. In practice, social psychologists have tended to
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focus more on group size, group 'atmosphere', task structure and leadership
structure than on other dimensions (Hogg, 1992). One consequence of this
tradition in social psychology is that the study of group phenomena is dispersed
among relatively independent research topic areas that do not often communicate
readily with one another.
Hogg (1992) points out that research into cohesiveness, conformity, obedience,
leadership, prejudice, inter-group conflict, social identity, categorisation processes,
and stereotyping all deal with group processes, but there is only minimal
integration across these studies. In general, researchers often see themselves as,
for example, social cognition, inter-group relations, or small group processes
researchers rather than researchers whose study area is 'the group' per se.
Nevertheless, the influence of groups upon individual psychology is now a well-
established finding in social psychology and this finding owes much to experimental
research in small group functions.
In order to study social groups and their influence it is important to distinguish
groups from mere aggregates of individuals. There are many definitions of 'social
group' with each definition tending to reflect a particular emphasis. Johnson and
Johnson (1987), for example, identify a number of emphases which they build into
their own definition:
'a group is two or more individuals in face to face interaction each
aware of his or her membership in the group, each aware of the others
who belong to the group and each aware of their positive
interdependence as they strive to achieve mutual goals'
Johnson and Johnson (1987)
This type of characterisation is generally reserved for small face to face, short
lived, interactive, task orientated groups. 'Group processes' from this perspective
are sometimes equated to 'interpersonal processes among more than two people'.
Baron and Byrne (1991) have suggested that groups consist of two or more
individuals who share common goals, whose fates are interdependent, who have a
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stable relationship, and who recognise the group's existence. Baron and Byrne
claim that groups exert influence on their members by means such as roles, status,
norms, and cohesiveness. However, Myers (I993) points out that the distinction
between simple collective behaviour and group behaviour among interacting
individuals sometimes blurs. People who are merely in each other's presence do
sometimes influence one another. Triplett (I889) had shown that the mere
presence of others boosts performance on physical tasks. Subsequently, Allport
(1920) and Travis (1925) demonstrated that the presence of others improves the
performance of people not only on motor tasks but also on cognitive tasks such as
simple multiplication problems. This became known as the social-facilitation
effect. However, it should be noted that other studies conducted about the same
time revealed that the presence of others could have a disruptive or social-
inhibition effect. Dashiell (1935) and Pessin (1933) discovered that in that the
presence of others efficiency diminishes in tasks such as learning nonsense
syllables,completing a maze, and performing complex multiplicationproblems.
Zajonc, (1965) attempted to explain the phenomenon of social facilitation by
appeal to arousal theory. His suggestion was that, since arousal enhances
whatever response tendency is dominant, increased arousal enhances performance
on easy tasks for which the most likely 'dominant' response is the correct one.
Thus, people solve easy anagrams fastest when they are anxious. On complex
tasks (for which the correct answer is not dominant) increased arousal promotes
incorrect responding. Thus on harder anagrams people perform less well when
anxious. A variant of the arousal model is 'distraction-conflict' theory which
suggests that such arousal stems from a conflict between paying attention to others
and paying attention to the task at hand. The distraction-conflict approach seemed
to make sense of confusing results and was borne out by later experiments (Hunt
and Hillery, 1973; Michaels, Blommel, Brocato, Linkous and Rowe, 1982).
However, the distraction-conflict approach does not answer the question of what it
is about the presence of others.which causes arousal. One argument is that the
presence of others engenders evaluation apprehension.
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Evaluation apprehension is grounded in subjects' expectations about the potential
evaluation of their work. To demonstrate the effects of this form of apprehension,
Cottrell and associates (Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak and Rittle, 1968) added a third
condition to Zajonc and Sales's (1966) nonsense syllable study. They blindfolded
observers in this 'mere presence' condition and discovered that 'mere presence' did
not boost well practised responses. Other experiments confirmed Cottrell's
conclusion that the enhancement of dominant responses is strongest when people
think they are being evaluated. Evaluation apprehension also helps explain other
experimental findings such as: people perform best when their co-actor is slightly
superior (Seta, 1982); arousal may lessen when a high-status group is 'diluted' by
the addition of people whose opinions are not rated highly (Seta and Seta, 1992);
people who worry most about others' evaluations are the ones most affected by
their presence (Gastorf, Suls and Sanders, 1980; Geen and Gange, 1983); social
facilitation effects are greatest when the other co-actors are unfamiliar and hard to
'keep an eye on' (Guerin and Innes, 1982).
Although groups are more efficient in performing certain types of tasks such as
additive and compensatory tasks, individuals are more efficient in performing
disjunctive tasks. In some cases where groups might prove relatively efficient,
their output is hindered by social loafing - the tendency of some members to 'take it
easy' and let others do most of the work. Latane, Williams and Harkins (1979)
asked groups of subjects perform a simple task, the task being to shout or to clap
as loudly as they could. The subjects performed singly, or in pairs, or in groups of
up to six members. They were also blindfolded and wore earphones which played
shouting or clapping sounds and were, because of this, unable to determine the
contribution of others. The findings indicate that as group size increases,
individual effort decreases. The noise generated by six people shouting or clapping
together was less than three times that produced by a single person alone.
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There is evidence that this 'social loafing' also occurs in cognitive tasks. In one
study (Weldon and Gargano, 1988) subjects were asked to evaluate types of jobs.
In one condition, subjects were told they were the only evaluator. In another, they
were told they were one of 16 judges. Comparisons of cognitive effort expended,
as measured by amount of information used, showed that 'solo' subjects worked
significantly harder. Latane (1981) has argued that this effect can be seen in part
as an aspect of social impact. In social loafing studies, Latane identifies the
experimenter's instructions as the major source of social influence. If the subject
thinks that he or she alone is the receiver of instructions, then he or she takes the
full impact of these instructions. However, if the subject thinks that others are
involved, then the effect of the instructions on him or her is 'diffused' throughout
the 'group'. So subjects' efforts are influenced by the degree of impact on the
subject of the researchers instructions, and this impact is lessened when subjects
believe they are in a group. To support this notion Latane suggests the following.
In cases of social impact, there is a negative power function where as group size
continues to increase, the rate of decrease of influence on an individual diminishes.
This is a 'negatively accelerating' power function in that influence will decrease as
the number of the majority increases, but in a diminishing fashion:
Other researchers have tried to apply the same sorts of explanations for loafing as
have been used to explain facilitation and inhibition. Thus Harkins and Jackson
(l985) and Williams, Harkins and Latane (1981) have suggested that when people
do not feel as though their individual work is under scrutiny, evaluation
apprehension is lessened. Jackson and Harkins (1985) have also suggested that
people may employ an exchange or equity principle in group working. If, on the.
basis of previous interactions, the subject thinks that others are going to loaf then
the subject will reduce his or her effort to match the effort of others. Alternatively,
people may not merely loaf in order to approximate to others' relative
contributions, as might be suggested by exchange theory. Instead, in accord with
equity theory, they will perform a relatively sophisticated calculation of how much
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effort they should put into the group performance given the sort of outcome they
expect to receive, relative to others' inputs and outcomes.
Williams,Harkins and Latane (1981) point out that making an individual's efforts
identifiable is one important way to reduce loafing. Zaccaro (1984) has argued
that increasing group members' commitment to success reduces loafing and that
this effect can be amplified by group size. So, in conditions of high success
motivation, the larger the group size, the more a person may contribute. Szmanski
and Harkins (1987) have also suggested that enabling group members to evaluate
their own contributions, or the contributions of their own group relative to other
groups, decreases loafing. More recently, White, Kjelgaard and Harkins (1995)
have argued that self-evaluation is related to whether a task has clearly specified
goals. They suggest that the existence of goals offers the opportunity for task
performers to evaluate themselves against a 'desired' standard of performance,
although evaluation by others is still an important effect if the goal set is regarded
as too stringent.
What these studies of task performance show, then, is that the aggregation of
individuals, whether into a small group structure or some looser form of
collectivity, is a social phenomenon which has psychological impact on the task-
related behaviour of individuals involved. Moreover, other small groups studies
show that such psychological effects of group membership are not restricted to
task behaviour. It is an obvious social fact that within our society, many key
decisions are made, not by individuals,but by groups of people. A well established
finding is that as a result of their deliberations, such groups often demonstrate
'group polarisation': a tendency to shift toward more extreme views.
This discovery stems from Stoner (1961), who carried out a study of group
decision-making. He asked college students to play the role of advisers to
imaginary persons supposedly facing decisions between two alternatives. The first
alternative, while less attractive carried low levels of risk while the second
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alternative was more attractive but carried more risk. For example, subjects might
be asked to consider a character who had to choose between a low-paying but
secure job and a higher-paying but uncertain job. The procedure was that subjects
initially made decisions on an individual basis and then met in small groups to
discuss the problem until unanimous decision was reached. Stoner's finding was
that, in a large number of cases, the group decisions tended to be slightly more
risky than the decisions made by the members individually. This shift towards a
more risky decision state came to be called the 'risky shift'.
A number of subsequent studies seem to verify the 'risky shift' phenomenon.
However, Knox and Safford (1976), among others, seemed to demonstrate a
group shift towards caution. Therefore, the suggestion was made that the 'risky
shift' is merely an example of a more general phenomenon: the shift towards
polarisation. It appears that group discussion tends to make individuals more
extreme in their views - to enhance or strengthen their initial standpoint. So, if a
person is mildly in favour of a course of action, he or she will be more strongly in
favour of the action after discussion with the group. In much the same way, if he
or she is against the action at the outset: he or she will be more strongly against it
after discussion. Moreover, this polarisation effect occurs in situations other than
group estimates involving risk. Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) demonstrated that
the polarisation effect also occurred with a different judgement dimension - the
expression of attitudes. French secondary school students were asked to express
attitudes towards President De Gaulle and towards America. The statements were
such as: 'De Gaulle is too old to successfully carry out his difficult job' and
'American economic aid is always used to exert political pressure'. Having reached
an opinion individually, they then discussed the issues and formed a consensus.
Moscovici and Zavalloni's findings were that initially favourable responses to De
Gaulle became more favourable while initially negative attitudes towards
Americans became more negative through discussion. Additionally, a more
extreme judgement also held when the individuals were tested separately post-
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consensus. Thus it appears that, just as with risk-related decision-making,
formation of attitudes seems to be affected by group membership.
This brief survey of the empirical evidence on small groups demonstrates that being
in the presence of, or being a member of, small groups has a psychological impact
on people. This provides a first indication that being a member of a group may
influence people's beliefs. However, as far as stereotypical beliefs are concerned,
the full impact of group membership is only seen when the individual is considered
as a member of a group in relation to or in contrast with other groups to which the
individual does not belong. To pursue this theme, consideration is now given to
the importance of inter-group interactions in the formation and maintenance of
stereotypes.
The social psychology of inter-group interaction, and its impact on stereotype
formation, can be traced back to the 'Robber's Cave' study (Sherif, Harvey, White,
Hood and Sherif, 1961). In this study, twenty-two eleven and twelve year old
boys, randomly allocated to one or other of two groups, were taken to a remote
Boy Scout campsite to participate in a 3 week summer camp session. For the first
week of the session, the researchers prevented contact between the two groups and
members of each group took part in co-operative activities with the aim of
boosting group cohesion. At the beginning of the second week, contact between
the groups was initiated by camp staff and a number of inter-group competitions
such as baseball games and treasure hunts was then arranged. During this second-
week phase, the staff noted that members of the two groups began to insult and
tease members of the other group and to express negative stereotypical views of
the other group. Sherif et al (1961) explained this outcome in terms of
competition. They suggested that group members' inter-group attitudes and
behaviour reflected the real, objective interests of their group in comparison with
the other group. The perceived threat to one group's interests represented by the
other group engendered a negative perception of that other group. In this way,
inter-group competition engendered prejudicial stereotypes. Sherif also
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demonstrated that the adverse effects of group competition effects could be
altered. He engineered a third phase of his study in which the two groups were
required to co-operate together and demonstrated that inter-group cooperation
reduced negative stereotyping of one group's members by the other group.
Sherif's view of this 'Robber's Cave' experiment was that inter-group competition
over real goals strengthens relations within groups and disrupts them between
groups. Thus the creation of group-based stereotypes is explained in terms of
goal-based competition. However, Turner (1981) questions whether the
competition which produces these stereotyping effects is itself produced by conflict
over extrinsic goal states or interests. Some research findings, he argues, seem to
show that mere competitiveness, per se, is enough to produce these effects, even
where there are no real goals to be attained. Moreover, he also suggests that inter-
group co-operation may not, of itself, reduce hostility to out-group members.
Sherif et al suggested that super-ordinate goals, engendering inter-group co-
operation, should decrease out-group hostility. However, in the study by Sherif et
al study, the presence of super-ordinate goals was accompanied by large amounts
of social interaction between the two groups which possibly blurred group
boundaries. This, Turner suggests, allows for the possibility that if inter-group co-
operation is not accompanied with a certain level of social interaction, the hostility
will remain.
More importantly, a set of experiments carried out in the 1960s and 1970s (Tajfel,
1981) seem to suggest that stereotyping apparently arises in the absence of either
competition or co-operation. In an early study (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963), it was
shown that when subjects are presented with perceptual stimuli and encouraged to
think of them in terms of categories, they tended to accentuate the differences
between categories. The study required subjects to report the length of lines, each
of which differed in length from the other by a constant ratio. In a 'Classified' .
condition, the four shorter lines were labelled 'A' and the four longer lines, 'B'. The
results showed that this labelling caused subjects to accentuate differences between
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'A' and 'B' by exaggerating the difference in length between the longest of the 'A'
lines and the shortest of the 'B' lines. In subsequent discussions of categorisation,
Tajfel suggested that this form of distortion also operated when social categories
were being used and that the accentuation of inter-group differences effect and the
intra-group similarities effect underlay many of the features of stereotypes. Thus,
Tajfel's early perspective was that social categorisation naturally involves
accentuation effects which distort perception. A variety of later studies seemed to
support this idea. Wilder (1986), for example, reported that when assigned
arbitrarily to two groups, subjects reported that they expected in-group members'
opinions to be more like their own than the opinion of out-group members.
Similarly, Doise (1978) had revealed that children accentuate male/female
differences and intra-category similarities to a greater extent if they expect to be
asked to provide descriptions of both groups rather than a description of just one
group.
In his early work, then, Tajfel had already begun to develop an explanatory
framework, built around the social cognition of categorisation, which might explain
the development of group-based stereotypes in terms of group-based
categorisations. Tajfel's explanatory model was extended once he turned his
attention to the occurrence of stereotype-induced discrimination favouring the 'in-
group'. The evidence for this discrimination comes from Tajfel's 'minimal group'
studies. In one of these studies, Tajfel and colleagues (Tajfel, Flament, Billig and
Bundy, 1971) brought groups of schoolboys together to a lecture room and told
them they would be conducting a study of visual judgement. Four hundred and
nine slides, consisting of large numbers of dots, were then flashed on a screen
briefly, and subject wrote down estimates of the number of dots that appeared on
each screen. The boys were told that some people consistently overestimate and
some underestimate the number of dots. Each boy was then taken to a separate
room and told that he belonged either to the group of over-estimators or under-
estimators, the boys in fact being randomly allocated. They were allocated identity
codes to preserve anonymity. The boys were then asked to assign monetary
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rewards or penalties to the other participants. They were each given a booklet of
eighteen allocation matrices. Their task was to examine the pairs of payoffs and
allocate a number of points to each of the two people identified by code number
and group label. The decision maker never made decisions about himself and he
had no way of knowing the identity of the others referred to. It seems clear that
the fairest rule would be to allocate twelve and eleven repeatedly and when
allocating points to pairs of people who both came from the same group as himself,
that is what subjects did. However, where the pairs were made up of people from
the two different groups, the fairness rule was abandoned. Consistently, boys
assigned more points to the member of their own in-group. Indeed, using a variant
of this matrix, Tajfel and his colleagues were able to show that subjects were
willing to dis-benefit one of their own in-group members, in an absolute sense, if
thereby they were able to relatively benefit him in comparison with the out-group
member (Brown, 1986). Moreover, Billig and Tajfel (1973) showed that even
group membership was not required if subjects could be persuaded merely that
they are in some way similar to the people they are assessing. Subsequently,
Howard and Rothbart (1980) demonstrated that this preferential treatment was not
restricted to immediate judgements. In a study of stereotype recall, they showed
that the subjects from two randomized groups were equally accurate in
remembering favourable statements about in-group and out-group members.
However they were more accurate in remembering unfavourable statements about
out-group members than in-group members.
Thus it appears that prejudice is associated with people seeing themselves as
belonging to different groups. However, this appeal to group categorisation to
explain the group biases observed in the minimal group studies does not, of itself,
explain the systematic favouring of 'in-group' members rather than out-group
members. Tajfel and his colleagues' preliminary explanation (Tajfel, FJament, Billig
and Bundy, 1971) was that the boys viewed the experiments in terms ofa 'norm' of
competition. This has many similarities with Wilder's suggestion (1986) that
subjects are following a norm-based script of social interaction. However, Tajfel
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later rejected the idea of norms as unhelpful, since the same appeal to norms might
have been made if cases arose in which bias in favour of the out-group was
displayed, such as appeals to a 'norm' of generosity.
Eventually, Tajfel formulated a new theory of stereotypes and inter-group relations
which sought to build on his early notion of group categorisation and also
explained, in a non-circular fashion, group biases revealed in minimal and real
group settings. The approach which Tajfel (1972), and later Tajfel and Turner
(1986) developed was termed 'social identity theory'. Tajfel defined a social
identity as 'the individual's knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups
together with some emotional and value significance to him of the group
membership' (Tajfel, 1972). In part, the lessons of earlier studies of categorisation
were retained. When people are placed in a position of categorising themselves,
they tend to exhibit accentuation effects. That is, they exaggerate similarities
between themselves and other members of the group in which they have included
themselves, and exaggerate differences between that group and other groups.
However, Tajfel also took it to be axiomatic that people are predisposed to
evaluate themselves positively. From this it follows that, having identified oneself
with a group, one seeks to evaluate that group positively. This leads to the process
of forming a 'frame of reference' by means of which one's own group can be
compared with other, relevant groups (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and
Wetherell, 1987). The essential function of such comparison, in terms of the social
identity theory, it to allow for bolstering self esteem by distinguishing evaluatively
between the in-group and the out-group so that the in-group is viewed in a
relatively positive light. So from this perspective the explanation of in-group
favouritism rests on two complementary processes: social categorisation and
esteem-enhancing social comparison. Turner (1981) argues that the categorisation
process creates a stereotypical accentuation of similarities between self and other
in-group members and a perceived exaggeration of the differences between groups.
The social comparison process, due to its underlying motive to favour self through
the medium of in-group favouritism, selects the specific dimensions on which
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accentuation occurs. These will be dimensions on which the in-group is placed
more favourably than the out-group. The social comparison process is also
responsible for amplifyingthe relative superiority or favourability of the in-group
over the out-group - or maximisingthe evaluativelypositive distinctiveness of the
in-group.
In more recent developments (Hogg, 1992; Turner and Oakes, 1989; Oakes,
Haslam and Turner, 1994) social identity theory has been developed into self-
categorisation theory. However, social identity theory and self-categorisation
theory differ from one another at the levels of both theory and prediction. For
example, self-categorisation theory treats maximisation of inter-group differences
and intra-group similaritiesas related phenomena, and incorporates both in a ratio
termed the 'meta-contrast ratio'. Self-categorisation theory also introduces a
greater reliance on the idea that adoption of a social identity via self-categorisation
introduces a depersonalisation effect which produces group behaviour. At the
level of prediction, Ellemers, Spear and Doojse (1997), for example, suggest that
the two theories differ in predictions associated with low-status groups. Self
categorisation theory, with its emphasis on depersonalisation, suggests that
members of such groups are likely to retain their group membership. They may
deal with problems of low status by social creativity: adopting other forms of social
comparison that are more esteem enhancing. Social identity theory, on the other
hand, with its emphasis on esteem, would predict that members of low status
groups will seek, wherever possible, to become sociallymobile. However, despite
such differences, Hogg (1992) suggests that self-categorisation theory should be
thought of as 'differing from social identity theory more in emphasis than in
content'. Accordingly, for the rest of this chapter reference will be made solely to
social identity theory, although much of what is said in relation to that theory is
equally applicable to self-categorisation theory.
In terms of social identity theory, it is. now possible to explain the in-group
favouritism which emerges from the minimal group studies. In the relatively
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abstract and empty context of these experiments subjects construct meaning by
employing the social categorisations provided by the experimenters to locate self
with respect to others. The categorisation process renders each group perceptually
distinct from the other as well as reducing the perceived variation between
individuals within each group. To this extent, categorisation generates a
stereotyped view of both the in-group and the out-group, and a distribution of
individuals is transformed into two distinct groups. Within the minimal group
paradigm, social comparison occurs when the subjects use the booklets provided to
make point (or money) allocations, since this is the only readily available dimension
of inter-group comparison. The outcome is the maximisation of inter-group
differences in favour of the in-group. Positive distinctiveness is thus achieved.
Tajfel (1972) took pains to point out that the social identity theory explanation of
in-group favouritism in minimal group studies meant that discrimination is not an
automatic consequence of categorisation. Discrimination, if it arises, follows from
categorisation and comparison. It follows that discrimination is a feature not only
of viewing oneself as a member of a given group, but of developing some notion of
what it means to belong to that group, relative to belonging to some other group.
The accentuation of differences is biased in favour of the in-group because
individuals are deriving their social identity (in the transient context of the
experiment) from the social category which embraces the self Self-definition
activates a need to achieve or maintain a positive self-evaluation and this can be
accomplished by favouring the in-group (and hence the self) over the out-group:
that is, by engaging in in-group favouring social comparisons.
In recent research, this notion of in-group favouritism has itself been shown to be a
complex phenomenon. Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) separate out two distinct
notions. The first involves formation of a positive self-image, which is then
generalised to the in-group (self-anchoring). The second is a process of
differentiation in which people infer that out-group characteristics will be different
from in-group characteristics. Cadinu and Rothbart demonstrated that when
people are given information about one group and then asked to make judgements
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about another group, differences arise based on group membership. They identify
two cases. The first comprises 'in-group' judges: those subjects who were asked to
make a judgement about a group to which they were assigned, based on favourable
information" about the group to which they were not assigned. The second
comprises 'out-group' judges: those subjects who were asked to make a judgement
about a group to which they were not assigned, based on favourable information
about the group to which they were assigned. In-group judges tended to use self-
anchoring as a means of making judgements about the group for which no
information was given, and ignored information which was provided about the out-
group. Out-group judges, on the other hand, tended to employ differentiation
processes. They made judgements about the in-group, based on information which
they had received about the out-group, which assumed a difference would exist
between the two groups.
Social identity theory suggests, then, that cognitive processes of social
categorisation are inextricably linked with evaluative processes of social
comparison. According to Hogg and Abrams (1988), this mixture of cognitive and
evaluative processes is also the underlying basis for stereotyping. Stereotypes, in
the social identity view, serve in-group functions of rationalising the in-group's
treatment of the out-group. Furthermore, in-group members are expected to
employ negative stereotypes of the out-group in an attempt to differentiate their
group from other groups, that is, by making comparative social judgements that
benefit the in-group relative to the out-group. In this sense, the evaluative aspect
of stereotypes can be seen as a motivational force which influences social
judgements. This inter-weaving of 'pure' cognitive stereotypical elements and the
motivational aspect of self esteem has recently been empirically verified. Doojse,
Spears and Koomen (1995) point out that stereotype research has tended to
overlook the distinction between judging a particular information sample and then
generalising from that sample to the target group as a whole. They suggest that
this generalisation phase is affected, in part, by one's understanding of the
variability of the information sample. They also suggest that this cognitive effect
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interacts with the motivational, self esteem protective aspects of stereotypes. To
this extent, they suggest that the motivational and cognitive aspects of stereotype
theory should be regarded as complementary, rather than as competitive. In a
study of seventy-two university students, the authors demonstrated that subjects
generalised from sample information, if that information was in-group favourable,
both when the sample was described as homogenous and when the sample was
described as heterogenous. However, generalisation of in-group unfavourable
information only occurred if the sample was described as homogenous. When the
sample was described as heterogenous, subjects displayed a weaker tendency to
generalise from the in-group unfavourable sample information. Doojse et al (1995)
conclude that the motivational aspects of stereotypes interact with cognitive
aspects of the stereotyping process.
The view of stereotyping based on social identity suggests that an individual may
subscribe to certain stereotypes, not necessarily to justify some personal conduct
or social position, but as a way of defending the actions of others with whom he or
she shares a social identification. Thus people could possess stereotypes of groups
whom they personally have never encountered, but whom other members of their
group had encountered. Additionally, social identity theory's emphasis on
competition between groups helps to explain why two disadvantaged groups
would promulgate negative stereotypes of one another. Although neither group
could be said to occupy a privileged position in need of defence or justification,
both groups may make psychological gains by comparing themselves favourably to
another group similar in status. Hogg and Abrams (1988) argue that social identity
theory's account of the psychological benefits which accrue from group-based
stereotyping also helps to explain why stereotype contents are uniform in
character. The shared-ness of stereotypes is due to social conformity with group
norms. In other words, social identity theory states that stereotypes are consensual
because all members of the social group are expected to follow them so as to
establish collective justifications for inter-group behaviour.
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If social identity theory is correct, where two social categorisations cut across each
other, discrimination may be reduced. For example, Deschamps and Doise (1978)
found that that two simple categorisations, male/female and youth/adult, led to
stereotypical attributions of traits. However, they also found that when these two
categorisations were present together, stereotypical discrimination was reduced.
When one categorisation was crossed with or intersected by the other, the
perception of differences arising out of the male/female categorisation tended to
be balanced by a perception of similarities arising out of the youth/adult
categorisation. Somewhat more deterministically, Deschamps (1984) concludes
that 'crossed category membership can thus effectively neutralise the differentiation
(arising between groups)'. This phenomenon could be attributable to a conflict
between incompatible structures or more simply to altered salience. When a
person has to focus on two separate dimensions of categorisation the amount of
processing distinctly relevant to each is likely to be diminished. Similar effects are
reported by Brown (1986) and Hagendoorn and Henke (1991).
While minimal group studies deal with groups which, by definition and intention,
do not possess many of the qualities of social categories in the real world, similar
effects have been noted among real-life groups. For example, Judd, Park, Ryan,
Bauer and Kraus (1995) refer to two established findings in stereotype research:
perceived out-group homogeneity and ethnocentrism. They point out that these
findings are based, in the main, on laboratory studies of 'safe' groups as opposed to
groups that have a long history of conflict and whose group loyalties are strong. In
their questionnaire study, the authors had predicted that they would find perceived
out-group homogeneity and ethnocentrism effects to be accentuated when matters
of group conflict and strong loyalties were salient. However, they discovered, in
looking at White American and African American groups that while the
accentuated stereotypical effects were noted in African American responses, they
were not present in White American responses. The authors' conclusions were that
the stereotypical effects arose from socialisation effects, and they conjectured
54
Chapter Three
differential socialisation patterns explained the disparity in findings across the two
groups.
Real world groups also differ from minimal groups in that there are often status,
power and prestige differences between groups which can be perceived to be
legitimate, stable and immutable to varying degrees. These and a range of other
factors must have some impact on the form and content of inter-group behaviour
and should therefore be theoretically incorporated to furnish an adequate
explanation of inter-group behaviour. This is precisely what the social identity
theory does in its macro-social emphasis (Tajfel and Turner 1979~ Taylor and
McKirnan 1984). Social identity theory treats categorisation and social
comparison as psychological processes which provide the parameters within which
socio-historical factors or, more accurately, subjective understanding of those
factors operate. Tajfel distinguished between inter-group comparisons which
occur in a fixed, consensually legitimate and stable framework and inter-group
comparisons which arise when there is dissent: a distinction between secure and
insecure comparisons (Tajfel 1974). When groups agree about each other's status
there is little pressure to alter the status quo. However, when groups disagree
about each other's status there is pressure for change. It follows that whether
people strive to maintain or to change their social identity, this is influenced by the
extent to which they perceive the existing inter-group framework as legitimate.
Social identity theorists suggest that in the case of low status groups, people may
attempt to alter their social status by leaving the group to which they currently
belong (Ellemers, 1993). Adoption of a social mobility strategy by leaving the
group will be determined in part by the extent to which such people have a social
mobility belief system: the belief that inter-group boundaries are permeable and
that it is possible to move between groups. In some cases, boundary permeability
depends on whether a group can exert pressure on their members in order to
prevent them from leaving. For example, people seeking to leave a social group, if
unsuccessful, may face marginalisation by other group members (Breakwell 1979).
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In other cases, boundary permeability is reduced because group membership is
externally ·designated by attributes such as age or gender.
It has been pointed out that a mobility strategy may improve one's personal
position but it leaves one's group's position unchanged, and this, therefore,
involves a degree of dis-identification with the original group (Milner 1981).
However, the precise relationship between social mobility, boundary permeability
and dis-identification is not simple. The alternative to social mobility is to adopt a
strategy of social creativity which re-defines inter-group relations along different
dimensions to improve in-group esteem. Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish and Hodge
(1996) demonstrate that choice of social mobility over social creativity does not
always depend on the extent to which subjects believe that group boundaries are
'permeable'. Jackson et al (1996) conjecture that choosing to remain within a low
status group may be due to the fact that boundary permeability implies temporary,
rather than permanent, group membership. Consequently, the pressure to escape
membership of low status but boundary-permeable groups is lessened. Karasawa
(1995) has argued that the impact of belonging to a low status group is also
mediated by the group member's level of identification with the group. In a similar
fashion, Ellemers, Spears and Doojse (1997) show that low identifiers tend to view
their own group as less homogenous than do high identifiers.
There is also evidence to suggest that real-world group categorisations may have
more generalised effects, independent of questions of status and mobility. Kunda,
Sinclair and Griffin (1997) note that the content of stereotypes is reliant on traits.
They point out, however, that traits merely represent summary statements of
behaviour and thereby mask various possible behavioural manifestations of the
trait. They also suggest that any given trait may imply different forms of behaviour
when applied to different groups. This means that the same trait may form part of
different stereotypes and that fundamentally the stereotype 'drives' the trait. For
example, 'aggression' may be a trait common to the stereotypes of courtroom
lawyers and professional boxers. However, the trait 'aggression' driven by the
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stereotype 'courtroom lawyer' as opposed to the stereotype 'professional boxer'
sets up different expectations for behaviour. Kunda et aI's (1997) claim is that
stereotype-driven construal of traits is best explained by a parallel-constraint-
satisfaction model of impression formation as opposed to other models more
commonly used by psychologists.
Earlier models of impression formation see cognitive processes as working serially.
By contrast, the parallel-constraint-satisfaction model of impression formation
pictures cognitive processes working simultaneously and constraining each other.
The earlier models were based on a notion that all associations are excitatory. The
parallel-constraint-satisfaction model is based on a notion that associations can be
inhibitory as well as excitatory. The parallel-constraint-satisfaction model
therefore assumes that while any given trait has a whole range of associations only
certain of these are activated on anyone occasion. Thus the meaning of the trait
varies from one occasion to another. This occurs because the sub-set of
associations activated on any given occasion is influenced by matters such as
context, prior activation and priming of related concepts. Kunda et al (1997)
tested the hypothesis that stereotypes affect the meaning of traits by asking
subjects to describe behaviours that would exemplify specific traits in named
occupational groups such as 'car salesmen' and 'actors'. They concluded that
stereotypes do influence the meaning of traits to a certain extent and that this
stereotypical 'reading' of a trait persists even if extra information is provided which
apparently undermines the stereotype.
Ruttenberg, Zea and Sigelman (1996) have also questioned the extent to which
findings from the minimal group paradigm extend to real world group interaction.
They argue that if there is a link between in-group esteem and bias towards the
out-group, then prejudice should be stronger among those whose in-groups
demonstrate high collective self-esteem than for those with low collective self-
esteem. However, in a study comparing the views of Jewish and Arab students,
Ruttenberg et at (1996) discovered that Arab students displayed low levels of
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collective self-esteem and yet also displayed high levels of prejudice against the
out-group. Other authors have pointed out that out-group bias can be mediated by
other effects. Among these are the questions of whether encounters with out-
groups are 'collective rather than individual, and whether the encounter involves
conflict or not (Abrams, 1985; Oakes, 1987). Chiasson, Charbonneau and Proulx
(1996) have also shown that perceived similarity between self and an out-group
individual also moderates out-group bias.
In summary, what the study of the social psychology of groups reveals is that
group membership influences both behaviour and judgement. When group
membership is combined with inter-group interaction, the outcome is often the
formation of stereotypes which can give rise to biased judgements which favour the
in-group. One important explanation of this effect, social identity theory, derives
from Tajfel's work on categorisation and comparison. When people think of
themselves as members of an in-group (relative to an out-group) they tend to
accentuate inter-group differences and minimise intra-group similarities. At the
same time, they tend to compare the two groups along a dimension or dimensions
in such a way that the in-group is seen in a more favourable light than the out-
group. Although early findings were based on laboratory experiments such as the
minimal group paradigm, later studies have demonstrated that similar effects arise
among real-world groups, although it appears that a range of other factors play an
important role in deciding whether out-group bias will arise. So according to
social identity theory's account of stereotypes, stereotyped thought can largely be
understood as a natural phenomenon which arises out of the categorisation
processes associated with the formation of social groups, taken together with the
axiomatic assumption that we are motivated to seek self-esteem enhancement.
People think of themselves in terms of group memberships, and strive to preserve
self-esteem by positively evaluating their own groups at the expense of others
(although this may be mediated by other factors). What this means is that under.
normal circumstances people adopt stereotyped ways of thinking which, on the one
hand, allow them to preserve a positive view of their fellow group members and,
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on the other hand, allow them to maintain a relatively negative view of the
members of other, relevant groups.
So, from the perspective of social identity theory, membership of social groups
may affect the stereotypical beliefs which people have about women in general and
women artists in particular. However, stereotypes which result from group
membership are not the only stereotyping influences which may affect an
individual's beliefs. Social identity theory claims that the self is made up of two
parts: a social identity and a personal identity. Social identities derive from group
memberships as described in this section. Personal identity derives from one's
unique history of socialisation (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Simon, Pantaleo and
Mummendey, 1995; Reid and Deaux, 1996). In terms of understanding how
people view women artists and their work, it seems likely that any aspect of
personal identity which is associated with stereotypical views of women is likely to
represent a further explanatory factor. For this reason, the following section
explains the way in which people may be said to possess a personal identity-based,
stereotyped view of gender, irrespective of their social group memberships.
3.3 Gender and the Gender Schema
In order to analyse the idea of a personal identity-based, stereotyped view of
gender, this section begins with a series of inter-related definitions of terms and
concepts associated with gender. It then moves on to consider gender, identity and
the role of society. Two perspectives on measuring masculinity and femininity are
then discussed: Bern (1974; 1981b) and Spence and Helmreich (1974; 1981). The
conclusion drawn is that within a study of beliefs about women artists and their
work, Bern's Sex Role Inventory represents an appropriate tool for measuring
whether people are sex-typed. The claim will then be made that the sex-typed
individual has a personal identity-based, stereotyped view of gender.
Definitions of terms. Cook (1985) considers sex and gender by isolating concepts
most closely related to physiological structure. 'Sex' or 'gender' is that physical
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aspect of an individual which is determined by chromosomal makeup. The labels
'male' or female' which are ascribed at birth are usually in accord with this
chromosomal property. Related to these labels is a person's sense of 'gender-
identity': the sense of self as a gendered (male or female) person. In contrast with
the narrower notions of 'male' and 'female', masculinity and femininity are
stereotyped constructs which derive from society's views about the traits and
attributes which are characteristic of males and females. Sex-typing is a social
process through which individuals come to acquire, and learn to value, the
property of being either 'masculine' or 'feminine'. If an individual acquires
masculine or feminine characteristics which are stereotypically associated with his
or her gender, then that person is described as sex-typed. The set of gender-
stereotypical characteristics which the individual thereby acquires is sometimes
referred to as a 'sex-role'. For this reason, the stereotypical characteristics of
masculinity and femininity which are associated with being male and female are
sometimes referred to as 'sex-role stereotypes'. If the individual does not acquire
masculine or feminine characteristics which are stereotypically associated with his
or her gender, then that person is described as non-sex-typed". It follows from this
that 'gender-identity' can be read either in the narrow sense, as referring to sense of
self as male or female, or in a broader sense, as referring to one's sex-role
stereotypical identity in terms of being masculine or feminine. (*It should also be noted that if
an individual acquires masculine or feminine characteristics which are not stereotypically associated with his or her gender, then
that penon is described as cross-sex-typed.)
Archer and Lloyd (1985) have analysed the content of gender stereotypes and
identify two sets of characteristics which have been stereotypically associated with
masculinity and femininity. Masculinity characteristics, sometimes termed
'instrumentallagentic', include goal orientation, assertive activity, self-development
and separations from others. Femininity characteristics, sometimes termed
'expressive/communal', include sensitivity, emotionality, selflessness, and
interrelationships. These 'positive' characteristics are widely considered to be
typical and/or desirable for the relevant sex to possess. 'Negative' characteristics
have also been identified. For masculinity, these negative characteristics include
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being emotionally inexpressive and unskilled in interactions with others, while for
femininity they include being passive and dependent. In Chapter Two it was noted
that stereotypes may involve beliefs about behaviours, occupations and physical
appearance as well as traits. Deaux and Lewis (1984) suggest that the content of
stereotypes comprises four independent components: traits, behaviours, physical
characteristics and occupations. Irrespective of the independent status of these
components, in social life people extend knowledge about one component to the
other three, with knowledge about physical appearance being especially important
(Brannon, 1996).
Within studies of gender, stereotyping influences are sometimes referred to as
'gender schemata', most notably in the work ofBem (1974; 1981b). Following
Bartlett (1932), and more recently Fiske and Taylor (1984), a schema can be
described as representing organised knowledge based on cultural experience rather
than on an abstract relation between cause and effect. A schema functions as an
anticipatory structure: a readiness to search for and to assimilate incoming
information in schema-relevant terms. Schematic processing, like stereotypical
processing, is therefore highly selective. Schema theory construes perception as a
constructive process: what is perceived is a product of the interaction between the
incoming information and the perceiver's pre-existing schema. The readiness with
which an individual evokes one schema rather than another is referred to the
'cognitive availability' of the schema. As with stereotype theory, the emphasis in
schema theory is on the active construction of reality, rather than mere passive
observation of it (Fiske and Taylor, 1984).
Fiske and Taylor (1984) identify four major types of schemata: person schemata
(the person's view of others in terms of psychological properties such as traits and
goals), self schemata (the information one believes oneself to have abut one's own
psychology), role schemata (beliefs about the appropriate norms and behaviour for
people in differing broad social' categories based on features such as sex and age)
and event schemata (a person's understanding of a given social event, based on
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experiencing the sequencing of events in similar social events in the past). Fiske
and Taylor (1984) suggest that the third of these, role schemata, have 'clear
affective and behavioural consequences'. In this respect, they argue, role schemata
'explain much of the way social stereotypes function.' More recently, Fiske (I995)
has suggested that role schemata just are stereotypes. Accordingly, in this study of
stereotypical beliefs about women artists and their work, no distinction is made
here between gender schemata and sex-role stereotypes.
Gender, identity and the role of society. Eagly (1983) has emphasised the
distinction between gender identity as a physiological phenomenon and sex-role
identity as a social phenomenon by arguing that sex-role identity has a purely social
origin, resulting from the segregation of women and men into different occupations
and social roles. She claims that there are few actual sex differences and yet there
is a large difference between the masculine and feminine stereotypes. She explains
this apparent contradiction by locating the source of sex-role stereotypes in social
life (Eagly, 1983; Eagly and Steffen, 1984; Eagly and Kite, 1987). Hinde (1987)
even suggests that there may be advantages to both sexes in having a social
organisation which exaggerates the perceived differences between the sexes.
On the other hand, it has been also argued that even in the case of sex-role
stereotypes, not all stereotype differences between what is held to be masculine
and feminine are merely cultural manifestations. For example, a study of gender-
related stereotyping in thirty nations reports considerable cross-cultural uniformity
in the assignment of traits by gender (WilJiams and Best, 1982). This occurs
irrespective of differences in societal structures. Moreover, Hewstone and Antaki
(1988) argue that men and women must be expected to have differing cognitive
models of society because differences in social behaviour may reflect in part sex
differences in biological propensities. Williams and Best (1982) suggest that it may
be most accurate to suppose that, within each society's socialisation practices,
values and myths will interact with environmental and other more objective factors:
for example, societies with a female deity tend to have a more favourable female
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stereotype than those without. This suggests that, even if there is some objective,
non-social 'kernel' to sex-role stereotypes, much of their nature is still determined
at the purely social level.
Although there is some debate about the extent to which sex-role stereotypes, or
gender schemata, are purely social phenomena, it seems reasonable to suppose that
there are social influences which at least partly determine the way we think about
the gender of ourselves and others. One of the most influential accounts of gender
schematic processing is that offered by Bern (1981b). Bern, in common with other
researchers (e.g. Banaji and Prentice, 1994) has speculated that the prevalence of
gender-based schematic processing may be partly explained by the fact that sex has
evolved to be a basic category of perception for our species and that the gender
schema thereby has a biologically based priority over other schemata. Thus social
and biological factors render the gender schema 'cognitively available'. However,
since not everyone becomes equally sex typed, individual differences presumably
derive from the extent to which one's particular socialisation history has stressed
the functional importance of the gender dichotomy.
Measuring masculinity and femininity. A number of methods have been devised
for measuring the influence of societal constructs on gender identity. Among
these, Bern's Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) and Spence and Helmreich's Personal
Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ) have proved particularly influential (Bern, 1974;
Spence, Helmreich and Stapp, 1974). The first stage of construction of the Bern
Sex-Role Inventory BSRI (Bern 1974) incorporated an investigation of sex-role
stereotypes which largely confirmed the pattern of beliefs described by Braverman,
Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, and Rosencrantz (1972). The BSRI comprises two
scales: one which measures masculinity and one which measures femininity. If a
male subject scores high on masculinity and low on femininity then he is described
as sex-typed. Similarly, if a female subject scores Iowan masculinity and high on
femininity then she is likewise described as sex-typed. If a 'subject scores high or
Iowan both scales, then he or she is described as androgynous or undifferentiated.
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Thus, measurement on the two BSRI scales produces four distinct categories:
masculine, feminine, androgynous and undifferentiated. Bern conceives of sex-
typing as a particular pattern of schematic thought which endows the individual
with a stereotyped way of thinking about the world: if an individual is relatively
strongly sex-typed, then he or she is prone to understanding the social world in a
gender-schematic way as comprising two sorts of people, the masculine and the
feminine:
It is important to note that gender schema theory is a theory of
process, not content .... It is the process of partitioning the world into
two equivalence classes on the basis of the gender schema, not the
contents of the equivalence classes, that is central to the theory.
Accordingly, sex-typed individuals are seen as differing from other
individuals not primarily in terms of how much masculinity or
femininity they poses, but in terms of whether or not their self concepts
and behaviours are organised on the basis of gender.'
Bern, 1981b
In 1974, Spence, Helmreich and Stapp developed the PAQ, based on a set of
adjectives stereotypically associated with men and women. It was assumed that
adjectives representing consistent stereotypes about sex differences would also be
adjectives that could indicate actual differences between the sexes. Spence and
Helmreich (1979) depicted such adjectives as identifying personality traits which
could then be used to study the nature of masculinity and femininity. According to
Spence and Helmreich (1985), the best way to conceptualise gender-oriented
influences on the self is to conceive of gender identity, understood in terms of
sense of self as masculine or feminine, as a basic property of personality which is
akin to, though not identical with, gender identity understood in terms of sense of
self as physiologically male or female'
'I proposed, however, that masculinity and femininity, as they refer to
an individual's self-concept, be retained and' re-conceptualised as
gender identity: a basic phenomenological sense of one's maleness or
femaleness that parallels awareness and acceptance of one's biological
sex and is established early in life' Spence, 1985
Spence and Helmreich (Spence and Helmreich, 1981; Spence, 1985) have pointed
out that according to Bern, sex-typing is a single continuum from very strong sex-
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typing through very weak sex-typing to none at all. But, they argue, Bern also says
that Masculinity and Femininity are orthogonal dimensions. So their complaint is
that the very same BSRI scores are thus supposed to do two incompatible jobs:
place an individual on a single, sex typing continuum, and place an individual on
two separate, 'masculinity' and 'femininity' dimensions. Moreover, they argue,
assessment of empirical evidence suggests that the BSRI and other similar
instruments measure primarily self-images of instrumental and expressive
personality traits and that these trait clusters show little or no relationship to global
self-images of masculinity and femininity or to uni-dimensional constructs such as
the tendency to utilise gender schemata.
Bern's response (Bern, 1981) is that Spence and Helmreich's (1981) critique is
based on a misunderstanding. According to Bern, the BSRI is only meant to
identify masculine men and feminine women, i.e. people who are strongly sex-
typed, and androgynous and undifferentiated people, i.e. people who are not
strongly sex-typed. Bern (1981 b) argues that there is nothing inherently
contradictory in using a measurement which comprises two separate scales to
measure an underlying uni-dimensional construct. Bern denies that the BSRI
merely 'taps' instrumental and expressive traits and claims instead that the BSRI
'taps different things for different people'. For non sex-typed individuals the BSRI
may well tap instrumental and expressive traits while for sex-typed individuals the
BSRI taps gender-schematic responses. Thus, when non sex-typed individuals
describe themselves as, for example, dominant or nurturant, this need not imply
gender schematic concepts of masculinity or femininity. However, when sex-typed
individuals describe themselves as dominant or nurturant it does imply gender
schematising. According to Bern, the only function of the BSRI within research on
gender schema theory: is to identify sex typed individuals. Once sex-typed
individuals have been identified, it is then possible to test the theory that sex typed
individuals are more likely than non sex-typed individuals to engage in gender
schematic processing. Fundamental to Bern's arguments is the assertion that the
BSRI does not measure gender schematic processing. Rather, it is a tool for
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identifying people who should, according to the theory, be engaged in gender
schematic processing.
As further evidence against gender schema theory, Spence and Helmreich (1981)
refer to the finding that sex typed individuals have not consistently been found to
have more traditional attitudes about the roles of men and women than non sex
typed individuals. But Bern (1981 b) claims that Spence and Helmreich fail to
appreciate that salient social attitudes are more a function of social psychological
variables than of personality variables.
Spence and Helmreich were not the only theorists to raised concerns about the
BSRI. Leaper (1995) has suggested that 'masculine' and 'feminine' may not have
the same connotations as the personality traits that are stereotypically associated
with them. He notes that self-reportage on masculinity/femininity scales revealed
that men acknowledge their possession of 'feminine/socio-emotional traits' and
women similarly acknowledge 'masculine/instrumental traits'. Additionally, he
claims that within-gender variation in self reportage may be more marked than
across-gender variation. Furthermore, he points out that there is considerable
inconsistency in connotations of masculine and feminine with psychological
meanings possibly conflicting with physical and sociological meanings. For
example, people who express a liking for a gentle man may not express a liking for
'a feminine man' and people who like an assertive man may not express a liking for
'a masculine man'. Leaper's (1995) study attempted to discover whether people
would react differently to the terms 'masculinity' and 'femininity' than they would to
personality attributes typically associated with each of these. In the study, male
and female college undergraduate students were asked to rate their liking of
hypothetical women and men on the basis of descriptors which included both
instrumental and socio-emotional adjectives. The expectation was that subjects
would rate characters described as masculine differently than those described with
instrumental traits and that, similarly, subjects would rate 'feminine' characters
differently than those identified by socio-emotional traits.
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Leaper's (1995) study used Byrne's 7 point liking scale and subjects were asked to
rate 45 male and 45 female targets each described by a single adjective. The
adjectives drawn from the BSRI and the PAQ were instrumental, socio-emotional
and neutral. One of the key findings was that both men and women considered 'a
masculine woman' and 'a feminine man' the least liked of the hypothetical
characters. Both men and women demonstrated a preference for hypothetical
women described by instrumental adjectives. There was little difference in the
.ratings for male characters. Women subjects demonstrated more of a preference
for non-traditional targets than men and Leaper points out that research evidence
from other studies suggests that women are more likely to prefer andlor accept
androgynous individuals than men are. Additionally, 'an affectionate man' and 'an
independent women' were among the characters most liked by women and least
liked by men subjects. On the other hand 'a feminine woman' was highly rated by
men but not by women. Leaper claims that the findings support the notion among
laypersons that the terms 'feminine' and 'masculine' are not always equated with
socio-emotional and instrumental terms respectively. Instead, subjects'
interpretations of these terms may reflect social constructions of gender. The
study therefore points to an important distinction between gender-stereotype labels
and the characteristics with which they are usually taken to be associated.
However, Leaper (1995) does point out that Bern herself has observed that
gender-schema theory implies that behavioural traits should be described as human
attributes rather than as feminine or masculine attributes.
At the more basic level of cognitive processing, Rubble and Stagnor (1986) have
argued that it remains unclear as to how schemata actually function in social
information processing. They do, however, suggest that their review of literature
on developmental and social-psychological gender schematic processing provides
one firm conclusion: people's responses to information are affected by the
information's relation to gender. They also agree that when information is 'gender
relevant' (either in terms of consistency or inconsistency) it is both processed and
remembered more readily than information which is not 'gender relevant'- and that
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this not only supports a fundamental proposition of schema theories but also the
results of studies on gender schematic processing.
What the foregoing suggests, then, is that gender schematic or sex-role
stereotypical processes are an important determinant of the way people think.
Opinion is divided about how best to conceptualise the influence of gender on
individuals. Spence and Helreich have argued for a stable personality trait which is
akin to gender identity understood as sense of self as male or female. Bern, on the
other hand, has proposed the view that people employ stereotypical modes of
thought when considering gender related issues. Partly in response to this latter
debate, Bern has amended her original standpoint by taking into account the
importance of the non-sex-typed individual, whether androgynous or
undifferentiated. However, these changes aside, Bern's analysis of the impact of
gender stereotypical thought seems as well supported by available evidence as
those of her critics. Moreover Bern argues that gender stereotypes represent, at
least in part, a means of predicting social attitudes, although this stereotypical
effect may be mediated by group-membership stereotypical effects (Bern, 1981).
Spence, on the other hand, admits that the gender-identity construct measured by
the PAQ is less likely to be predictably related to attitudes and behaviours.
For these reasons, the suggestion here is that within a study of beliefs about
women artists and their work, Bern's Sex Role Inventory represents an appropriate
tool for measuring whether people are sex-typed. According to Frable (1989), the
Bern Sex Role Inventory measures a facet of the individual's gender psychology.
Moreover, in their influential paper on the structure of stereotypes, Stangor and
Lange (1994) identify Bern's gender-schema as an example of an individualistic
influence on stereotypical thought. It is therefore also suggested that the sex-typed
individual, on the basis of personal identity, holds stereotyped beliefs about gender.
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3.4 Summary and Conclusion
The previous chapters have made the case for understanding people's beliefs about
women artists and women's art in terms of social psychology. It has been argued
that these beliefs arise out of stereotypes which have two sources: social identity
and personal identity. The idea that some stereotypes have an origin in social
identity was traced back to early studies in small group effects. These studies
demonstrated that when people act within a group their actions are influenced by
the group. It was then suggested that, when the broader notion of inter-group
interaction is considered, people can be seen to display group-based
categorisations of the self- and others which influence how they view themselves
and others. In particular, the social identity perspective highlights the way that
individuals develop stereotypical ways of thinking about in-group and out-group
members. It was noted, however, that the actual processes associated with in-
group favouritism and generalisation from samples to whole groups are more
complex than early versions of social identity theory allowed for. Moreover, the
move from laboratory-based studies to real-world groups involved consideration of
a number of complicating factors such as the influence of power and status, real
world knowledge and real-world expectations of group membership permanence or
non-permanence. The general conclusion drawn, however, was that at least some
forms of stereotypical thinking are rooted in social group membership.
Social identity theory assumes that our understanding of stereotypes includes both
social identity and personal identity. In the present context it was noted that
aspects of personal identity which influence thinking about gender-related issues
are likely to be particularly important. Although there is debate between Bern and
Spence and Helmreich over how best to characterise gender influences on thought
and action, it was concluded that Bemis gender-schema approach was an
appropriate perspective to adopt in the present study. Bemis argument is that sex-
typed individuals view the social world in gender stereotypical terms.
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There are, therefore, two distinct sources of stereotypical beliefs: social identity
and personal identity. What this means is that an understanding of people's beliefs
about women artists and their work requires an analysis of the extent to which
those beliefs are influenced by social identity and personal identity. It is this task
which is pursued in Chapter Four.
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A SURVEY OF STEREOTYPICAL BELIEFS ABOUT WOMEN
ARTISTS AND WOMEN'S ART
4.1 Introduction
Chapters Two and Three have focused exclusively on social psychological theories.
Chapter Two argued that stereotypes and attitudes are related, in that stereotypical
beliefs just are the cognitive component of attitudes. However, it was mentioned
that attitudes, as distinct from stereotypes, apply not only to groups of people but
also to other social phenomena. It was then argued, in Chapter Three, that
stereotypical beliefs have two sources: social identity and personal identity. The
contents of Chapters Two and Three, taken together, act as a foundation for the
present chapter whose task is to examine these theoretical insights against
empirical data generated by a survey of beliefs about women artists and women's
art. The prediction here is that people's views on women artists, and the belief
component of their attitudes towards women's art, are influenced by stereotypical
beliefs about women. Specifically, it is predicted that the origins of these
stereotypical beliefs will be seen to lie both in social identity and in personal
identity.
In order to test this prediction, it is necessary to gather views on women artists and
women's art whilst manipulating social identity and personal identity variables.
The analytic survey is suited to this purpose. Analytic surveys, according to
Oppenheim (1992), 'mimic' the laboratory experiment in that they find associations
and explanations, are oriented towards hypotheses and utilise 'independent' and
'dependent' variables. The survey discussed here looks for associations among
social and personal identity and beliefs about women artists and women's art. It
encapsulates the hypothesis that' social 'and personal identity causally influence
these beliefs in a stereotypical fashion. Within this survey, three stereotyping
factors: gender, feminism and sex-role categorisation, represent the independent
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variables while belief statements about women artists and women's art represent
the dependent variables.
4.2 The Survey Instrument
Development. The survey instrument (see Appendix I), designed around general
themes associated with women artists and women's art, was developed over a
number of stages. These general themes, and their associated sub-themes, were
derived, in part, from the observations of the art theorists and art historians
discussed in Chapter One and from the content of semi-structured, exploratory
discussions with six arts professionals. For example, the general theme of
'inclusion' incorporates three distinct sub-themes: collectivity, exclusivity and
generality. Discussions with arts professionals had revealed that some people view
women's art as something which should attempt to speak to or include all women
in a 'collective' sense. However, some other arts professionals had expressed fears
that the collective feature of women's art might prevent women artists from
including non-gender topics in their art and that such 'exclusivity' might
marginalise women's art. A further issue which was raised during these
discussions was whether some art forms are especially suited to promoting
women's issues or whether women's issues can be explored across all art forms in
a 'general' sense.
A set of belief statements was then formulated under each of the general themes
and a pilot survey instrument, which included demographic questions, was
developed and circulated to a further twelve arts professionals for completion and
comment. Revisions to the pilot survey instrument resulted in a second draft of the
survey instrument. This version of the survey instrument was then pilot tested on a
group of seventy participants at a women's arts conference. The pilot study phase
concluded with the derivation of five multi-statement, urn-dimensional scales. A
reliability measure was calculated for each of the five scales using Cronbach's
Alpha as recommended .by DeVauss (1986). The values of Alpha for the five
scales in the pilot phase were all at the recommended level of Alpha >= 0.7 (De
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Vauss, 1986). (Values of Cronbach's Alpha for the actual survey samples are
provided in Appendix II.)
Final Version. The final version of the survey instrument comprises twenty-nine
belief statements about women artists and women's art. Following Kidder and
Judd (1986) and Oppenheim (1992), these statements are accompanied by a
standard rating scale with five categories, for example:
Women's art should deal exclusively with women's issues
Strongly Agree Cannot Disagree
agree decide
Strongly
disagree
In addition to the twenty-nine belief statements, the survey instrument contains two
questions (3i and 6b) intended to allow self-categorisation in terms of the feminism
and gender independent variables.
Two 'open' questions (3h, 4e), three 'Yes/No format' questions (3i, 6d, 6e), three
'conditional' questions (lfi, lfii, 2el-3) and two 'multi-choice' format questions
(2a, 4c) are also included in the survey instrument with a view to future research.
Structure. The statements and questions within the final version of the survey
instrument are arranged in six sections. Of these, Sections 1-5 represent general
themes, each of which may have one or more sub-themes (see Appendix III).
Section 6 provides demographic information.
Section 1 deals with the general theme of inclusion, which encompasses three sub-
themes:
collectivity (Ib 'Women artists should support other women artists'; Id "All
women have the potential to be artists')
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exclusivity (lc 'Women's art should deal exclusively with women's issues'; If
'Women's arts events marginalise the possible contributions of women's
cultural/artistic products to mainstream arts')
generality (Ie 'Some art forms are potentially more effective than others in making
statements about women')
Section 2 deals with the general theme of usefulness which encompasses three
sub-themes, each represented by a multi-statement, uni-dimensional scale:
Scale J 'Women's art is, and should be, educational' (mean of responses to 2b
'Women's art should perform an educational function for women' and 2c
'Women's art should perform an educational function for men' and 2g
'Women's art can help men to understand women')
Scale 2, 'Women 's Art includes Social Comment' (mean of responses to 2d 'So far
as art is concerned, only women's art can raise women's consciousness' and
2f 'Women's art is only truly relevant if it contains social comment')
Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves' (mean of
responses to 2h 'Being creative helps a woman feel good about herself and
2i 'Being creative, with other women, helps a woman feel good about
herself).
Section 3 deals with the general theme of possible social influences which
encompasses two further sub-themes both of which are represented by multi-
statement, uni-dimensional scales:
Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered' (mean of responses to 3a 'Women's art can
comment of the world of men as well as on the world of women' and 3b
'Men's art can comment of the world of women as well as on the world of
men')
Scale 5 'Women's Interpretation of Art is Influenced by Demographic Factors'
(mean of responses to 3d 'A woman's age affects the way she interprets the
social and political content of women's art' and 3e 'A woman's social class
affects the way she interprets the social and political content of women's art'
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and 3f 'A woman's ethnicity affects the way she interprets the social and
political content of women's art').
Section 4, deals with the general theme prejudice, with no sub-themes. This
incorporates three statements: 4a 'Women's art and men's art should be judged on
the basis of the same aesthetic criteria'; 4b 'The "public" applies different standards
when evaluating the art of women and the art of men if the sex of the artist is
known in advance'; la 'It is more difficult for a woman to receive recognition as
an artist that it is for a man' .
Section 5 deals with the general theme of financial and business policy, with no
sub-themes. This incorporates four statements: 5a 'In general, women artists and
women's arts events receive adequate funding and support from bodies such as the
Arts Council and local authorities'; 5b 'Women artists should adopt a more
businesslike approach to attracting sponsorship'; 5c 'Women's art and women's
arts events represent a 'bad risk' for sponsors' and 5d 'Women's art should benefit
from positive discrimination as regards funding'.
Subjects. The survey instrument was administered to two different samples. The
first sample comprised 507 first year psychology students of whom 34% were male
and 66% female. The average age of the student sample was 22.01 years, with a
standard deviation of 6.98 years. The size of the student standard deviation is
explained by a relatively long 'tail' of mature students. The second sample
comprised 37 arts professionals involved in the production and/or dissemination of
women's art, of whom 38% were male and 62% were female. The average age of
the arts professionals sample was 36.23 years, with a standard deviation of 10.40
years.
The purpose in selecting two samples was to explore the extent to which the
reasoning of Chapters One and Two applies to two different populations. The
student sample represents 'the 'general public': those who have little known
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connection with, or specialist knowledge of, women's art but who might
nevertheless constitute potential 'consumers' of women's art. The arts
professionals sample is made up of those who are employed in the arts. It should,
however, be emphasised that the distinction between 'student' and 'arts
professional' does not constitute another explanatory, independent variable since
there is a range of differences, demographic and experiential, separating out the
two populations.
Administration. For reasons of practicality, administrative arrangements for the
distribution and collection of the survey instrument differed for each sample. The
student sample received copies of the survey instrument in groups of
approximately 35. Student subjects were seated in a classroom and the survey
instrument was then distributed and collected after completion. The arts
professionals were solicited initially by telephone and asked if they .would be
willing to complete and return a copy of the survey instrument. It was only after
their agreement to co-operate had been confirmed that a survey instrument along
with a pre-paid return envelope was mailed to them. These procedures proved
effective in that both samples had a response rate of 100%.
In Chapter Three, section 3.2, it was made clear that 'group-membership-induced'
stereotyping influences judgement only when such membership becomes salient. In
order to manipulate the salience of gender and feminism group membership
categories, administration of the survey instrument to student subjects was
preceded by a short introductory talk about women, the arts and feminism.
Subjects were informed that the survey instrument was designed to examine beliefs
about women artists and women's art and that the researcher was interested in
their views as men and women and as people who might or might not have feminist
sympathies. For the arts professionals subjects, a similar social identity priming
process was carried out during the telephone conversation which invited each
subject to complete the survey instrument.
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The five-category rating scale used for the survey instrument statements included a
'Cannot decide' option. It was intended that subjects use this category as an
intermediate between agreeing or disagreeing, rather than as a means of avoiding
expressing an opinion at all. In consequence, following De Vauss (1986) the
introductory comments made before administration of the survey instrument
emphasised that subjects should try to express a belief in regard to all statements,
and that the 'Cannot decide' response category should be seen as falling
somewhere in between' Agree' and 'Disagree'.
4.3 Method of Analysis and Presentation
The sex-role. Values for the sex-role categorisation 'independent' variable were
retrieved by means of the Bern Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI; see Appendix IV) in the
following way. Each subject's responses to each one of the sixty statements in the
BSRI were included in an SPSS data file. Following the procedure outlined in
Bern (1981) these responses were then used to produce masculinity and femininity
raw scores for each subject via SPSS's COMPUTE command. The masculinity
and femininity raw scores were then used as the basis for categorising subjects into
one of four categories - feminine, masculine, androgynous or undifferentiated by
means of the 'median split method'. This method requires that, for each group of
subject, the median score for masculinity and the median score for femininity are
calculated from all subjects' raw scores for masculinity and femininity. Thereafter,
the levels of each subject's raw scores, once calculated, are compared with the
median scores for masculinity and femininity of the 'normative sample' to
determine how that particular subject should be categorised.
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Table 1: Sex-role categories
Masculinity Score
Below Median Above Median
Below undifferentiated masculine
Femininity Median (lo-lo) (lo fern-hi masc)
Score Above feminine androgynous
Median (hi fem-lo masc) (hi-hi)
In line with Bem's suggestion about the normative sample from which median
scores for masculinity and femininity are calculated for purposes of categorisation,
this study adopted the median scores for masculinity and femininity representative
of each one of the two samples comprising the current data set. Because the
student sample and the arts professionals sample differed on a variety of
parameters such as age and occupational status, median scores for femininity and
masculinity were calculated for the student sample and the arts professionals
sample separately.
The median femininity score for the arts professionals sample was 4.58 and the
median masculinity score was 4.70. The median femininity score for the student
sample was 4.75 and the median masculinity score was 4.35. The SPSS
COMPUTE-IF command was used to categorise individual subjects by comparing
the subject's own median scores with the median scores for the relevant sample,
student or arts professionals. A transformation was then carried out on the sex-
role category independent variable. Bem's categorisation classifies subjects into
four categories: masculine, feminine, androgynous and undifferentiated. For the
purposes of this analysis the original sex-role categories were re-coded to form a
three-value variable with the values 'masculine', 'feminine',
'androgynous/undifferentiated' .
Design. The independent variables were operationalised in the following way.
Values for the sex-role categorisation independent variable (masculine, feminine,
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androgynous! undifferentiated) were derived as described above. Values for the
feminism and gender independent variables (feminist, non-feminist and male,
female) were derived from responses to survey statements 3i and 6b respectively.
This produced a 3x2x2 factorial design. The dependent variables were derived in
the following way. Each survey instrument statement whose response format
ranged from 'Strongly agree' to 'Strongly disagree' was coded using a coding
scheme in which 1 was equivalent to 'Strongly agree', 2 to 'Agree', 3 to 'Cannot
decide', 4 to 'Disagree' and 5 to 'Strongly disagree'. The five multi-statement,
uni-dimensional scales were coded by calculating, for each subject, the mean score
for all of the survey instrument statements included in that scale.
Analysis. Two preliminary decisions were made about the method of analysis for
the survey data prior to its being carried out. The first was associated with the
level of measurement of subject's responses to the 'Strongly agree ... Strongly
disagree' format survey instrument statements, both when these are analysed as
single statements and when analysed as components of multi-statement scales. A
number of authors (Kerlinger, 1973; Howell, 1987; Greene and D'Oliveira, 1982)
argue that survey data collected by rating scales of the sort employed here may be
regarded as interval data. Accordingly, the decision was made to analyse the
response data using parametric techniques.
The second decision centred on choice of statistical test. The study aims to explain
variation in subjects' responses to the dependent variable statements by reference
to the three independent variables. Accordingly, since the data were regarded as
parametric, the three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) model was chosen. The
ANOV A model allows the researcher to examine the effects of several different
independent variables, independently and in interaction. It does this by estimating
how much observed differences in dependent variable scores are due to the
independent variables and how much due to extraneous variables. To achieve this
the ANOV A test calculates what proportion of total variance in scores is due to
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the independent variables and what proportion due to the extraneous variables (the
'error' variance).
ANOVA functions by analysing variance and is therefore sensitive to unequal cell
sizes (Kerlinger 1973~ Ferguson 1981). Consequently, the method of ANOVA
selected is the one which is recommended for unequal cell size designs: the 'classic
experimental' or 'least-squares' approach (Coolican, 1994). This form of ANOV A
makes use of weighted means which reflect the frequency of responses in each cell
of the ANOV A table. These weighted means are based on arrangements of scores
and frequencies of the sort presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Example of weighted means
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.60 2.58 2.78 3.04
(10) (53) (9) (53)
Masculine 2.76 2.55 2.82 3.49
(21) (30) (50) (41)
AndlUnd 2.50 2.73 3.12 2.91
(30) (66) (43) (78)
Table 2 shows mean scores for student responses to statement 1a, with the
frequency of subjects for each cell recorded in brackets underneath the response
score. Weighted averages for combinations of cells are calculated by multiplying
each cell response score by the cell frequency count, adding these products
together and then dividing by the total frequencies. For example, the weighted
mean score for feminine feminists, irrespective of gender, is: «2.60 x 10) + (2.58 x
53»/63 = 2.58. Similarly, the weighted mean score for men, irrespective of both
gender and sex-role category, is:
«2.60xl0) + (2.76 x 21) + (2.50 x 30) + (2.78 x 9) + (2.82 x 50) + (3.12 x
43»/163 = 2.82.
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Description of interactions reported is accomplished by the discussion of simple
effects, which were calculated following Howell (1987). Between subjects mean
squares were calculated (by performing the relevant one-way ANOV A using the
SPSS SELECT CASES and ONEWAY commands) and then divided by the
original interaction error mean squares to produce the desired F ratio. According
to Howell (1987) and Coolican (1994), this process avoids the possibility of
inflating Type I errors which arises if multiple tests are performed.
The results are presented according to the thematic structure of the survey
instrument, as described in section 4.2 (see also Appendix III), and are therefore
set out in the following order, with arts professionals responses following student
responses in each case:
Inclusion (collectivity, exclusivity, generality)
Usefulness (Scale 1 'Women's art is, and should be, educational', Scale 2,
'Women's Art includes Social Comment', Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel
good about themselves')
Social influences (Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered', Scale 5 'Women's
Interpretation of Art is Influenced by Demographic Factors')
Prejudice
Financial and business policy.
4.4 Hypothesis
The hypothesis towards which the following results are directed can be expressed
in the following way:
Hypothesis. Social identity and personal identity will influence
stereotypical beliefs in that different levels of the feminism,
gender and sex-role categorisation independent variables will be
associated with different levels of response to the survey
instrument statements.
This hypothesis is intended to be non-directional, in that it predicts differences
between feminists and non-feminists, men and women, and among subjects from
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different sex-role categories, but does not suggest a 'direction' for those
differences. This non-directional nature is intended to reflect two key facts.
Firstly, the survey addresses unknown terrain, in that no existing studies of
attitudes to women's art which examine the differential effects of these three
variables were found. In this sense, the present study is expressly designed as an
exploratory exercise. Secondly, the point of encompassing different themes within
a domain such as stereotypical beliefs about women artists and women's art is
specifically to allow for the fact that the influence of independent variables, such as
whether one is feminist, gender and sex-role categorisation, might have different
effects as attention switches from one theme to the next.
Although the hypothesis underlying the survey research is non-directional, it is
possible to identify at least two general directional influences which may be
relevant to subsequent discussion of results. Firstly, the directional effect of being
feminist can be explained by looking at responses to the question at 3h 'How
would you define feminism?'. Descriptions of feminism offered in response to this
open-ended question suggest that subjects see feminism as synonymous with: a
counter to the oppression of women; a challenge to existing social structures;
women's collective support for one another; a means of providing education and
raising consciousness. This indicates that directional predictions might. be made as
follows. Feminist subjects will hold a stereotyped view of women which makes
these subjects more likely to agree with statements which refer to women being
disadvantaged by existing social structures, with statements that such structures
should be challenged, statements which imply that women should display solidarity
and statements which emphasise the educational and consciousness raising roles of
women's art. Secondly, men and women can be expected to display group
categorisation effects and in-group favouritism and out-group hostility. That is,
where survey instrument statements refer to comparisons between men and
women, men and women can be expected to respond in a manner which both
highlights the gender distinction and favours the in-group.
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The effect of the third stereotyping force, sex-role categorisation, is hard to predict
in a directional sense. It is assumed here that a person's sex-role self-
categorisation will have some kind of influence on how he or she thinks about
gender-related matters. However, there is nothing in the theory of sex-role
categorisation to suggest that people who self-categorise as 'feminine' will, for
example, be more sympathetic to women than 'masculine' people, or will express a
greater sense of 'solidarity' with women. Accordingly, the sex-role categorisation
component of the hypothesis must remain firmly non-directional.
In summary, then, the survey sets out to discover if stereotyped thinking, arising
from whether someone is feminist or not and from that person's gender and sex-
role categorisation, has an impact on different facets of his or her beliefs about
women artists and women's art. In this instance, the nature of the impact is,
therefore, less important than the question of whether it actually exists. Thus, the
hypothesis which underlies the survey research as a whole is non-directional. That
said, in discussing the pattern of results obtained as the survey moves from one
theme to the next, attempts will be made to make sense of the direction of findings
in regard to considerations about feminism, gender and sex-role categorisation
already introduced.
4.5 Inclusion: Results and Discussion
Student sample: responses to Collectivity
Section 1 of the survey instrument, comprising statements 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e and 1f,
deals with the general theme of 'inclusion'. Inclusion incorporates three sub-
themes, the first of these being 'collectivity' (statement lb 'Women artists should
support other women artists' and Id 'All women have the potential to be artists').
The responses of the student sample to statement 1b are presented in Figure I.
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Figure I: Student sample: responses to statement Ib 'Women artists should
support other women artists'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement Ib by
feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.40 2.26 2.56 2.60
Masculine 2.43 2.20 2.76 2.71
AndlUnd 2.27 2.41 2.35 2.55
The ANOV A test showed a main effect for feminism with F( 1,471) = 10.02,
p<.OI. The weighted mean score for feminists was 2.32 and for non-feminists was
2.59. This means that within the student sample, feminists were more likely to
agree with statement 1b than non-feminists. There were no significant interaction
effects among responses to statement 1b.
The student sample responses to statement 1d, which also falls under the sub-
theme collectivity are shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Student sample: responses to statement Id 'All women have the
potential to be artists'
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A breakdown of the student sample responses in terms of the three independent
variables is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement Id by
feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 3.30 3.30 3.11 3.51
Masculine 3.14 2.87 3.10 3.12
AndlUnd 3.03 2.94 3.42 3.21
The ANOV A test showed significant main effects for feminism and sex-role
categorisation with F(l,471) = 4.31, p<.05 and F(2,471) = 3.52, p<.05
respectively. The weighted mean score for feminists = 3.07 and for non-feminists
= 3.26. This means that feminists were more likely to agree with statement 1d than
non-feminists. The weighted mean scores for the sex-role categories were:
'feminine' = 3.38, 'androgynous/ undifferentiated' = 3.14 and 'masculine' = 3.06.
This means that masculine subjects were more likely to agree with statement 1d
than either feminine or androgynous/ undifferentiated subjects. There were· no
significant interactions.
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Arts professionals sample: responses to Collectivity
The responses of the arts professionals sample are similar to the responses of the
student sample. Arts professionals sample responses to statement Ib are presented
in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement Ib 'Women
artists should support other women artists'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement Ib
by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00
Masculine 2.00 2.29 2.00 3.00
AndlUnd 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00
The ANOV A test showed that within the arts professionals sample responses there
were no main effects. There was, however, a two-way interaction between
feminism and gender, with F(1,21)=7.62,p <.01. Tests of the simple effects
showed that non-feminist men were more likely to agree with statement 1b than
non-feminist women (F(1,21) = 10.82, p<.01). These data are shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement Ib by feminism
and gender
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The other statement dealing with the collectivity hypothesis is statement Id ('All
women have the potential to be artists'). The arts professionals sample responses
to this statement are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement Id 'All women
have the potential to be artists'
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A breakdown of the arts professionals sample responses in terms of the three
independent variables is shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement Id
by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 3.00 2.67 3.00 4.00
Masculine 1.00 2.57 5.00 2.00
AndlUnd 2.75 2.60 2.50 4.00
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The ANOV A test showed that there were no mam effects among these data.
However, there was a three-way interaction among sex-role category, feminism
and gender, with F(2,2I) = 3.60, p<.OS. Tests of the simple effects showed that
there was only one significant simple effect: feminist masculine men agreed more
with statement Id than non-feminist masculine men. These data are shown in
Figure 6 and Figure 7.
Figure 6: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement Id, by gender
and sex-role category (feminists only)
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Figure 7: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement Id, by gender
and sex-role category (non-feminists only)
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Student sample: responses to Exclusivity
The second sub-theme incorporated within the 'inclusion' general theme is
'exclusivity' (statement le 'Women's art should deal exclusively with women's
issues' and statement If 'Women's arts events 'marginalise' the possible
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contribution of women's cultural/artistic products to mainstream arts'). The
responses of the student sample to statement 1c are presented in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Student sample: responses to statement Ie 'Women's art should
deal exclusively with women's issues'
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A breakdown of student sample responses in terms of the three independent
variables is shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement Ic by
feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 4.30 4.36 4.00 4.32
Masculine 4.19 4.27 4.34 4.39
AndlUnd 4.40 4.24 4.37 4.39
The ANOV A test showed no significant main effects or interactions among the
student sample responses to statement 1c.
The other statement within the survey instrument associated with exclusivity is
statement 1f. The student sample responses to this statement are presented in
Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Student sample: responses to statement 1f 'Women's arts events
'marginalise' the possible contribution of women's cultural/artistic products
to mainstream arts'
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A breakdown of the student sample responses in terms of the three independent
variables is shown in Table 8:
Table 8: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement If by
feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 3.10 2.75 2.89 3.02
Masculine 3.19 2.93 3.00 3.22
AndlUnd 3.07 2.98 2.84 3.06
The ANOV A test showed that there were no main effects in the student sample
responses to statement 1f However, there was a two-way interaction between
feminism and gender (F(1,47I) = 5.34, p<.05). A test of the simple effects showed
that feminist women are more likely to agree with statement If than non-feminist
women (F{l,471) = 4.82, p<.05). The weighted mean score for feminist women =
2.89 and for non-feminist women 3.09. These data are presented in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Student sample: responses to statement If 'Women's arts events
'marginalise' the possible contribution of women's cultural/artistic products
to mainstream arts' by feminism and gender
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Arts professionals sample: responses to Exclusivity
The responses from the arts professionals sample shows a similar pattern to that
found with the student sample in respect of exclusivity. Arts professionals sample
responses to statement Ic are shown in Figure II.
Figure 11: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement Ic 'Women's art
should deal exclusively with women's issues'
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A breakdown of the arts professionals sample responses in terms of the three
independent variables is shown in Table 9.
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Table 9: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement Ic,
by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 4.67 4.67 5.00 5.00
Masculine 5.00 4.57 5.00 4.00
AndlUnd 4.50 4.60 5.00 5.00
The ANDV A test showed that there were neither main effects nor interaction
effects among the arts professionals sample responses.
The arts professionals sample responses to statement If which also falls under the
sub-theme 'exclusivity' are presented in Figure 12.
Figure 12:Arts professionals sample: responses to statement If 'Women's arts
events 'marginalise' the possible contribution of women's cultural/artistic
products to mainstream arts'
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A breakdown of the arts professionals sample responses In terms of the three .
independent variables is shown in Table 10.
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Table 10: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement If
by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.67 3.50 3.00 2.00
Masculine 2.00 2.86 2.00 4.00
AndlUnd 2.75 3.20 3.00 2.00
The ANOV A test showed that there were neither interaction nor main effects
among this data.
Student sample: responses to Generality
The final sub-theme within the general theme of 'inclusion' is 'generality'
(statement 1e 'Some art forms are potentially more effective than others in making
statements about women'). The student responses to statement l e are shown in
Figure 13.
Figure 13: Student sample: responses to statement Ie 'Some art forms are
potentially more effective than others in making statements about women'
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A breakdown of the student responses in terms of the three independent variables
is shown in Table 11.
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Table 11: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement Ie by
feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.80 2.30 2.22 2.57
Masculine 2.43 2.17 2.54 2.76
AndlUnd 2.47 2.48 2.33 2.44
The ANDV A test showed no mam effects among responses to statement 1e.
However, it did reveal two significant two-way interactions among the responses.
The first interaction was between feminism and gender with F(1,471) = 4.84,
p<.05. A test of the simple effects showed that feminist women were more likely
to agree with statement le than non-feminist women (F(1,471) = 5.26, p<.05).
The weighted mean score for feminist women was 2.35 and for non-feminist
women was 2.56. These data are presented in summarised form in Figure 14.
Figure 14: Student sample: responses to statement Ie by feminism and
gender
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The second interaction was between sex-role categorisation and feminism with
F(2,471) = 3.93, p<.05. A test of the simple effects associated with this interaction
showed that feminist masculine subjects agree with statement ] e more than non-
feminist masculine subjects (F(1,471) = 7.11, p<.OI). The weighted mean score
for feminist masculine subjects was 2.28 and for non-feminist masculine subjects
2.64. These data are presented in summarised form in Figure] 5.
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Figure 15: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement Le by
feminism and sex-role category
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Arts professionals sample: responses to Generality
The findings of the student sample are partly replicated in the responses of the arts
professionals sample to statement l e which are shown in Figure 16.
Figure 16: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement Ie 'Some art
forms are potentially more effective than others in making statements about
women'
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A breakdown of the arts professionals sample responses in terms of the three
independent variables is shown in Table 12.
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Table 12: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement Ie
by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 3.00 3.50 2.00 l.00
Masculine 4.00 3.57 5.00 2.00
AndlUnd 3.S0 3.80 3.00 2.00
The ANOVA test showed that there was an interaction effect between gender and
feminism, with F(1,21) = 4.36, p<.OS. Tests of the simple effects showed that
there were two significant simple effects. Feminist women are more likely to agree
with statement le than non-feminist women (F(1,21) = 12.00, p<.OI) and feminist
women are more likely to agree with statement 1e than feminist men (F( 1,21) =
5.31, p<.05). These data are shown in Figure 17.
Figure 17: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement Ie by feminism
and gender
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'Inclusion': Summary and Discussion
Taken together, the data relating to the general theme of 'inclusion' confirm the
hypothesis formulated in Section 4.4. The two social identity variables (feminism
and gender) and the personal identity variable (sex-role categorisation) were seen
to have an effect on subjects' beliefs as measured by their responses to the survey
statements. Although the hypothesis is non-directional, it is possible to explore in
more detail what was 'revealed about subjects' beliefs by their responses to
statements in each of the sub-themes.
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Collectivity. Among both students and arts professionals, there was some
evidence that feminists agreed more than non-feminists with the statement 'Women
artists should support other women artists'. Reflecting on subjects' definitions of
'feminism' which were discussed in Section 4.4, it is not surprising that feminists
would look favourably at women as artists engaging in mutual support. Among
the arts professionals, it was women non-feminists who most strongly disagreed
with the statement. This interaction effect may show that for non-feminist women,
any suggestion that women should be mutually supportive in a feminist sense
would be particularly undesirable, since it would attribute to the in-group a self-
stereotype threatening feature.
There was also evidence from both samples that feminists were more likely than
non-feminists to agree with the statement 'All women have the potential to be
artists'. The definitions produced by subjects of 'feminism', which were described
in Section 4.4, included the idea that feminists adopt a challenging view of existing
social relations. In the present case, this may mean that 'feminism' could be
construed as reactive to traditionally held elitist views of the arts and the artist.
There was also an effect related to sex-role categorisation in both samples.
Irrespective of gender, masculine student subjects were more likely to agree with
the statement than feminine or androgynous/undifferentiated subjects. One
interpretation of this is that, for people whose beliefs are stereotypicaJly masculine,
being an artist does not necessarily connote being a man in comparison with other
occupations which are traditional male preserves such as science or engineering. A
second interpretation is that, for people whose beliefs are stereotypically
masculine, being an artist does not connote being in a 'proper' occupation whereas
being an artist would be a suitable 'pastime' for women. The sex-role
categorisation influence on art professionals was more complex in that it interacted
with both gender and feminism. The effect of feminism described above occurred
only am?ng masculine men; feminist masculine men agreed with the statement
more strongly than non-feminist, masculine men. This presents several questions.
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The first is the issue of why, in line with the student responses, masculine arts
professionals do not display a higher level of agreement with the statement than
feminine or androgynous/undifferentiated arts professionals. The answer may lie in
the fact that for arts professionals the Arts do represent a high status profession
and so even masculine art professionals will be likely to view being an artist as a
legitimate occupational role. To the extent that arts professionals constitute a
group, this response may even be seen as a form of positive bias towards the in-
group. The second question is why the bias towards agreement with the statement
among feminists should arise only among masculine men. One possible explanation
is that non-feminist, masculine males may typify an extreme combination of beliefs:
being masculine men, they are, in Bem's terms 'sex-typed' in that they believe
social roles to be highly determined by gender; being non-feminists, they are
relatively unwilling to see traditional gender roles challenged; being men, they are
prone to seeing high status occupations such as (from their perspective as arts
professionals) the arts as the occupational preserve of men. This combination of
several identity aspects may be thought of as a •double categorisation effect'. This
is related to the claim made by Deschamps (1984), discussed in Chapter Three,
that pairs of in-group categorisations which imply similarities with and differences
from the self may cancel one another out. Here the suggestion is that pairs of
identity effects may operate interactively to magnify the relevant stereotyping
influences.
Exclusivity. Taken together, the data relating to the theme of 'exclusivity' tend to
offer little support for the hypothesis. Only the student subjects showed any
influence of social identity and personal identity in their responses, and this
influence was restricted to responses to statement If Here, non-feminist women
were more likely to agree than feminist women that 'Women's arts events
'marginalise' the possible contribution of women's cultural/artistic products to
mainstream arts'. In line with what was said earlier about subjects' definitions of
feminism as including the notion of challenging social structures, one interpretation
of this finding is that feminist subjects view the role of women's art as involving
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engagement with mainstream social structures with the view of introducing change
to those structures.
Generality. Taken together, the data relating to the theme of 'generality' offer
support for the hypothesis. Among the students and the arts professionals, there
was evidence that feminist women agreed more than non-feminist women with the
statement that 'Some art forms are potentially more effective than others in making
statements about women'. In addition, among the students, feminist masculine
subjects were more likely to agree with the statement than non-feminist. masculine
subjects. Among the arts professionals, feminist women were more likely to agree
than feminist men. One interpretation of this is that feminists have stereotyped
views about certain forms of art. For example, certain forms of art are explicitly
feminist, such as feminist performance art and feminist literature, and feminists may
see such art as especially important in terms of making statements about women.
If this interpretation is correct, it explains why agreement is particularly strong
among feminist women. Since feminist art may, for some feminists, be perceived
as the preserve of feminist women, the in-group favouritism effect (which
encourages subjects to view feminist art as especially important or worthy) will be
strongest among people who are both feminist and women. This can be seen as
another example of the 'double categorisation effect'. This effect may also explain
the difference within the arts professionals' responses between feminist women
and feminist men. If the interpretation of the results in terms of feminist bias
towards feminist arts is correct, it also helps to explain why non-feminist masculine
subjects are particularly unlikely to agree with statement 1e. As pointed out in
Chapter One, Chambers (1986) has suggested that women's advances in popular
culture are perceived as threatening by male-oriented institutions.
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4.6 Usefulness: Results and Discussion
Student sample: responses to Scale 1 'Women's Art IS, and should be,
Educational'
Section 2 of the survey instrument comprises three multi-statement, urn-
dimensional scales and deals with the general theme of 'usefulness'. This general
theme incorporates three sub-themes: 'education', 'social comment' and
'creativity' and each sub-theme is represented by one of the three scales. The first
of the multi-statement, uni-dimensional scales is Scale 1 'Women's art is, and
should be, educational', which comprises mean responses to statements 2b, 2c and
2g. The student sample responses captured in this scale are presented in Figure 18
Figure 18: Student sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 1
'Women's art is, and should be, educational'
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A breakdown of the student sample responses in terms of the three independent
variables is shown in Table 13:
Table 13: Student sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 1, by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.27 2.55 2.70 2.84
Masculine 2.67 2.50 2.75 2.91
AndlUnd 2.61 2.61 2.99 2.82
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The ANOVA test shows there was a main effect for feminism, with F(1,472) =
15.68, P < .01. The mean score for feminists was 2.57, and for non-feminists 2.85,
which signifies that feminists were more likely to agree that women's art can have
an educational function than non-feminists. There were no interaction effects
among these data.
Arts professionals sample: responses to Scale I 'Women's Art is, and should be,
Educational'
The arts professionals sample responses, as captured by Scale 1, also show the
influence of feminism, although this is moderated by gender. The responses of the
arts professionals sample represented by Scale 1 values are presented in Figure 19.
Figure 19: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 1 'Women's art is, and should be, educational'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 14.
Table 14: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to
statements comprising Scale 1, by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.78 2.89 2.00 5.00
Masculine 2.33 3.14 2.00 2.00
AndlUnd 3.08 2.60 2.00 3.50
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There were no main effects among this data. The ANOY A test showed that there
was an interaction between feminism and gender, with F(1,2l) = 4.16, p<OS. A
test of simple effects showed that feminist women were more likely to agree that
women's art is, and should be, educational than feminist men (F(1,2l = 5.41,
p<.05). These data are shown in Figure 20.
Figure 20: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 1, by feminism and gender
W=:!:'d1
:::: ~ -+{j::-:::-:--~--==-=------==-=-==-=------==-=------::~
• Men
--B- Women
Feminist Non-
feminist
Feminism
Student sample: responses to Scale 2 'Women's art raIses consciousness and
includes social comment'
The second sub-theme incorporated within the 'usefulness' theme is Scale 2
'Women's art includes social comment', which comprises mean responses to
statements 2d and 2f. The student sample mean responses as captured by this scale
are presented in Figure 21.
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Figure 21: Student sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 2
'Women's Art includes Social Comment'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 15.
Table 15: Student sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 2, by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 3.90 3.97 3.67 3.88
Masculine 3.83 3.72 3.99 4.07
AndlUnd 3.87 3.79 3.75 3.95
The ANOV A test showed that there were no main effects. However, there was
one significant two-way interaction in these data, between feminism and sex-role
categorisation, with F(2,470) = 4.86, p<.05. A test of the simple effects associated
with this interaction showed that there was one significant simple effect. Feminist
masculine subjects agreed more than non-feminist masculine subjects (F(l,470) =
7.48, p<.OI) that women's art includes social comment. These data are shown in
Figure 22
103
Chapter Four
Figure 22: Student sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 2
by feminism and sex-role category
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Arts professionals sample: responses to Scale 2 'Women's art raises consciousness
and includes social comment'
The arts professionals sample responses which are summarised by means of Scale 2
are presented in Figure 23.
Figure 23: Arts professionals sample mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 2 'Women's Art includes Social Comment'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 16.
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Table 16: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to
statements comprising Scale 2 by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 3.33 4.33 5.00 5.00
Masculine 4.50 4.36 4.50 4.00
AndlUnd 3.88 4.40 4.00 3.00
The ANOV A test showed that there were no main effects. However, there were
two significant two-way interaction effects. The first was between feminism and
gender, with F(I,32) = 6.04, p<.05. A test of the simple effects within this
interaction showed that there were two significant simple effects. Feminist men
show a greater level of agreement than non-feminist men (F(1,21) = 4.61, p<.05).
They also showed a great level of agreement than feminist women (F(l ,21) =
9. 15). These data are shown in Figure 24.
Figure 24: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 2 by feminism and gender
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There was also an interaction effect between feminism and sex-role category, with
F(2,21) = 6.33, p<.Ol. A test of the simple effects in this interaction showed that
again there were two significant simple effects. Non-feminist androgynous/
undifferentiated subjects were more likely to agree than either non-feminist
masculine subjects or non-feminist feminine subjects (F(2,2l) = 4.73, p<.05). In
addition, feminist feminine subjects were more likely to agree than non-feminist
feminine subjects. These data are shown in Figure 25.
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Figure 25: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 2 by feminism and sex-role category
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Student sample: responses to Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about
themselves'
Within the general theme of usefulness, the final sub-theme is represented by Scale
3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves'. Scale 3 comprises the
mean of responses to statements 2h and 2i. The student mean responses captured
by this scale are presented in Figure 26.
Figure 26: Student sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 3
'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 17.
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Table 17: Student sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 3 by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.10 2.17 1.83 2.44
Masculine 2.36 2.03 2.39 2.33
AndlUnd 2.20 2.18 2.40 2.22
The ANOVA test showed a main effect for feminism (F(1,470) = 5.87, p<05). The
weighted mean value for feminists was 2.17 and for non-feminists was 2.33. This
meant that feminists were more likely to agree that creativity is a positive aspect of
women's art than non-feminists. There was also a significant interaction between
gender and sex-role categorisation with F(2,470) = 3.44, p<.05. A test of the
simple effects showed that there were two significant simple effects. Feminine men
were more likely to agree that creativity is a positive aspect of women's art than
masculine or androgynous/undifferentiated men (F(2,470) = 3.69, p<.05).
Feminine men were also more likely to agree than feminine women (F(I,470) =
4.28, p<.05). These data are presented in Figure 27:
Figure 27: Student sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 3
by gender and sex-role category
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Arts professionals sample: responses to Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel .
good about themselves'
The arts professionals sample responses which are summarised by means of Scale 3
are presented in Figure 28.
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Figure 28: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 18.
Table 18: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to
statements comprising Scale 3, by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 1.50 2.17 2.00 3.00
Masculine 2.50 2.21 3.00 3.00
AndlUnd 2.00 1.80 1.50 3.00
The ANOV A test showed that there were neither interaction effects nor main
effects among these data.
'Usefulness': Summary and Discussion
Taken together, the data relating to the general theme of 'usefulness' confirm the
hypothesis formulated in Section 4.4. Once again, the two social identity variables
(feminism and gender) and the personal identity variable (sex-role categorisation)
were seen to have an effect on subjects' beliefs as measured by their responses to
the survey statements. As before, it is useful to note some of the directional trends
in subjects' responses to statements encapsulating this theme even though the
hypothesis itself is explicitly non-directional.
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Scale J 'Women's art is, and should be, educational', The student sample's
responses showed that feminists were more likely to agree with the statements
captured by the scale than were non-feminists. Given the emphasis on education
and consciousness-raising which appeared in subjects' own definitions offeminism,
this result is not surprising. This distinction between feminists and non-feminists
which arose in the student sample does not recur in the arts professional sample.
This may be because arts professionals, unlike subjects from the student sample,
view the arts and education as synonymous in that the function of the arts is seen
as implicitly educational. This interpretation would be consistent with the finding
from the arts professional sample that feminist women are more likely to agree
with the scale statements than are feminist men. If an educational role for art is
viewed as a positive feature by the arts professionals, then the higher level of
agreement represented by the responses of feminist women arts professionals can
be interpreted as another example of the double in-group categorisation effect
which was discussed earlier in relation to the 'generality' sub-theme.
Scale 2 'Women 'sart raises consciousness and includes social comment '. Among
the student subjects, feminist masculine subjects agreed with the statements
comprising Scale 2 more than non-feminist masculine subjects. The feminists'
preference for viewing art as including social comment is predictable from the
subjects' own definitions of feminism as including criticism of existing social
structures. Non-feminist masculine subjects are especially different in this regard.
This may be explained on the basis of the 'double categorisation effect', using the
same argument which was applied in relation to non-feminist masculine subjects in
connection with the 'collectivity' sub-theme.
Among arts professionals, several interactions were noted. Feminist men were
more likely to agree with the items that make up Scale 2 than non-feminist men.
Similarly, feminist feminine subjects were more likely to agree with Scale 2 than
non-feminist feminine subjects. The differences between feminist men and non-
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feminist men and between feminist feminine subjects and non-feminist feminine
subjects are compatible with the explanations offered for the student responses.
By definition, feminists have a preference for viewing art as including social
comment. In addition, feminist men were more likely to agree with Scale 2 than
feminist women, a difference which has a less obvious explanation. However,
given the feminists' basic preference for social comment, it may be that feminist
women have a broader view of the possible roles of women's art than feminist men
and react against the idea that women's art must contain social comment.
A further finding was that non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated subjects
agreed with Scale 2 more than either non-feminist masculine subjects or non-
feminist feminine subjects. One possible interpretation for this finding is that it is
another example of the 'double in-group categorisation effect'. Non-feminists are
less willing than feminists to ascribe a consciousness-raising and social commenting
role to women's art. This effect is amplified in those cases where subjects are sex-
typed in that they adhere to traditional stereotypes of maleness and femaleness.
Scale 3 'Creativity helps women to feel good about themselves '. One difference
noted in the student responses is that feminists are more likely to agree with Scale
3 than non-feminists. One possible interpretation of this result is that feminists,
more so than non-feminists, problematise the position of women and thus value
creativity, in that it allows women to develop through self-expression. Student
responses also showed that feminine men were more likely to agree with Scale 2
than masculine men or androgynous/undifferentiated men. A possible
interpretation of this result is that femininity, as discussed in Chapter Three, is
stereotypicaIly associated with expressiveness (Spence and Helmreich, 1981), and
so masculine and androgynous/undifferentiated men might be less inclined to value
creativity positively.
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4.7 Social Influences: Results and Discussion
Student sample: responses to Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered'
Section 3 of the survey instrument comprises two multi-statement, uni-dimensional
scales and deals with the general theme of 'social influences'. This general theme
incorporates two sub-themes: 'gender' and demography. Each of these sub-
themes is represented by one of the multi-statement, uni-dimensional scales. The
first of these is Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered', which comprises mean responses to
statements 3a and 3b. The student sample responses associated with this scale are
presented in Figure 29.
Figure 29: Student sample mean responses to statements comprising Scale 4
'Art is Non-gendered'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 19.
Table 19: Student sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 4 by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 1.75 1.78 2.17 2.01
Masculine 1.95 1.80 1.86 1.76
And/Und 1.80 1.96 1.94 1.97
The ANOV A test showed no significant main effects. However, there was a
significant interaction between feminism and sex-role categorisation with F(2,471)
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= 3.22, p<.5. A test of the simple effects associated with this interaction showed
that there were two significant simple effects. Non-feminist masculine subjects are
more likely to agree that art is Non-gendered than either non-feminist feminine or
non-feminist androgynous/ undifferentiated subjects (F(2,471) = 3.56, p<.05). In
addition, feminist feminine subjects are more likely to agree than non-feminist
feminine subjects. These data are presented in Figure 30.
Figure 30: Student sample: mean responses to statements comprising Scale 4
by feminism and sex-role category
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What this shows is that Hypothesis 1 is in part confirmed. The student sample
responses support the claim that beliefs about women's art are influenced by
stereotyped thinking in that feminism and sex-role category show up as influences.
Arts professionals: responses to Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered'
The arts professionals sample responses which are summarised by means of Scale 4
are presented in Figure 31.
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Figure 31: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 20.
Table 20: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to
statements comprising Scale 4 by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 1.33 1.42 l.00 2.50
Masculine l.00 l.93 2.00 2.00
AndlUnd l.63 2.10 1.50 3.00
The ANOV A test showed that there was a main effect for gender, the mean score
for men being 1.46 and that for women being l.90, with F(1,21) = 6.90, p<.05.
This means that men were more likely to agree that art is non-gendered than
women. There were no interaction effects. Taken together, the student sample
responses and arts professionals sample responses support the claim that beliefs
about women's art are influenced by stereotyped thinking in that, across both
populations, feminism, gender and sex-role category show up as influences.
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Student sample: responses to Scale 5 'Women's interpretation of art is influenced
by demographic factors'
Within the theme of 'social influences', the last sub-theme explored is represented
by Scale 5 'Women's interpretation of art is influenced by demographic factors',
which comprises mean responses to statements 3d, 3e and 3f. The responses of the
student sample as captured by this scale are presented in Figure 32.
Figure 32: Student sample mean responses to statements comprising Scale 5
'Women's interpretation of art is influenced by demographic factors'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 21.
Table 21: Student sample: breakdown of mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 5 by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.40 2.64 2.44 2.53
Masculine 2.52 2.69 2.44 2.63
AndlUnd 2.44 2.59 2.40 2.61
The ANa VA test showed a main effect for the gender variable, with F(1,472) =
6.57, p<.Ol. The weighted mean response for men was 2.44 and for women, 2.61.
This suggests that men were more likely than women to agree that women's
interpretation of art is influenced by demographic factors. There were no
interaction effects.
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Arts professionals sample: responses to Scale 5 'Women's interpretation of art is
influenced by demographic factors'
The arts professionals sample responses which are summarised by means of Scale 5
are presented in Figure 33.
Figure 33: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statements
comprising Scale 5 'Women's interpretation of art is influenced by
demographic factors'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 22.
Table 22: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to
statements comprising Scale 5 by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 1.89 3.11 2.00 1.00
Masculine 2.00 2.19 5.00 2.67
AndlUnd 2.17 2.13 2.33 4.00
The ANOV A test showed no main effects. However, it did show a significant
three-way interaction with F(2,21) = 5.99, p<.Ol. Tests of the simple effects
associated with this interaction showed that there were nine significant simple ,
effects. These.fall into three groups of effects.
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Firstly, non-feminist, masculine men disagreed with the claim that women's
interpretations of art are influenced by demographic factors more than feminist,
masculine men (F(I,21) = 4.40, p<.05), more than non-feminist, masculine women
(FI,21) = 6.61, p<.05) and more than non-feminist feminine or androgynous/
undifferentiated men (F(2,21) = 7.11, p<.Ol.
Secondly, feminist, feminine women disagreed more than non-feminist, feminine
women (F(I,21) = 9.27, p<.OI), more than feminist, feminine men (F(I,21) = 7.25,
p<.05) and more than feminist masculine or androgynous/ undifferentiated women
(F(2,21) = 4.34, p<.05).
Thirdly, non-feminist, androgynous/ undifferentiated women disagreed more than
feminist, androgynous/ undifferentiated women (F(I,21) = 7.05, p<.05) and more
than non-feminist, androgynous/ undifferentiated men (F(l,21) = 4.49, p<.05).
These data are shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35.
Figure 34: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to
statements comprising Scale 5 by gender and sex-role category (feminists
only)
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Figure 35: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to
statements comprising Scale 5 by gender and sex-role category (non-feminists
only)
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'Social influences': Summary and Discussion
Taken together, the responses of the student and arts professionals to the
statements comprising Scale 4 and Scale 5 which constituted the general theme of
'social influences' again offer support for the hypothesis that the subjects hold
stereotypical beliefs which are influenced by social identity (feminism and gender)
and personal identity (sex-role categorisation). As with responses to the first and
second general themes, it is possible to move beyond the firmly non-directional
nature of the hypothesis to consider the specific detail of some of the responses
connected with the 'social influences' theme.
Scale 4 'Art is Non-gendered'. Student sample responses associated with this
scale showed that non-feminist masculine subjects were more likely to agree that
art is non-gendered, in that women's art can comment on the world of men and
vice versa, than either non-feminist feminine subjects or non-feminist
androgynous/undifferentiated subjects. A second finding from the student data is
that feminist feminine subjects are more likely to agree with Scale 4 than non-
feminist feminine subjects. One possible interpretation of this interaction result is
that masculine subjects and feminist subjects share an agreement with Scale 4 but
may have different reasons for doing so. Masculine subjects may agree with the
scale because they see little relationship between gender and art. A similar
suggestion was made in relation to the sub-theme of collectivity, where it was
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suggested that masculine subjects may view some occupations, such as engineering
and science, as 'gendered' and other occupations as 'non-gendered'. Feminists
may agree with the scale because they are concerned about placing women's art in
a 'ghetto'. It was, for example, pointed out earlier in connection with the
'exclusivity' theme that feminist women may express particular concerns with
marginalisation of women artists. If these interpretations are correct, then
masculine subjects and feminist subjects have a tendency to agree with Scale 4 but
for opposing reasons. Some support for this interpretation is offered by the fact
that feminist masculine subjects are not more likely to agree with Scale 4 than non-
feminist masculine subjects while, on the other hand, feminist feminine subjects are
more likely to agree with Scale 4 than non-feminist feminine subjects. The
opposing viewpoints of masculinity and feminism seem to cancel one another out.
The arts professionals data show an interestingly related finding in that men are
more likely than women to view art as non-gendered.
Scale 5 'Women's interpretation of art is influenced by demographic factors'
The student data present only the finding that men are more likely than women to
agree that women's interpretation of art is affected by demographic variables. One
interpretation of this finding is that women are less willing to see themselves as
people whose views could be influenced by 'external' factors. The picture formed
by the arts professionals' data is more complex. This is not surprising, since arts
professionals are likely to have developed, as a result of their jobs, relatively
sophisticated views on how people interpret art. This may explain the fact that the
arts professionals' responses constitute a three-way interaction among feminism,
gender and sex-role categorisation with a large number of significant simple
effects. Three groups seem to stand out as people who especially disagree with the
statements comprising Scale 5: non-feminist masculine men, feminist feminine
women and non-feminist androgynous! undifferentiated women.
In earlier discussions, non-feminist masculine men have been depicted as viewing
women's art from a traditionalist, sex-typed viewpoint. This suggests that non-
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feminist masculine men tend to hold to a very traditional understanding of the role
and place of women in society. This understanding may be interpreted here as
meaning that non-feminist masculine men are, because of the double categorisation
effect of being masculine and sex-typed, relatively unwilling to view women as
engaged in the thoughtful and complex socio-political debate represented by
balancing demographic factors such as age and class with one's interpretation of
art.
Feminist, feminine women represent a mixture of beliefs in that they may be
expected to support notions such as an unwillingness to adhere to standard,
accepted views on societal structures while, at the same time, having a relatively
traditional, sex-typed view of the role which it is appropriate for women to adopt
in society. One interpretation of the results, seen from this perspective, is that
feminist, feminine women are not willing to acknowledge that women need
necessarily be affected in the way they think by social demographic variables such
as age or class. At the same time the fact that these women are sex-typed may, in
a double categorisation effect similar to that seen with non-feminist masculine
males, interact with their feminism. Being sex-typed in that they are feminine
women, they may share some of the same stereotypical beliefs about women's
appropriate social roles as masculine men. This would mean that there would be
twin forces acting upon feminist, feminine women encouraging them to disagree
with Scale 5.
Non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated women represent a 'mirror image' of
feminist, feminine women, in that they are neither feminist nor sex-typed.
Nevertheless, the pattern of their agreements in respect of Scale 5 is similar to that
of the feminist, feminine women. One possible interpretation of this result is that
non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated women disagree with Scale 5 for
different reasons than do feminist feminine women. Being non-feminist, they are in
some respects like the non-feminist masculine men who also disagreed with Scale 5
and so it may be that part of their disagreement stems from their unwillingness to
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. view women in a socially challenging role of reflecting on social and political issues
in art. They are also, being androgynous/undifferentiated, non-sex-typed people
and it may be that such people not only do not view gender as a relevant means of
understanding the world but, in addition, do not view any demographic variable in
this light. This might explain why androgynous/undifferentiated people might fail
to see the relevance of age, class and ethnicity to a consideration of women's art.
If correct, this interpretation would, then, represent yet another example of the
'double categorisation effect' mentioned above.
4.8 Prejudice: Results and Discussion
Student sample: responses to statement 4a
Section 4 of the survey instrument comprising statements 4a and 4b, together with
statement 1a, deals with the general theme of 'prejudice'. The student responses
to statement 4a 'Women's art and men's art should be judged on the basis of the
same criteria' are presented in Figure 36.
Figure 36: Student sample: responses to statement 4a 'Women's art and
men's art should be judged on the basis of the same criteria'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 23.
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Table 23: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement 4a by
feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.10 2.06 2.11 2.30
Masculine 2.29 2.27 1.94 2.20
AndlUnd 2.13 2.05 1.93 2.01
The ANOV A test showed that there were no effects among this data, in that
neither gender, nor sex-role categorisation, nor whether a subject was feminist had
any effect on responses to this statement.
Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 4a
When attention is turned to the arts professionals sample, the same result is
obtained. The responses from the arts professionals sample to statement 4a are
presented in Figure 37.
Figure 37: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 4a 'Women's art
and men's art should be judged on the basis of the same criteria'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 24.
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Table 24: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement 4a
by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 1.67 1.83 2.00 l.00
Masculine 1.00 1.43 1.00 2.00
AndlUnd 1.50 l.80 l.00 2.00
The ANOV A test showed that there were neither main effects nor interaction
effects among these data.
Student sample: responses to statement 4b
The general theme of 'prejudice' also incorporated statement 4b 'The public
applies different standards when evaluating the art of women and the art of men if
the sex of the artist is known in advance'. Student responses to this statement are
presented in Figure 38.
Figure 38: Student sample: responses to statement 4b 'The public applies
different standards when evaluating the art of women and the art of men if
the sex of the artist is known in advance'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 25.
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Table 25: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement 4b by
feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.40 2.49 2.56 2.73
Masculine 2.81 2.87 2.84 2.90
AndlUnd 2.63 2.52 2.72 2.78
The ANaVA test showed a main effect for feminism, with F(I,471) = 3.17, p<.05.
The mean score for feminists was 2.60, and for non-feminists 2.78. There were no
interaction effects among responses to statement 4b. This means that, among the
student sample responses, feminists were more likely to agree than non-feminists
that the public applies different standards when evaluating the art of women than
they do when evaluating the art of men.
Arts professionals sample: statement 4b
A similar pattern of results can be observed among the arts professionals sample
responses to statement 4b. Responses from the arts professionals sample to
statement 4b are presented in Figure 39.
Figure 39 Arts professionals sample: responses to statement 4b 'The public
applies different standards when evaluating the art of women and the art of
men if the sex of the artist is known in advance'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 26.
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Table 26: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement 4b
by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.00
Masculine 2.00 2.14 4.00 3.00
AndlUnd 2.75 2.40 3.00 5.00
The ANOV A test showed that there was a mam effect for feminism. The
feminists' mean score was 2.35 and that of the non-feminists 3.43, with F{l,2I) =
9.18, p<. 01. As was the case with the student sample, this means that feminists
were more likely to agree than non-feminists that the public applies different
standards when evaluating the art of women than they do when evaluating the art
of men.
Student sample: responses to statement 1a
The last statement incorporated within the 'prejudice' theme is statement la 'It is
more difficult for a woman to receive recognition as an artist than it is for a man'.
Responses from the student sample to statement la are presented in Figure 40.
Figure 40: Student sample: responses to statement la 'It is more difficult for
a woman to receive recognition as an artist than it is for a man'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 27.
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Table 27: Student sample: breakdown of responses to statement la by
feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.60 2.58 2.78 3.04
Masculine 2.76 2.55 2.82 3.49
AndlUnd 2.50 2.73 3.12 2.91
Among the student sample responses there was a significant three-way interaction
offeminism, gender and sex-role categorisation (F(2,469) = 4.47, p<.OI). Simple
effects tests on the mean scores of participants showed the following pattern.
Non-feminist masculine women disagreed more than non-feminist feminine or
androgynous/ undifferentiated women (F(2,469) = 4.94, p<.OI). They disagreed
more than non-feminist masculine men (F(1,469) = 10.34, p<.OI). They also
disagreed more than feminist masculine women (F(l,469) = 16.06, p<.OI).
In addition, feminist feminine women agreed more than non-feminist feminine
women (F(l,469) = 6.01, p<.05) while feminist androgynous/undifferentiated men
agreed more than non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated men (F(I,469) =
7.24, p<.OI). These data are presented in Figure 41 and Figure 42.
Figure 41: Student sample: responses to statement la by gender and sex-role
category (feminists only)
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. Figure 42: Student sample: responses to statement la by gender and sex-role
(non-feminists only)
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Art professional sample: responses to statement 1a
The arts professionals sample responses to statement 1a are presented in Figure 43.
Figure 43: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement la 'It is more
difficult for a woman to receive recognition as an artist than it is for a man'
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Table 28.
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Table 28: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of responses to statement la
by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 1.33 2.17 2.00 2.00
Masculine 2.00 1.86 4.00 1.00
AndfUnd 2.00 2.60 2.00 4.00
The ANOV A test showed no main effects but did show a three-way interaction,
with F(2,21) = 4.02, p<. 05. Simple effects tests on the mean scores of participants
showed the following pattern. Non-feminist androgynous/ undifferentiated women
disagreed more than non-feminist feminine and masculine women (F(2,21) = 5.12,
p<.05). They also disagreed more than non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated
men (F(I,21) = 5.87, p<.05).
In addition, non-feminist masculine men disagreed more than non-feminist
masculine women (F(I,21) = 9.89, p<.OI) and also more than feminist masculine,
men (F(1,21) = 4.40, p<.05).
These data are shown in Figure 44 and Figure 45.
Figure 44: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement la by feminism,
gender and sex-role category (feminists only)
Mean
Statement 5
Response 4
3 -- ..2r:~--~-~-~_'--~-~-~---~~l+---------------r--------------,
Feminine
• Men
-.- Women
Masculine AndlUndiff
BSRI Category
127
Chapter Four
Figure 45: Arts professionals sample: responses to statement la by feminism,
gender and sex-role category (non-feminists only)
Mean
Statement 5
Response 4
3
2 - .... -----l+-----------~~F-------------~
• Men
- .. - Women
Feminine Masculine And/Undiff
BSRI Category
'Prejudice': Summary and Discussion
Taken together, the data associated with the general theme of 'prejudice' show the
expected level of support for the hypothesis. Neither students not arts
professionals are willing to express 'prejudiced' views of women's art.
Accordingly, their responses to statement 4a show no variance. However,
responses to statement 4b and statement 1a do show the effect of the social
identity variables (feminism and gender) and the personal identity variable (sex-role
categorisation) which was predicted in the hypothesis. In keeping with the
discussions of earlier themes, this result, which supports the non-directional
hypothesis, is now explored in more detail by looking at the different ways in
which the independent variables have influenced subjects' responses.
4a 'Women's art and men's art should be judged on the basis of the same
criteria '. The student responses and the arts professionals responses to this
question show no effect of either social identity or personal identity variables. The
reason for this lies in the fact that only five per cent of the student sample was
willing to disagree with the statement that the work of men and women artists
should be assessed in the same way. This is not a surprising result, since it is
unlikely that subjects would be willing to describe themselves overtly as adopting a
positionon women's art which might be construed as prejudicial.
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Statement 4b 'The public applies different standards when evaluating the art of
women and the art of men if the sex of the artist is known in advance '. The
responses of both students and arts professionals demonstrate a clear effect due to
the feminism variable. In both cases, feminists are more likely than non-feminists
to express the belief that the public applies different standards to the art of women
in comparison with men's art. Given earlier discussions of the definition of
'feminism' offered by the subjects themselves, this result is unsurprising. Feminists
are those who believe that women suffer from prejudice in contemporary society.
Accordingly, one likely interpretation of this result is that feminists believe, more
than non-feminists, that people apply prejudiced standards to women's art.
Statement la: 'It is more difficult for a woman to receive recognition as an artist
than it is/or a man '.
Among the student responses, there were several instances of feminist subjects
(e.g. feminist feminine women and feminist androgynous/undifferentiated men)
being relatively likely to agree with statement la. In addition, non-feminist
masculine women were, relatively unlikely to agree with statement 1a. One
possible interpretation of this result is that non-feminist masculine women
represent another case of the double categorisation effect. On the one hand, being
non-feminist means that they are less likely to agree that women in general suffer
from prejudice. On the other hand, being masculine, and therefore cross-sex-
typed, they may hold beliefs which differ from traditional beliefs about women's
place in society. This would explain why they disagree with statement la more
than feminist masculine women and more than non-feminist feminine or
androgynous/undifferentiated women. However, they also disagree with statement
1a more than non-feminist masculine men. This is a more puzzling phenomenon
since these men might be expected to represent the group least sympathetic to
statement 1a. A possible explanation for the observed responses may be that non-
feminist, masculine women are even more extreme in their disagreement with
statement 1a than non-feminist, masculine men because they perceive the content
of the statement to imply some form of threat to their self-image. By agreeing with
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statement 1a they would be implicitly accepting that they belong to a group which
is subject to widespread prejudice.
The responses among the arts professionals to statement 1a are in some ways
similar and in some ways dissimilar to the student responses. Among the arts
professionals, it is the non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated women who are
relatively unlikely to agree with statement I a whereas in the student sample the
greatest disagreement was noted among non-feminist masculine women. The arts
professionals' response may, then, to some extent be interpreted in the same way.
Being non-feminists, these subjects are relatively unsympathetic to the notion that
women suffer from general social prejudice. Although these subjects are
androgynous/ undifferentiated rather than masculine, they do share a similarity with
their student sample counterparts in that like the masculine subjects, they are not
sex-typed, that is they do not adhere to traditional views on gender appropriate
behaviour in society. To this extent non-feminist androgynous/undifferentiated
women represent a different, though related, double categorisation effect.
Another finding from the arts professionals' responses is that non-feminist
masculine men were relatively likely to disagree with statement Ia. This is in line
with earlier discussion of non-feminist masculine men in which it was pointed out
that they represent a group which is both traditionalist in viewpoint and committed
to standard societal expectations about women in society. Among the student
sample, non-feminist masculine women disagreed even more strongly than the non-
feminist masculine men. It was suggested that this might be due to a perceived
threat to self image on the part of these women. The same effect did not arise
among the arts professionals. This may indicate a difference between the two
samples, in that the arts professionals who are non-feminist masculine women may,
on the one hand, have a more mature and settled self image and may, on the other
hand, have greater life experience of prejudice against women than their
counterparts in the student sample.
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4.9 Business and Finance: Results and Discussion
Section 5 of the survey instrument turns to the fourth general theme found in
beliefs about women's art, Business and Finance, as it affects women's art.. This
general theme is explored by means offour separate statements: Sa, 5b, Sc and Sd.
Section 5 was aimed solely at the arts professionals sample because the survey
instrument items in Section 5 target issues germane to professional knowledge
based on experience. For this reason, presentation and analysis of data applies to
responses from the arts professionals sample only. The first three statements, Sa,
Sb and Sc, yielded neither significant main effects not interactions. Accordingly,
only the results for statement 5d are presented here. The responses of the arts
professionals sample to statement 5d are presented in Figure 46.
Figure 46: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statement 5d
'Women's art should benefit from positive discrimination as regards funding'
Percentage
of 40
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A breakdown of these responses in terms of the three independent variables is
shown in Figure 47.
Figure 47: Arts professionals sample: breakdown of mean responses to
statement 5d by feminism, gender and sex-role category
Feminist Non-feminist
Men Women Men Women
Feminine 2.00 3.40 2.00 5.00
Masculine 2.00 3.14 4.00 4.00
AndlUnd 3.25 2.40 4.00 3.00
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.The ANOVA test showed that there was a main effect for feminism, with the
feminist weighted mean = 2.88 and the non-feminist weighted mean = 3.71
(F(1,20) = 4.53, p<.05). This means that feminists were more likely to agree with
statement 5d than non-feminists. There was also a significant interaction effect
between gender and sex-role category (F(2,20) = 4.58, p<.05). A test of the
simple effects associated with this interaction showed that there was one significant
simple effect. Feminine men are more likely to agree with statement Sd than
feminine women (F(1,20) = 4.38, p<.05). These data are shown in Figure 48.
Figure 48: Arts professionals sample: mean responses to statement 5d, by
gender and sex-role category
Mean
Scale 5
• Men
- .. - Women
Scores 4
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'Business and finance': Summary and discussion
The arts professionals' responses to the statements comprising the 'business and
finance' general theme show only a limited level of support for the hypothesis.
Responses to statements Sa, 5b and Sc show no effect of the feminism, gender and
sex-role categorisation variables. One possible interpretation of these results is
that, as arts professionals, the subjects have such strong views on matters of
finance that the social identity and personal identity variables have no effect upon
them. In respect of statement 5d, there is a pattern of influences on those
responses which can be attributed to the stereotyping effects of feminism, gender
and sex-role categorisation. Feminists agree more than non-feminists that
women's art should receive positive discrimination in funding. This result is in
accord with the sorts of definitions of 'feminism' in terms of social change which
the subjects themselves provided. The interaction effect is slightly more puzzling
in that feminine men agree with statement 5d more than feminine women. One
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possible interpretation is that feminine women, being sex-typed, have a very
traditional view of women's role in society which makes them especially unwilling
to support the idea of special help for women artists and that this unwillingness
shows up most in comparison with feminine men.
4.10 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter set out to apply the theoretical insights of Chapters Two and Three to
the empirical study of people's beliefs about women artists and women's art. The
claim was made that people's views on women artists, and the belief component of
their attitudes towards women's art, are influenced by stereotypical beliefs about
women. Specifically, it was predicted that the origins of these stereotypical beliefs
lie in social identity and in personal identity. To test this prediction required a
method which would allow for the gathering of views on women artists and
women's art whilst manipulating social identity and personal identity variables and
it was argued that the analytic survey represents such a method.
The empirical study utilised a specially prepared survey instrument which contained
a number of statements about women artists and women's art. It also contained
two items which allowed subjects to be self-categorised in terms of whether or not
they were feminists and in terms of their gender. In addition, the BSRI was used
to classify subjects by sex-role categorisation. Two samples were selected: a
student sample and an arts professionals sample. Their responses to the survey
instrument statements were used to test the hypothesis that social identity and
personal identity influence stereotypical beliefs in that feminism, gender and sex-
role categorisation are associated with differences in response to the survey
instrument statements.
The results of the analytic survey confirmed this hypothesis. In all five of the
survey's general thematic areas, some influence of these social identity (feminism
and gender) and personal identity (sex-role orientation) variables was noted. This
demonstrates that people's views of women artists and the cognitive component of
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their attitudes towards women's art consist, in part, in stereotypical beliefs. These
stereotypical beliefs arise from social and personal identity and so confirmation of
the hypothesis reveals that people's beliefs about women artists and their attitudes
towards women's art are influenced by their social and personal identities.
Although the hypothesis was not intended to be directional, it nevertheless proved
useful to examine the detail of how these three independent variables influenced
subjects' responses. Certain combinations of social and personal identity seemed
to have particularly noticeable effects on subjects' responses. For example, in a
number of cases, non-feminist, masculine men had views which were in opposition
to those of others. In addition, the combination of whether someone was a
feminist or not and that person's gender seemed to have a strong effect on his or
her responses, as did the combination of whether someone was a feminist or not
and that person's sex-role orientation. In a number of cases, a 'double
categorisation effect' seemed to be in operation in which the stereotyping
influences of one aspect of social identity were magnified by the stereotyping
influences of the other aspect of social identity or by sex-role categorisation. This
bears interesting parallels with some of the theoretical issues of cross-category
stereotyping discussed in Chapter Three.
One of the themes in the survey instrument was 'prejudice'. The statements which
comprised this theme, 41, 4b and Ia, asked subjects to respond to statements about
whether standards for judging women's art ought to be different from those used
to judge men's art (statement 4a), whether they actually are different (statement
4b) and whether it is more difficult for women artists to receive recognition
(statement la). Although the subjects' responses to these questions showed some
variability due to the influence of social and personal identity, it is noteworthy that
there was a very obvious trend in the responses as a whole. Among students, only
5% or subjects admitted, in response to statement 4a, to a belief that the standards
for judging women's art should differ from those used for judging men's art.
Among the arts professionals, no-one admitted to this belief However, in
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response to statement 4b. 52% of student subjects and 78% of arts professional
subjects agreed that 'the public' did. in fact, apply different standards. Moreover,
in response to statement 1a, 45% of student subjects and 78% of arts professional
subjects agreed that it is more difficult for women artists to receive recognition.
This demonstrates that although almost all subjects denied that prejudicial
standards should be applied to women artists and their work, well over half of all
subjects believed that different standards are in fact applied and that women artists
suffered a lack of recognition.
Several conclusions may now be drawn from the analytic survey.
Firstly, people hold stereotypical beliefs which influence their views of women
artists and their attitudes towards women's art (insofar as those stereotypical
beliefs constitute the cognitive component of such attitudes). These stereotyping
effects are related to aspects of social and personal identity and may be especially
strong if 'double categorisation effects' arise.
Secondly, people report a widespread belief that women artists are disadvantaged
in society and are assessed by means of standards which are not applied to men
artists.
Thirdly, people seem reluctant to admit that they, themselves, subscribe to the
notion that women artists should be treated differently from men artists.
These conclusions raise a further interesting question. If people's views on women
artists and the cognitive component of their attitudes to women's art are in part
caused merely by aspects of social identity and personal identity, then public views
on women artists and their work seem prey to social forces which are independent
of questions of actual artistic worth or merit. Moreover, there is a widespread
belief that the effect of these social forces is that women artists are disadvantaged.
This raises the question of how people responsible for: maintaining and supporting
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women artists and their work deal with these issues. In particular, it introduces the
possibility that arts professionals who have such responsibilities may, themselves,
have views on women's art which are socially conditioned and may even be
prejudicial.
It is unlikely that survey methodology will contribute usefully to an exploration of
this further question. In the first place, subjects' responses to statement 4a show
that people are unlikely to express a willingness to apply overtly different standards
to women artists from those they would apply to men. Moreover, Wetherell and
Potter (1992) have argued that many forms of prejudicial expression are
specifically designed to avoid being seen as overtly prejudicial. It seem, then, that
if this further research question - how do arts professionals deal with the
disadvantaged status of women artists and their own possible prejudices - is to be
addressed, then a switch in methodology is called for. In discussing the similar
difficulty of analysing racial prejudice, Wetherell and Potter (1992) have advocated
the use of discourse analysis.
The following chapter pursues the question of how arts professionals view
themselves in relation to women's arts, given the twin difficulties of the
disadvantaged status of such art and their own possible prejudices. In line with
Wetherell and Potter's suggestions, the methodology used to explore these issues
is the discourse analysis approach. Accordingly, Chapter Five begins with a
discussion of the relative merits of traditional social identity theory approaches to
analysing identity and argues for the value of the discourse analysis approach. A
brief outline of discourse analysis is then offered. Following this, a number of
extracts from interviews with arts professionals are analysed with the aim of
exploring the extent to which arts professionals are able to deal with the
problematic status of women's art and their own beliefs which might potentially be
construed as prejudiced against women artists.
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DEFENDING IDENTITIES: BIAS AGAINST WOMEN'S ART AND
ARIS PROFESSIONALS' SENSE OF SELF
S.l Introduction
In Chapter Four it was shown that public attitudes towards women's art are
socially constructed phenomena which depend in part on memberships of social
groups and also on more individualistic features such as sex-role categorisation.
One consequence of this, it was argued, is that women's art is perceived to suffer
from a generalised prejudice in comparison with men's art. The purpose of this
chapter is to explore the consequences of this 'generalised prejudice' for those
whose occupational role includes a commitment to support women artists and
promote women's art. To this end, themes which arose during a series of
interviews with male and female arts professionals will be explored by the analytic
method known as 'discourse analysis'. The goal of this analysis is to illuminate
how those employed as arts professionals construct 'versions' of themselves in
discourse which avoid potentially damaging associations between their own
occupational activities and the apparently low status of women in the world of art
and artistic production.
The motivation for adoption of the discourse analytic method is as follows. If
indeed, the occupational role of arts professionals is seen to be endangered those
interviewed about women artists and women's art will attend to two apparently
contradictory issues in arriving at a sense of self as arts professionals. As members
of the arts establishment, might they be perceived as biased against women artists
and women's art? On the other hand, as promoters of women's art, does this
signify involvement with a low status group? These kinds of issues are
representative of the kinds of issues which have presented difficulties for traditional
approaches to social identity theory.
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Self-descriptions which ascribe negative characteristics such as bias or prejudice to
oneself are problematic for social identity theory because, as recent studies in
stereotyping have revealed, expressions of prejudice may be subtle, rather than
overt (Vrugt and Nauta, 1995). These studies have also revealed that forms of
prejudice such as sexism may include benevolent as well as hostile elements (Glick
and Fiske, 1996). Indeed, Wetherell and Potter (1992) have argued that in many
cultures forms of subtle or ambivalent sexism are a normal means of expressing
prejudiced views while attending to issues of impression management. Wetherell
and Potter argue that many expressions of prejudice are carefully designed to avoid
imputations of bias against the person making the prejudiced statement. Because
of this they conclude that the most accurate way to examine subtle or ambivalent
forms of prejudice is by a careful analysis of the forms of talk which are used in
making the prejudiced claims.
Association with low status groups represents a second difficulty for social identity
theory. It is not clear, on the basis of social identity theory, why people associated
with a low status group should accept this low status view of their own group.
Condor (1990), criticises social identity theorists for taking the consensuality of
stereotypes to be an 'a priori assumption' without saying why different groups
should subscribe to the same stereotypes. In particular, Widiger and Settle (1987)
point out that social identity theory does not account for the phenomenon of
negative self-stereotyping. Evaluations of women by women show that women
themselves endorse negative stereotypes of women such as 'irrational' or 'passive'.
(Spears and Manstead, 1989). Evidence such as this of the derogation of the in-
group, and related findings on out-group favouritism, have led Hinkle and Brown
(1990) to suggest that the phenomenon of out-group favouritism represents a
theoretical difficulty for social identity theory.
Phenomena such as negative stereotyping of the in-group have, nevertheless, been
discussed within the terms of social identity theory. For example, Tajfel (1982),
Tajfel and Turner (1986) and Hogg and Turner (1987) have suggested that at
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times stereotypes of the in-group will reflect that group's position In society
whether positive or negative. Thus social identity theorists attempt to resolve the
ambiguity between the hypothesis of in-group justification and out-group
favouritismof disadvantaged groups; they appeal to the perceived 'legitimacy' and
'stability' of the system or on the extent to which group members are able to
conceive of 'cognitive alternatives' to the current state of affairs. When negative
images of the in-group are seen as both legitimate and unlikely to change,
disadvantaged groups may internalise harmful stereotypes of themselves. When
these stereotypes, however, are perceived as unfair or open to change, in-group
favouritism will prevail once again and negative stereotyping of the in-group will
disappear (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).
Critics, however, might argue that the appeal to perceptions of legitimacy or
stability of social systems fails to explain why individuals do not re-assess their
notions of legitimacy (in a socially creative way), or seek to challenge social
stability, rather than accept the status quo. This acceptance is difficult to square
with the centrality of group membership enhancing self esteem which lay at the
heart of social identity theory in its original form. The need for active debate with
such conceptions of legitimacy and stability is underlined by Jost and Banaji
(1994). They suggest that the traits on which subordinate groups positively
differentiate themselves may actually serve to reinforce the status quo, by creating
stereotypes whereby these subordinate groups (less advantaged groups) are seen
by themselves and others as accommodating or content (easygoing) or not
particularly concerned with achievement. Perceptions concerning the stability and
legitimacy of the status quo or the extent to which it is undisputedly or widely
accepted as valid may reflect what Jost and Banaji term 'system justification'. In
this mode of stereotyped thought, justification of the status quo frequently
outweighs the individual's defence of group interests. In cases of this nature,
negative stereotyping of the in-group seems to function as a means of justifying an .
unequal state of affairs, even at the expense of personal or group interest (Sidanius
and Pratto, 1993).
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Jost and Banaji argue that, from an ideological perspective, because the ideas of
the dominant tend to become the ideas of the dominated, stereotypes may be
advanced even by those who stand to lose by them, in order to preserve an
apparent 'justness' of their situation. This form of stereotyping, it is argued, may
override motives to justify the positions or actions of the self or group, thus
leading to negative stereotyping of the self or in-group and to the high degree of
consensuality of stereotypes. People make sense of existing states of affairs by
assigning attributes to the self and others that are consonant with the roles or
positions occupied by individuals and groups. Stereotypes serve a system-
justification function for those who subscribe to them to the extent that prevailing
systems of social arrangements are justified and reproduced.
Critics might argue that this suggestion lacks a proper analysis of what it is about
'dominant' ideologies that makes them dominant. To suggest that a stereotype
which imparts low esteem to a group is dominant within a culture because it is
accepted by all members of that culture, including the low-esteem group itself is
insufficient by way of explanation. Even if the dominance of the prevailing
ideology is being taken to explain acceptance the acceptance of a low self-esteem
stereotype this cannot, in tum, explainthe dominance of the prevailingideology.
One possible means of resolving debates such as those described is to accept the
discourse analytic approach to self and identity, and to view self-categorisations as
elements of discourse which people selectively draw upon in portraying
themselves. The discourse analytic approach deals with the problem of self-
acceptance of low-esteem stereotypes by explicitly addressing the issue of
argumentation. Billig (1987; 1991), for example, explicitly advocates considering
human interaction in terms of argument. His claim is that theories such as social
identity theory have over-estimated the power of stereotypes by concentrating
solely o~ the generalisation of thought which they provide. Billig suggests that
alongside any social generalisation, it is possible to discover discrete
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particularisation which challenges or modifies the claim made by means of the
generalisation. This means, in the case of stereotypes, that when researchers find
stereotypes to be in use, the researchers will also tend to find that subjects will
make exceptions to the stereotype's general rule by formulating particular cases
which stand outside that rule.
Social interaction involving stereotypes can, therefore, be thought of in terms of
debate, where the general consequences of the stereotype are opposed by specific
instances of particularisation which seek to challenge, or make exception to, that
generalisation. Central to this debate is what Billig (I987) terms 'witcraft'.
'Witcraft' is a perspective which regards everyday talk as specifically designed to
address matters of generality versus particularisation. Billig is careful to point out
that not all forms of communication involve witcraft, and not all attributions of
stereotyped thinking are unsound. However, Billig also claims that when situations
are perceived by participants to be 'difficult', 'problematic' or 'open to argument',
the processes of ordinary talk which he identifies as witcraft will come into play.
It follows that, when pursuing the question of how arts professionals view
themselves in relation to women's arts, there is good reason for adopting a
discourse analytic perspective. A review of stereotyped ways of thinking, such as
the survey of stereotypical beliefs about women's art presented in Chapter Four, is
useful in those cases where categorisations are explicitly manipulated by
experimental means. However, such a process is unlikely to illuminate cases where
such stereotypical attributions are likely to be seen as 'problematic' or 'difficult'
for the targets of such stereotypes. And it can be predicted that the sense of self
which arts professionals will display will address the problematic issues of bias and
low status. The work of Wetherell and Potter (1992) and Billig (1991) suggests
that in cases of this type, people are likely to display sophisticated
conceptualisations of themselves which negotiate these problems through the
formation of carefully designed accounts. These accounts display the sorts of
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distinction-drawing and exception-making which Billig refers to as
'particularisation' .
A central claim of discourse analysis is that when people use language to
characterise their social world, they do so in a constructive fashion. Before
exploring the way in which the arts professionals constructively develop a sense of
self, it is useful to begin by reviewing the theoretical and methodological features
which characterise the discourse analytic approach
5.2 Discoune Analysis
There are different approaches within the discourse analytic tradition (Fairclough,
1992). At one extreme, are the attempts to analyse discourse in terms of broad
socio-political factors (e.g. Parker, 1992). The antecedents of this approach can be
traced back to Foucault's (1972) post-structuralist claims that language must be
viewed as a historical force though which ideologies are developed and maintained.
For discourse analysts, this means that the analyst must study the derivation of
'discourses', linked sets of statements which create or construct social phenomena.
The analytic goal is to understand the way in which these systems of statements are
inter-related. Thus, for example, Foucault (1977) offers an analysis of political
power relations by studying the way in which texts on crime and punishment reflect
wider features of the interaction between the individual and the state.
At the other extreme, some discourse analysts display a conceptual lineage which
can be traced back to the work of the ethnomethodologists. According to the
ethnomethodologist, our mundane world is made up of everyday activities (getting
up for breakfast, meeting work colleagues, going to the theatre) which we
understand largely in terms of the cornmon-sense social setting within which they
take place. By 'making sense' of everyday events, an ethnomethodologist means
the process by which normal people assign a specific character to these events.
That is, the sort of common sense understanding which people would be hard
pressed to see as anything other than 'the obvious' meaning of what is going on.
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The idea here is that in this sort of 'making sense out of everyday life' the
knowledge which people bring to bear on the context is so 'obvious' that, for
participants, it is practically invisible. An important point is that, for the
ethnomethodologist, this 'making sense' is a constructive activity in that people
work together to construct an understanding of the social setting they co-inhabit.
Moreover, 'making sense' requires that people have methods which they apply to
achieve this construction. The focus of ethnomethodology, then, is on studying the
methods which people utilise so that their social actions come to seem normal and
sensibleto them.
Garfinkel (1967) suggests that to study people's methods for making sense of the
social world requires paying attention to the accounts which they offer of the
world as seen from their own point of view. Here the concern is not with 'true' or
'false' accounts, but rather with the sorts of accounts which are offered - the
'accounting practices'. Garfinkel's idea is that if the analyst studies the sorts of
accounts which people offer of their actions (in providing explanations, or
defences, or examples, or instructions) then this provides an understanding of the
'commonplace' knowledge which these people are relying on in making sense of
their own activities. An example of this approach is Weider's (1974) study of
people who had been convicted of crimes involving drugs. These people were
living in a 'halfway house' facility which aimed to rehabilitate them into normal
society. Wieder conducted interviews with these residents, during the course of
which, he discovered that the residents lived by what they called 'the code'. In
order to be a 'regular guy', a resident had to live by the code and this code
motivated a whole range of behaviours likely to deter rehabilitation. These
behaviours included: avoidance of 'coping out' or confessing to anything; helping
other residents avoid detection; avoiding 'messing' with other residents' criminal
activities; refusing to trust staff, and remainingloyal to other residents.
Wider (1974~ noted that this code was known to staff as well as to inmates, and
that the staff relied upon the code in explaining residents' behaviours. Staff used
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the code as a form of 'folk knowledge' which could explain the events and actions
they observed. So, for example, a sulky refusal to take part in group discussion
could be portrayed as perfectly understandable because it exhibited aspects of the
code. So staff were able to 'tell the code' as a means of explaining how they saw
the residents' actions as reasonable. Staff also classified and categorised residents'
activities in a way that appeared, to the staff, perfectly understandable. This
classifying activity too relied upon the use of elements of the residents' own code.
Wieder is at pains to point out that this code was not something (like a prison's
rule book) which existed independently of the daily life of the residents. Rather,
their daily life involved constant discussion about what was going on, and this
discussion involved elements of the code, and so 'telling the code' was both an
activity which the residents engaged in and a means whereby they, and the staff,
could represent and understand their activities. What Weider's 'telling the code'
study illuminates is that, as people make sense of their everyday world, they
provide accounts which demonstrate the unproblematic status of their own and
others' beliefs and actions. According to ethnomethodologists, these accounts are
not to be viewed as a more or less reliable way of getting at 'the facts', but rather
as a topic for investigation in their own right. This is because the accounts, in part,
constitute the social activities which they purport to describe, or explain or defend.
More recently, the attention given to people's own understandings of their social
world by studying discursive activities had been taken up by discourse analysts
who have a special interest in conversational structures. This form of discourse
analysis, usually termed 'conversation analysis', focuses on the fact that
conversations normally have a highly patterned structure. Conversation is
structured so that a conversational tum from one person is followed by a tum from
another. Only about five per cent of conversation involves tum overlap, and yet
the pauses between turns are typically around half a second. According to
conversation analysts this is explained by the fact that there is a set of tum-taking
rules which people implicitly follow in conversations. Firstly, people unconsciously
recognise what constitutes an appropriately sizeable unit of conversation. The
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boundaries of units of this sort are implicitly recognised as 'transition relevant
places': points in the conversation at which a changeover from one speaker to
another would pass un-remarked by participants. These are often 'marked' by
vocal changes, and by verbal or noverbal 'closure tokens'. Coping with transitions
from one speaker to the next is also aided by the fact that participants jointly
construct and monitor a localised conversational context. One simple example of
this is the so-called 'adjacency pair', examples of which are, question-answer,
request-granting (or rejection) and offer-acceptance (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973).
One important aspect of adjacency pair constructions is that people normally have
a preference for one possible response over another, so that one response can be
termed the preferred response, and the other the dispreferred response. Thus when
someone issues a request, usually the preferred response would constitute a
granting of that request.
When a dispreferred response is uttered, this is usually marked in some way. There
may, for example, be a delay in replying, or indications of hesitancy or a relatively
complex response where a simple response such as 'No' would have achieved the
same rejection. What has just been described is an example of how ordinary
people routinely perform what conversation analysts describe as 'conversational
work' . There is a point in uttering a hesitant, complexly structured refusal of a
request. It allows the recipient of the request to demonstrate to the person who
made the request that the refusal is not being made in an unthinking, rude way for
which there are no good grounds. Thus, for conversation analysts, it is often as
important to note the extra conversational work which is accomplished in uttering
a refusal as it is to note the refusal itself Perhaps the clearest indication of this is
represented by cases where people offer accounts. In these cases, the person may
well be seen to accomplish an excuse, or a mitigation, or an apology while in the
act of uttering the refusal itself For conversation analysts, what is important about
this extra conversational work is that it allow the analyst to 'read off' from the.
participant's conversational contribution the 'orientation' which that person takes
to the conversation's preceding tum. For example, a conversational participant
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may perform conversational work which transforms the answer to a question into
an explanation or justification. The analyst can then 'read off', from the response,
that the participant has oriented to the preceding conversational tum as an
accusation, even if the preceding tum had the apparent form of a question. A
number of examples of just this sort of conversational work are presented by Drew
(1985) in his study of courtroom conversations. In one example, Drew offers an
extract from a cross-examination of Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officers
about why they failed to quell a riot. In the cross examination the RUC officers
can be seen to provide accounts, apparently spontaneously, of why action against
the rioters was unnecessary:
Counsel You saw this newspaper shop being petrol bombed on the
front of Divis Street?
Yes.
How many petrol bombs were thrown into it?
Only a couple. I felt that the window was already broken
and that there was part of it burning and this was a
rekindling of the flames
Witness
Counsel
Witness
(Drew, 1985)
In this example, the legal counsel does not accuse the officer of failing to respond
appropriately to prevent the bombing, he merely asks the officer how many petrol
bombs were thrown. However, the officer's response demonstrates that he orients
to the counsel's question as though the counsel had issued an accusation. It is this
orientation which leads him to proffer his account of why action on his part was
not necessary. By introducing the idea that the property WaS already damaged, and
that the bombs merely 'rekindled' existing fires, he avoids tackling issues such as
whether the rioters were the sort of people who should be arrested. It is in this
sense that the conversation analyst's interpretations claim to be the participants'
interpretation of, and the participants' orientation towards, what was said before.
Lying somewhere between the extremes of Foucauldian analysis and conversation
analysis is the approach to discourse which focuses on identifying 'repertoires' or
'variable accounts'. An essential aspect of this approach is that deployment of
discourse mechanisms and practices should be understood as having specific goals.
According to this approach, when people provide accounts, they can be seen to be
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performing particular social actions. In part, this line of thought derives from the
work of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) on speech act theory. Their view was
that analyses of language which treat language as essentially a mechanism for
describing the world are flawed. Instead, they argued, language should be viewed
as a means of accomplishing various social acts such as issuing warnings, uttering
threats and paying compliments. Some discourse analysts have adopted this view
of language as performative of social acts, but depart from speech act theory by
saying, firstly, that the range of actions which people routinely deploy in uttering
apparently simple accounts is far greater than speech act theory allows for.
Secondly, these analysts also claim that many of the actions performed via account
construction, such as blaming, explaining, mitigating and justifying, are not
identifiable in terms of special linguistic constructions. Rather, the action a person
performs in generating an account is only fully understood by examining the way
that account is constructed in relation to the local discursive context in which that
account is produced. One means of accomplishing this analysis is to study the
similarities and variability which can be observed within a number of different
accounts of the same or similar sets of beliefs, actions or events.
Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), for example, studied a group of biochemists by
interviewing them and by examining their letters to one another. Gilbert and
Mulkay discovered that the biochemists, in giving accounts of what they and others
were doing while developing competing biochemical theories, used particular
discursive strategies. Gilbert and Mulkay called these discursive strategies
'interpretative repertoires'. One crucial finding was that the biochemists, in
informaI settings, used two different kinds of repertoire. In accounting for their
own work, the biochemists' own view would be portrayed, by means of the
'empiricist repertoire' as connected directly to the evidence. The competing view -
the 'faIse' view - would be portrayed, by means of the 'contingent repertoire', as
arising out of contingent factors such as the competitor's flawed personality.
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Gilbert and Mulkay noted that the 'contingent' account of a competitor's work is a
requirement for the use of 'empiricist' accounts of one's own work: If one's own
'correct' view can be taken to derive un-problematically from the facts, it is difficult
to explaining how one's competitors could make the mistake of rejecting such an
obviously correct explanation. The answer lies in the asymmetry of contingent and
empiricist accounts. The contingent repertoire not only allowed the user of that
discursive mechanism to portray competitors' views as false, but also to provide an
account for mistaken views, grounded in contingent features such as flaws in the
competitor's personality. The Gilbert and Mulkay example demonstrates that, by
attending to similarities and variability in accounts, the analyst is able to establish
that apparently simple accounts are actually used to perform complex tasks, such
as establishing one's own view as correct while providing an undermining for a
competitor's view. According to discourse analysts, these actions need not be
considered to be deliberate attempts to mislead or confuse. Rather, the discursive
mechanisms which people deploy in achieving sophisticated social actions through
discourse are considered as everyday aspects of language use which people acquire
through normal socialisation and deploy in almost all contexts of social interaction.
This flexibility in the use of discursive mechanisms has now been displayed in a
wide variety of settings. Discursive mechanisms are even used in cases where the
'social phenomenon' under discussion is a publicly observable physical locale - the
sort of phenomenon which might seem the paradigm case of an objective fact not
open to discursive construction. For example, in a recent paper, Macnaghten
(1993) describes discursive practices revealed by a public inquiry examining
proposals for a landfill site. Much of the debate during the inquiry took place
between council officials and the developers who wanted to tum the proposed site
into a landfill area. Macnaghten found that although there was disagreement in
what each party wanted for the site, the councillors and developers tended to agree
in using a particular type of discourse which appealed to nature. In fact,
Macnaghten identifies a number different discursive 'versions' or 'constructions' of
nature. These include: nature as 'wilderness', nature as 'passive visual harmony'
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and nature as the 'harmony of activities'. Macnaghten reveals that both council
officials and developers appealed to these notions in providing accounts of what
would be the consequences of allowing the landfill operation.
For example, Macnaghten shows that the councillors use the 'wilderness' discourse
to argue that nature involves wilderness and that because the landfill site would
prevent wilderness, it is inconsistent with nature, and so the development should
not go ahead. Macnaghten then shows that the developers are able to use the same
'wilderness' discourse to argue that nature is wilderness, but that wilderness has
already been prevented in the area proposed for the site. On this basis, the
developers conclude that the landfill site proposal should therefore go ahead, since
the area proposed for use as a landfill site can no longer be categorised as 'nature'.
What Macnaghten concludes from his study is that the availability of these
discourses demonstrates the way participants were able to construct different
versions of 'nature' to suit different points in the debate.
What 'repertoire' or 'variable account' forms of discursive analyses reveal, then, is
that even so-called 'hard science' facts are open to discursive re-formulation, and
even publicly observable 'objective' facts such as physical locales are susceptible to
social construction through discourse. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that social
groups, and the identities which stem from membership of them, are likewise open
to discursive negotiation. In one set of interviews Potter and Wetherell (1988)
questioned onlookers of riots which occurred during demonstrations by anti-
apartheid campaigners protesting about the 1981 Springbok rugby tour of New
Zealand. Onlookers, as subjects, had the task of accounting for the violence and
conflict they observed. Potter and Wetherell draw from these accounts a number
of different versions of 'the self' which subjects drew on. Potter and Wetherell
isolate three of these versions: the idea of 'the ordinary person' (applicable to the
police) the idea of the 'genuine' demonstrator and the idea of the demonstrator
whose motives are 'not genuine': an example of a New Zealander's accounting
device which Potter and Wetherell call 'the stirrer'.
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The work of Widdicombe (1993) provides another example of the discursive
opportunities offered by social identification. In her study of how young people
accounted for the way they became 'gothic', the wearing of black clothes, leather
jackets, dramatic eye makeup and long black hair, Widdicombe revealed that her
subjects were able to manipulate discourse terms relating to identity to achieve
specific effects. She interviewed a number of people at rock concerts, asking them
how they came to belong to this specific 'subculture'. Her interest was in the
dilemma which questions about identity posed for such individuals. It would, for
example, be relatively straightforward for her subjects to construe their own social
identity in terms of the social groups which their clothing seems to make salient -
the goths. But simple identification with goths as a group is potentially
problematic: in being thought of as the sort of person who merely copies a trend.
Widdicombe isolated three aspects of the accounts given by her subjects which
address this potential problem for the account givers, and shows that the accounts
people offered of themselves as goths were designed to avoid any inference that
they became gothic to copy others.
Widdicombe (1993) noted that these accounts were carefully designed to avoid the
problematic inference of copying by 'negotiating' the existence of similar others.
Subjects achieved this by emphasising that their own dressing as gothic occurred
before meeting others who dressed in that way, and indeed their own choice of
dress arose in ignorance of the existence of others who did likewise. What this
suggests is that in providing accounts of oneself, an individual can be seen to use
such accounts to construct a social identity. Moreover, as Widdicombe shows,
these accounts can be tailored to resolve difficulties which individuals may perceive
in their account of self In the Widdicombe example, the problem for the subjects
is to maintain a sense of individuality and to avoid been seen as 'part of the herd'.
The subjects' discursive solution was to establish by means of their accounts
differences, as well as similarities, between self and relevant others. This shows
that, from the discourse analytic perspective, there is a sense in which people can
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self-ascribe categorisations while, at the same time, avoid all of the implications
which go with those categorisations. To this extent, the categorisations employed
in depicting the self are not fixed external phenomena, but rather are account-
generated constructions.
What most of forms of discourse analysis agree upon, then, is the idea that
discourse cannot be regarded as a neutral medium which merely reflects an
objective reality. Instead, discourse is regarded as a topic for analysis in its own
right, with the assumption that features of the social world, as understood by
actors within that world, are socially constructed phenomena. People draw
selectively from a range of discursive resources in order to provide a 'version' of
the social phenomenon under discussion. Further, the discourse analyst claims
that, as social actors, we only have access to social phenomena in terms of such
'versions'. For us, the social world is constructed by our discursive practices
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987). In considering questions of self-hood and identity,
the discourse analyst examines the ways in which people develop constructive
accounts of their own identities in order to negotiate whatever identity problems
may arise in the local discursive context.
In common with Widdicombe's goths, arts professionals have an identity problem.
They are associated with a form of art which is under-valued and against which
they may be suspected of bias. The question of how the arts professionals make
use of discursive resources in responding to this identity problem is explored in
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 which follow.
Section 5.3 addresses a problem acknowledged by the arts profession: the lack of
proper representation of women in the arts. Of course, one potential explanation
for this state of affairs is to assume that women's art is perceived, by those whose
responsibility it is to support the arts, as inferior to men's art. The difficulty in
adopting this explanation, for those working in the arts, is that the arts profession
is presented as essentially biased. In section 5.3 which follows, arts professionals
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comment on their working relationship with women artists and women's art. It
can be seen that in so doing they avoid any appearance that they, as arts
professionals, view women's art as lacking in merit. Instead, the lack of success of
women's art is seen to arise out of a number of objective or societal features or out
of personal features of women artists themselves.
In Section 5.4, the focus of attention switches to the idea of women only arts
events. If women artists are perceived to suffer from a pervasive public prejudice,
then one possible resolution of this might be forms of positive discrimination such
as arts events in which only women could take part. The various responses of the
arts professionals to this idea are presented. It is shown that these responses are
carefully crafted to avoid imputations of personal prejudice. Among men, this is
seen in the way they formulate rejections of the idea that women's arts events
should be staged. Among women. it is seen in the way they formulate acceptance
of the idea that women's art events should be staged.
5.3 Women Artists and Women's Art
The current section presents data taken from a series of interviews with men and
women who are employed within the arts profession. The interview protocol and
its rationale are presented in Appendix V. During these interviews, the arts
professionals were asked whether they 'had a position' on women's arts. The
question which subject's responses pose is: do arts professionals attend to matters
of identity when they talk about women's art? That is, when subjects talk about
women artists, do they frame their replies in such a way that they can be seen to
orient to the interviewer's questions in a given way. Specifically, do the subjects
hear the question as a potential accusation of bias against women artists in that
they spontaneously generate accounts which can be seen to defuse potential
accusations of bias.
One feature of the following extracts which is especially worthy of note is the
gendered status of the accounts on offer. Male arts professionals are seen to
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provide accounts which differ markedly in from those offered by female arts
professionals. This is, perhaps, not surprising. When dealing with the issue of
whether women artists are subjects of biased treatment by the arts establishment,
male arts professionals are faced with a doubly problematic issue. They have to
deal with the question of whether they may be perceived as biased against women
artists because they, as arts professionals are part of the arts establishment.
Additionally, they have to deal with the possible perception of themselves as biased
against women artists because they are men. As the extracts show, this double
jeopardy causes the male arts professionals to provide carefully constructed
accounts in response to the question of whether they 'have a position' on women
artists.
When male arts professionals were asked the question: 'Do you have a position in
relation to women artists?', they tended to produce one or other of two responses,
both explicitly oriented to the question of whether the subject himself is in any way
prejudiced against women artists. The first sort of response explicitly sets out a
non-prejudicial approach to women. The second sort of account includes an
explicit admission of some sort of gender prejudice or imbalance.
Male arts professionals: 'non-prejudice •accounts
The first sort of account is typified by an expression of non-prejudice which is
supplemented by a description of specific example of provision made for a woman
artist. This non-prejudiced practice is depicted as occurring in an unplanned
fashion, rather than as the result of a specific position or policy.
Bob (A position) within my work here there are women artists who I work
with from time to time one is the person who is writing our community
musical and another is on our staff and is the development worker for
the centre so I don't have a position in relation to
Int. In relation to women artists
Bob Wen, I mean, I don't see any difference between women artists and men
artists everyone ought to get the same opportunities
Tim We don't have views as such other than that we use them a lot both in
153
Chapter Five
terms of actually on the acting side we have used them and we have
also used women extensively for designers, lighting designers and
directors over the last few years although we don't I suppose have a set
policy it is something that I think is inherent we are kind of very open
we basically go for the best people and they often happen to be women
Jon It is difficult to define a position in respect of women artists in
particular I like to think that women artists are part of the spectrum of
artists whether musical or visual arts or whatever and so in a way I try
not to discriminate between the two at the moment this exhibition up
here is by a woman and in fact most of our visual arts exhibitions here
are female but that is not by any means a particular policy it is just how
it happens
All three extracts display a similar form. Each of the extracts contains an
expression of non-discrimination against women artists. In each case, this is
amplified by a listing of the involvement of women within the subject's own
workplace. Bob points out that 'There are women artists who I work with from
time to time' and Tim emphasises 'actually on the acting side we have used them
and we have also used women extensively for designers, lighting designers and
directors'. Similarly, Jon states that' At the moment this exhibition up here is by a
woman and in fact most of our visual arts exhibitions here are female'. This
carefully described lack of discrimination is depicted as a following naturally from
the nature of the art and artists with which the subject has been involved, rather
than from explicit policy or personal viewpoint.
What these accounts share, then, is a commonly held interpretation of the question,
by subjects, in terms of whether as arts professional they are biased against women.
Subjects also adopt a commons means of resolving this perceived threat to identity.
They demonstrate that they themselves are unbiased, a fact which can be 'read off'
from their explicitly specified support for women artists.
Male arts professionals: 'prejudice I accounts
The following accounts can be contrasted with the more complex responses
produced by male subjects who do express some fonn of discriminatory practice or
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viewpoint. The accounts also orient to the question in such a way that the subject
can be seen to interpret it as a question about bias against women artists. In these
cases, however, the subject admits to some form of bias, but this admission is
carefully formulated by setting the description of bias within the context of an
explicitly un-biased general position or policy. So whereas male professionals who
describe themselves as unbiased describe themselves as acting without the need for
specific policies, those who admit to some type of bias explicitly contrast this with
a more general un-biased policy which they describe themselves as adhering to.
Rob Yes in the sense I have views on women artists yes definitely the centre
has an ethos statement you mayor may not know which really demands
we programme a broad range and that we get all the community
involved and that we get everything as much as we can involved in the
arts and we're supposed to pile everything in so you know we tend to
kind of look at ethnic minorities and involve women as far as possible
but I think I'm aware that we don't have as high an input of women's
groups as we should have I think I'm aware that there's a question
mark over this centre's attitudes to women as a whole
Ken Professional first I think you are as good as your last venture in terms
of this here we have now particularly in the administration more female
members of staff than male that has not been absolutely deliberate in
terms of positive discrimination although I think that there has been a
tendency towards that I think that is very healthy I think it has been
very good that we now have young women in the staff here beginning
to come into quite important and influential positions and I think that
has been a good thing and I think we should have more of that I mean
somebody for example recently said well the next job that comes up it
would be good if it was a man it would balance out the fact that there
are a lot of women here I don't disagree with that but ifpushed I think I
would feel and now I suppose I am veering from the professional into
the personal as well but I think it is both I would say anyway I would
rather it was a woman I feel as though that is a good thing to have and I
think it has brought a different way of working this is said against a
background of course where the senior management here the people the
four directors three artistic directors and me are all men so I think it is
against that background that I am saying this
Dan do I have a position in relation to women artists I suppose I put my
position as this that as far as I possibly can I don't recognise any sectors
of discrimination whatever the basis of the person might be whether
they are male or female whether they are black or white whether they
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are homosexual or heterosexual as far as I am concerned I try and offer
that service now I recognise and I try to be honest about this that
particularly from my age grouping there are certain in-built prejudices
but my attitude to prejudices is that you don't pretend that they don't
exist you confront them and challenge them within yourself so I suspect
that built into me and it comes out occasionally through signals like
words or perhaps slightly patronising attitudes that I have got an in-
built attitude of my age and culture I am conscious of that and I fight it
In each of these cases, the subject ends his reply by admitting some form of
discriminatory practice or viewpoint. However, in these cases, the reply is
prefaced by an extended description of how that discriminatory reply should be
seen against a positive institutional or personal policy of non-discrimination. For
example, Rob begins his response to the question with 'Yes in the sense I have
views on women artists. Yes definitely. The centre has an ethos statement'. Ken
makes a somewhat more tentative start in identifying a policy: 'That has not been
absolutely deliberate in terms of positive discrimination although I think that there
has been a tendency towards that'. However, he then provides a relatively
extended positive evaluation of that tentatively stated policy: 'I think that is very
healthy. I think it has been very good .... I feel as though that is a good thing to
have'. Dan also provides an explicit policy statement which emphasises his non-
discriminatory stance: 'I suppose I put my position as this that as far as I possibly
can I don't recognise any sectors of discrimination' . '
Once again, subjects' can be seen to interpret the question asked as involving some
form of implication of biased practice. However, in these cases, the potential
threat to the subjects' own identities as unbiased arts professionals is dealt with in a
different way. By providing an admission of some sort of gender bias or imbalance
which is embedded within an explicitly non-biased policy statement, they are able
to present themselves as people who are in general un-biased, even if in particular
contexts their practice might appear to suggest otherwise.
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Female arts professionals: historical and structural accounts
For female arts professionals, the question: 'Do you have a position in relation to
women artists?' can be seen to carry different implications than was the case for
male arts professionals. Most importantly, there can be no implication for female
professionals that they are prejudiced against women artists because they are men.
This result of this is that women's responses take on a quite different character
from the responses of the men. None of the women interprets this question as
associated with direct bias or prejudice, in that none of them offers explicit
formulations of either un-biased or biased activities or policies. However, a
number of the women subjects still orient to the question as requmng an
explanation for the low status of women artists and women's art. These responses
comprise two sorts of accounts. The low status of women artists and women's art
is seen to derive either from generalised historical and social biases, as is shown
below, or from psychological difficulties among women artists themselves, as is
shown in the next sub-section.
In the 'generalised historical and social biases' responses, women subjects can be
seen to regard the question as in some way requiring explanation for the low status
of women artists. As was the case with the male subjects, the female arts
professionals attempt to address this issue in such a way that they, themselves, are
not responsible for the low status of women artists. Instead, this low status is
depicted as the outcome of large scale social pressures.
Sue Basically a questioning (position) where are they what happened to
them over the centuries my other particular position in life as it were if
you could say something like that would be actually black issues and
historical issues in general and I would love to think that all three were
compatible but the whole point is as far as I am concerned women's
issues women's rights and women's positions have over the centuries
been abused and misused and in that process women have become
marginalised inclusive of women artists.
Kay I find that quite a difficult statement if someone was to ask me do I see
myself as it feminist I would say yes certainly I think it is a historical
fact I don't think it is opinion that women artists and women's art has
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been defined and written over the centuries and been excluded women's
cultural and artistic products that is what I am saying
Mae Well I think well we'll start with women artists in general artists right
across the arts I felt that things are improving in terms of their
credibility but I think they're probably not improving this is my own
opiruon in terms of their availability as it were for instance
opportunities to show what they can do and there's still a great deal of
suspicion when women artists can get together collectively as a group
or as a people sort of class like oh this is feminist theatre which is
feminist art and somehow or other we have less credibility
Pat I have to say that (a position in relation to women artists) is not
foremost in my thinking about the arts but having said that I have come
to believe that women artists are not to the fore because they are
women artists as opposed to anything to do with their art it's difficult to
generalise I suppose but I would say that given the quality of a
woman's work would equal that of a male counterpart she would
probably have to struggle a great deal harder to have her work
exhibited and taken seriously
In each of these responses, the subject can be seen to treat the question as one
which calls for an explanation of the way in which women artists and women's art
are treated by the arts establishment. The form of account which this generates
allows the subject to demonstrate that bias against women's art arises because, as
Sue states, 'women's positions have over the centuries been abused and misused'
and because, according to Kay, 'women artists and women's art has been defined
and written over the centuries and been excluded'. In a similar vein, Mae refers to
lack of availability of opportunities for women artists compounded by 'a great deal
of suspicion when women artists can get together' while Pat casts the problem
with women's art as: '(a woman) would probably have to struggle a great deal
harder (than a man)'. As was the case with the male arts professionals, these
responses provide the subject with a means of tackling the thorny issue of the low
status of women artists and women's art. In addition, the nature of the responses
establish that as practising arts professionals, they themselves need not be regarded
as biased against women artists.
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Female arts professionals: psychological accounts
A second form of accounting is provided by some of the other women arts
professionals. Here again, the women demonstrate an interpretation of the
question as touching on the low status of women artists and women's art. Once
more, the explanatory accounts provided allow subjects to display that the cause of
this low status is not associated with their own practices as arts professionals.
Pam I don't (have a position in relation to women artists) I haven't in the
past identified artists by their sexuality by their gender I think I am
becoming increasingly aware of the professional limitations of being a
female artist not particularly me at the moment because I don't feel I
am in the midst of I am not really interested in the gallery and the
scrabbling for exhibitions any of these things at the moment so perhaps
I am not immediately responsive to it but I see it in other people's lives
and I see it in the activities of female friends who are working artists
when I start to see that maybe their activities are curbed by gender
Int. could you elaborate
Pam well I am a particular sort of woman and I think that my lack of
immediate concern with my own gender in terms of my profession is
indicative of my own personality which is quite strong and I have never
felt limited by my gender but I have friends who are perhaps more
conventionally female or are different kinds of women from me and are
givers and receivers of different kinds of gender messages and because
they don't behave in the way perhaps I behave they are often on the
receiving end of different forms of put-down restriction limitation just
because they are women
Bet Well taking women artists and my position of thought I feel that
women artists are definitely under-represented and they have a number
of constraints put on them at a disadvantage in relation to males artists
there's also I think great difficulty with women actually getting into and
surviving in the commercial sector it is very much a man's world
generally men have been better for whatever reasons social
psychological to make something I suppose make their egos visible sell
themselves as a personality because if you think abut a well known
contemporary Scottish arts there are very few women that would be
considered household names you're continually seeing people
interviewed and especially on television and it's exclusively a male
predominance I think that is largely due to women not selling
themselves or having the support to do so also career and job
opportunities are more difficult for women especially if they are
considering having a family
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In these responses, the women provide an explanation for women artists' lack of
success in terms of the psychological properties of women who are artists. Pam
contrasts her own 'strong' personality with that of others: 'I have friends who are
perhaps more conventionally female or are different kinds of women from me and
are givers and receivers of different kinds of gender messages'. Bet explains
women artists' lack success by saying that 'I think that is largely due to women not
selling themselves'. In Bet's case, this account is accompanied by a structural
account of the sort seen in the preceding section. So, just as with the other
women's historical and structural accounts, this appeal to women artists' own
weaknesses allows the subject to provide an explanation for women artists lack of
success which avoids any imputation of blame to themselves as practising arts
professionals.
5.4 Women's Arts Events
If women artists are perceived to suffer from biased treatment by the arts
administrative establishment, then one possible response might lie in forms of
positive discrimination such as arts events exclusively for women. Accordingly,
another question asked of the subjects was 'What is your position in relation to
women's arts events'. This question is also seen to pose potential problems for
arts professionals in terms of their ability to present themselves as unbiased
practitioners. When a subject rejects the idea of women's only arts events, this
rejection of positive discrimination in favour of women might be interpreted as
prejudice against women's art. It follows that subjects who respond negatively
might be expected to treat a negative reply as an accountable issue. However,
once again a gender difference is discernible in subjects' replies. Women do not
appear to regard this rejection of positive discrimination in favour of women artists
as an accountable issue, whereas men do.
Female professionals reject women's arts events
Where women subjects reject women's arts events, they provide replies which
display relatively simple structures with no specific accounting for the rejection of
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such events. The simple structure of women's rejections can be seen In the
following responses.
Deb we have never done (women's arts events) we have never presented
anything that was specifically for women
Int. have you had for example a play or a production which had an entire
cast of women
Deb no
Gil no I don't (have a position in relation to women's arts event)
Int. could you expand on that
Gil well why do women want to be exclusive like that is it because they
think they have been so badly done by before I don't think that having
women only events is going to change anything like that
Male professionals reject women's arts events
When male subjects reject women's arts events, their rejections are usually
carefully designed and are more elaborate. A possible reason for the nature of
these responses is that men treat rejection of women's arts events as accountable in
a way that women do not. That is, men face the two-fold difficulty which was first
seen in relation to their responses to women artists: their replies might be
interpretable as doubly prejudiced against women artists because they are both arts
professionals and men.
The male subjects can be seen to address two distinct issues in structuring their
negative responses. The first is a demonstration of some sort of support for such
events. The second is to provide an account of why, nevertheless, such events are
undesirable. Male subjects, as demonstrated in the extracts which follow, can be
seen to adopt a particular approach to these issues which has three components.
The first is a neutral or even positive evaluation of women's arts. The second is a
statement of personal involvement or support which outlines prior occasions on
which the subject has been involved in supporting women's art. The third is a
rejection of women's arts events, where women's events are compared with other
forms of 'minority' interest which are depicted as problematic in some way. For
example they remove the minority from the 'mainstream' or leave the minority in a
'sideline', 'ghetto' or 'special interest' domain.
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By drawing upon these three components to develop a response to the question
'What is your position in relation to women's arts events', male subjects are able to
reject such events while demonstrating that this is not associated with any personal
bias on their part against women artists.
Dan no I can't think of any positioning on (women's arts events) I remember
for instance here at the New Theatre a few years ago now that is
substantially a women's play Dina had one of the actresses staying
with me during its run so no I don't sense that to be honest let me tum
it the other way if it is a question of a sort of overt feminist
performance which I haven't seen much of I do have a sort of residual
irritation as I do about gay performances as I do about any
performance that is ideological my worry is that people who are
involved in those areas risk creating a ghetto for themselves
Jon D we have from time to time had women's evenings here and I think that
in some ways that can be a good thing because in some sectors of art
women are under-represented for example we had something called a
celebration of women week which was a folk event which was very
successful and it was a whole series of female performers but again I
wouldn't want to ghettoise them by just having women's events
because I think that is counter productive
Int. how do you categorise the difference between those whose concern it is
to promote women's art as opposed to the arts in general
Jon D I don't know it is difficult to say it without sounding patronising but
with any group who are promoting what they feel to be a minority
whether it is ethnic minorities or women or disabled they can tend to
take a more aggressive stance than the others and sometimes that can
be counter-productive for people who are trying not to discriminate
Ion T women's arts events I am quite happy that the organisations I work
with should host them perhaps I should just go back to in the late
seventies when I was working with a company which was hosting or
hosted the first lesbian and gay pride festival in London and quite a lot
of the company were involved in radical politics of a sexual nature
women's or gay lesbian as it's now become and my position was always
that it's for that organisation and for specific events aimed only ·at
women it was not appropriate the general arts organisations should
promote exclusiveevents but that organisations with a clear aim to raise
. consciousness or to develop specialist arts should handle the promotion
of those events I think it's very confusing for a general arts organisation
like 'this to promote one area rather than another
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Jim right I suppose I would have to say as a general statement I don't like
exclusivity generally in a way that I am not a great fan of for instance
lesbian and gay film festivals because I think lesbian and gay films
should form part of the mainstream of films now obviously there is an
argument to say well until they do form it there is always going to be a
need for those festivals and I can see the same argument applying to
women's arts events I can't see it from our point of view because I
generally believe that as a company we do embrace all kinds and sectors
of society as well but I can see an argument where there are I am
changing tack slightly but when I was in television at Granada there
was a massive frustration that there were no women television directors
I think there were probably two in the whole company and I often used
to talk to women researchers and producers of which there were many
but they never quite made that final step up to directors
The first three responses all show the same format. All three subjects begin their
replies with an initially neutral evaluation. Dan claims 'No I can't think of any
positioning on (women's arts events),. Jon D. states 'We have from time to time
had women's evenings here and I think that in some ways that can be a good thing'
while Jon T. states 'Women's arts events I am quite happy that the organisations
I work with should host them'. In each case, these neutral or even positive
evaluations are followed by an account of personal support for women artists: 'I
remember ... one of the actresses staying with me during its run' (Dan), 'For
example we had something ... it was a whole series offemale performers' (Jon D),
'Perhaps I should just go back ... women's or gay lesbian as it's now become' (Jon
T.).
Having established certain facts about their own views and experiences, the three
subjects then provide their final, negative evaluation in which women's art events
are likened to problematic minorites. Thus Dan complains 'I do have a sort of
residual irritation as I do about gay performances .... people who are involved in
those areas risk creating a ghetto' In a similar vein, Jon D. suggests 'whether it is
ethnic minorities or women or disabled, they can tend to take a more aggressive
stance than the others and sometimes that can be counter-productive'. Similarly,
Jon T argues that as far as women's, lesbian and gay events are concerned, it is
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'not appropriate the general arts organisations should promote exclusive events'
because 'I think it's very confusing for a general arts organisation like this to
promote one area rather than another'
Jim's reply is similar to those of Dan, Jon T. and Jon D. in that it contains the
same three structural elements, although on this occasion they appear in a different
order. Jim begins with a rejection of women's arts events in which a comparison is
drawn between women's arts events and lesbian and gay minorities which are
characterised as problematic in that they 'should form part of the mainstream of
films'. This is followed by a more positive evaluation: 'Now obviously there is an
argument ... applying to women's events'. His reply concludes with a story of
personal support for women: 'when 1 was in television ... 1 often used to talk to
women researchers and producers'.
These three components - statement of positive evaluation, story of personal
involvement and rejection by association with problematic minorities - therefore
seem to comprise a distinctive form of response by means of which male subjects
can reject women's arts events without giving the appearance of prejudice.
Moreover, other male subjects can be seen to provide replies which contain at least
two of these three elements.
Ken 1 personally 1 am answering all these questions as honestly as 1 can
which may mean 1 am not answering them very well because 1 am not
being regimented about my answers but 1 feel my instant reacting to
(women's arts events) which is very instinctive is to tum off really that
that's the kind of sidelining and kind of specialisation and making it
separate in a way which isn't particularly helpful and will probably tum
a lot of people off men and women I am not making a particular
distinction there but I think because it does make a distinction it
probably wouldn't engage people in art like sport arguably and there is
a bigger question in sport if you watch the Olympics you think why are
men and women running separately my son said why don't black people
and white people run separately and I am sure he would not have asked
that question unless he saw men and women and it leads to all sorts of
things and in the arts that doesn't tend to happen I wouldn't be
.particularly in favour of introducing that
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Len well I think (women's arts events) have played a very important role
and may continue to do so in some areas but I don't think that a policy
for women in the arts would be based around women's arts events my
very first experience in arts administration was working with a four
week festival of feminist art called living women which was ten years
back now and you see I think that even ten years ago that still had a
kind of breaking new ground kind of raising people's awareness
function I think that I would feel that I would think much more
carefully abut involvement in an event like that at the time it seemed to
be enough to say this is women artists let's go for it I think that has
changed yes they have played a role they may still playa role but I think
it has got to be very carefully thought through about what they are
aiming to do are they still genuinely expanding opportunities and still
raising consciousness in a positive way
Ken's reply begins with a negative evaluation: 'my instant reacting ..is to tum off
really' . He then produces a version of the problematic minority comparison. In
this version, the problematic status ('the kind of sidelining ... isn't particularly
helpful') is likened to that of men and women in sport which is also depicted as
potentially problematic or questionable ('there is a bigger question in sport ... you
think 'why are men and women are running separately'). The problematic aspect
of gender separation in sport is highlighted by contrasting gender divisions with
racial distinctions where exclusivity is prohibited. Len's reply begins with an initial
positive evaluation: '(women's arts event) have played an important role. This is
followed by a rejection of women's arts events, although in this case the
problematic minority comparison is absent. This rejection is followed, in tum, by a
personal support story: 'My very first experience ... raising people's awareness
function' .
So, overall, the suggestion here is that a number of the male arts professionals
orient to the question 'What is your position on women's arts events?' as though
their replies carry implications about bias against women's art. Specifically, in
comparison with the women subjects, the men seem to regard their rejection of
positively discriminatory women's only arts events as accountable. They deal with
this by utilising a form of account in which rejection is accompanied by an, in
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principle, acceptance of such events. They may supplement this ambiguity by
providing a description of some event in the past in which they can be seen to have
been personally supportive of women artists. In addition, male arts professionals
may also provide explain their rejection by comparing women's arts events with
other minority events which are, in some respect or another, problematic. By
providing this detailed accounting work, male subjects are able to demonstrate
that, contrary to what might have been inferred, their rejection of women's arts
events is not an indication of bias against women artists on their part.
It was shown earlier that women arts professionals do not treat the rejection of
women's arts events as an accountable issue, whereas male arts professionals do.
One explanation suggested for this difference between male and female subjects is
that, when men reject such events, they may regard such rejection as doubly
problematic, in that they may be seen as prejudiced against women's art because
they are arts professionals and because they are men. If there is something to this
notion, then it might be predicted that an analogous effect will surface among those
women and men who accept the idea of women's arts events. For in accepting the
idea of women-only arts events, arts professionals might be accused of negatively
discriminating against men artists. If this is indeed the case, it might be predicted
that male arts professionals who support women's arts events, because they are in
a similar position to women arts professionals who reject such events, will not
regard such support as an accountable issue. That is, their support cannot be
interpreted as negative discrimination against men artists on the grounds of bias
against the opposite sex. However, female arts professionals who express support
for women's arts events, because they are in a position analogous to that of male
arts professionals who reject such events (in that they might be construed as
showing prejudice towards the opposite sex), may be expected to regard their
support for such events as an accountable issue. In fact, the evidence from the
interviews suggests that some effect of this sort does indeed occur. Men who
express support for women's arts events do not regard this as an accountable issue,
while women who express such support do.
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Male professionals accept women's arts events
In the extracts which follow, male arts professionals can be seen to provide
relatively simple responses when asked 'What is your position in regard to
women's arts events'.
Jim well I think we touched on that earlier I really had an input in the
programming here because I personally would bring them much more to
the fore it so happens that in the coming Spring season we have one
event in the studio run by a female touring artists group and we have
another event which is in the next season which is again run by an all
women theatre
Bob women only arts events I wouldn't see any problem although we have
never had any women only arts events well no that is not true there is
our group called women together a well woman project and I know
they had some anger workshops in the arts centre where they used
percussion instruments so that was women only and oh I am forgetting
there was also a women's voice workshop and that was for women only
so these things happen there is no difficulty with them being able to
happen
These replies display the same sort of simplicity which female arts professionals
displayed when responding negatively to the same question. One interesting
difference is that both Jim and Bob include short descriptions of actual instances of
supporting women artists. In this respect, these responses are similar to the 'non-
prejudice' replies in connection with women artists which were described earlier.
Female professionals accept women's arts events
When female arts professionals respond to the 'women's arts events' question,
their replies can be seen to involve more elaborate accounts than the positive
replies of the men. The female arts professional's replies show a complexity of
accounting which is similar to replies from "male subjects expressing rejection of the
idea of women's arts events.
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One type of account that can be seen to accompany female subject's acceptances
of women's arts events makes use of the notions of comfort or support. In these
accounts, women's arts events are seen as necessary because they allow women to
provide a type of support among themselves which redresses the problematic status
of women working in the arts. The following extracts show the way this type of
account is used to frame the subject's acceptance ofwomen's arts events.
Ivy I can imagine that (women's arts events) would be valuable within
certain communities where you have women who do find it inhibiting to
get involved in a discussion for example about art or issues or
whatever if they are in a mixed group I mean there will obviously be
certain exhibitions plays etc which deal with subjects such as rape for
example where women might be more comfortable to discuss the issues
raised by the artworks in an all women's group
Pat from a community point of view I believe there's a role (for women's
arts events) because it I suppose there's a certain amount of security
for a woman attending a woman only event they would feel safer ifit's
about dipping your toe in the water to see whether that's something
that you want to get involved in or are you talking about women that
haven't been engaged in the arts before
Jan again through my job and through the district council's equal
opportunities policies we always run a programme of women's events
for international women's week and I'm responsible for the women's
arts events and section of that programme and it's something I fell very
committed to it's often a case of it's women's arts events but really the
aim of promoting women's arts events is to 'enable women to be
comfortable and to come to an activity and which they can directly
relate to as women
These three extracts demonstrate that women subjects treat support for women's
arts events as an accountable issue. In each case, the positive evaluation of
women's arts events is accompanied by an explanation, couched in terms of
comfort or support, which shows that they provide help and security for those
taking part. Thus, Ivy describes certain communities where women might feel
inhibited and contrasts these with women only events. where 'women might be
more comfortable to discuss the issues raised by the artworks'. In a similar
fashion, Pat suggests 'there's a certain amount of security for a woman attending a
168
Chapter Five
woman only event. They would feel safer'. Jan echoes this theme by arguing that
'really the aim of promoting women's arts events is to enable women to be
comfortable' .
A second form of account which female subjects offer to demonstrate the necessity
of women's arts events is a mirror image to the 'gheto-ising' account offered by
male subjects in rejection of women's arts events. In the male subject's accounts,
removal from the artistic mainstream is portrayed as a problematic consequence of
adopting women's arts events. In the female subject's responses, women's arts
events are seen as a solution to the pre-existing and problematic status of women's
art.
Kit I think it goes back to the women artists the need to highlight women's
position in the art world as a whole and I think there should be more of
it and more women should get together I think women are very easily
left to sort of feel that that is their place and that they are quite happy
with them maybe their expression is sort of dormant and this would
provide a great opportunity to put a lot of women to express
themselves and maybe bring abut a change or open a few more doors
because I think that women tend to be very isolated
Sue again I feel that because women in general have been so marginalised I
feel that within the position of women women artists have been
marginalised to such a degree that there is a need for women's arts
events then of course you have the counter argument that well why not
men's arts events then you have to go through the whole baggage of
explaining that even in theory been open all these years they have been
dominated or marginalised and all this type of thing by the men so yes
you need women's things
Pam I don't know that much about (women's arts events) because as I say I
have not had my consciousness particularly raised and I have not
wanted to either but I have just recently become aware of the
limitations as I say and I can see a political argument for women only
events in as much as they draw attention to the plight of women trying
to get their work exhibited I don't think it should be an aesthetic
limitation if that's the only way they can get to show their work is by.
having this theme behind them or if it's a thing that supports the way
they work then well and good I haven't as yet become involved in that
but I am thinking about it seriously
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Once again, female arts professionals who support women's arts events can be
seen to regard such support as an accountable issue. In these cases, the account
offered is a 'solution-to-existing-problems' account which pictures such events as a
remedy for existing problems. Kit claims that women's arts events might resolve
the difficulty that 'women are very easily left to sort of feel that that is their place
and that they are quite happy with them. Maybe their expression is sort of
dormant'. Sue argues that 'women artists have been marginalised to such a degree
that there is a need for women's arts events', while Pam suggests 'I can see a
political argument for women only events in as much as they draw attention to the
plight of women trying to get their work exhibited'.
A number of female subjects' responses to the question about women's arts events
make use of both the comfort or support account and the solution-to-problems
account.
Kay So it is events specifically put on for women yes I think there is
definitely a place for that because in all areas of life I think that women
can feel that it is quite difficult to be confident in a situation with a lot
of people who are supposedly artists or in a kind of mixed audience
certainly the kind of work we are doing here at arts in newtown it is
about bringing in people who don't have that precious or who do
actually have that precious idea about arts in that they feel excluded
that the arts is something quite elitist and quite difficult and only certain
people usually men can become involved
Bee well I suppose they have a very important place as far as I am
concerned they have an important place in terms of encouraging women
who might not normally go along to a mixed event because they don't
feel confident enough to do that or because it doesn't interest them it is
probably quite relevant that there are events there specifically for
women run by women and participated in by and for women I think that
is important in terms of the ladder of confidence and enabling and
facilitating and I think with the same token it does come in for criticism
in terms of men saying that they have a reputation for either being
sexually motivated events and it does create a bit of a closed shop
attitude and that in some respects needs to be overcome so that people
.understand exactly why an arts event is happening for women only and
I think that message is not put across strongly enough
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Bet I have mixed feelings about that actually I think that women should be
given more opportunities and there should be various ways in which art
galleries or local authorities should take more positive action to
facilitate women artists if for example a woman isn't able to a woman
artist aren't able to actually produce enough work to fill a gallery space
because they're mums or they are working part time whatever there
should be more of an opportunity for small group exhibitions and that
should be encouraged I think the problem is with women's arts events
is that it can give the wrong impression to people corning along to it the
public can often view that as being feminist or somehow exclusive and
perhaps positive discrimination isn't the answer in all cases I think it's
also on the other hand it can be very beneficial to participants because
they are meeting and working with women who are perhaps from very
similar backgrounds facing similar problems or have done in the past
and there can be a lot of interchange and advice and I think that's very
important
Kay initially explains her support for women's arts events in terms of comfort or
support: 'women can feel that it is quite difficult to be confident' and then expands
on this by arguing that such events encourage those who have 'that precious idea
about arts in that they feel excluded, that the arts is something quite elitist'. Bee
describes the role of women's arts events firstly as a means of redressing the
problem of women's exclusion. by 'encouraging women who might not normally
go along to a mixed event'. She then argues that they would help those who are
not 'confident enough to do that' and claims that such events are 'important in
terms of the ladder of confidence'. Bet depicts women artists as prevented from
normal artistic output ('because they're mums or they are working part time
whatever') a problem which is resolved by providing 'more of an opportunity for
small group exhibitions'. She concludes by suggesting, in comfort or support
terms, that 'it can be very beneficial to participants because they are meeting and
working with women who are perhaps from very sirnilar backgrounds facing
similar problems or have done in the past and there can be a lot of interchange and
advice'.
The question posed earlier was whether arts professionals attend to matters of
identity when they talk about women's art. It was surmised, in addition, that, as
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arts professionals, subjects might orient to questions about women artists and
women's art events as a potential accusation of bias in their professional practice.
The answer to this question appears to be a qualified 'yes'. In talking about
women artists and women's arts events, the subjects can be seen to tailor their
responses so that potential claims of bias cannot be levelled against them.
The qualification of this 'yes' answer rests in the fact that there also appears to be
a gender effect in the accounting practices of the subjects. Men interpreted the
question about women artists as a question about their own practices and whether
those practices were discriminatory. In their replies, men subjects showed that
they regarded admissions of discriminatory events as accountable affairs, but did
not treat expressions of non-discrimination as similarly accountable. Women did
not interpret the same question in terms of their own discriminatory or non-
discriminatory practices. But women did display an orientation to the question
which revealed that they understood it to be addressing the wider question o~ the
status of women artists. In their replies, they provided carefully crafted accounts
which located the explanation of women artists' problematic status within either
socio-historical contexts or within psychological properties of women artists. The
outcome of these accounts is that potential implications of bias in the arts
administrative process itself were diffused.
A similar gender disparity arose in connection with women's arts events being
viewed as accountable. For men, it is an accountable issue when they offer a
negative evaluation of women's arts events. It is not a similarly accountable issue
when they express support for women's arts events. For women, it is an
accountable issue when they express support for such events but it is not an
accountable issue when they reject such events. The suggestion here has been that
men's rejection accounts are specifically designed to avoid imputation of negative
bias against women artists. Women's acceptance accounts, on the other hand, are
specifically designed to avoid imputation of positive bias towards women artists.
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So it appears from these interviews with arts professionals that they do perceive a
relationship between their own identities as arts professionals and the way they are
perceived to deal with women's art. In their accounting practices, they address the
perceived low levels of support which the arts establishment provides for women
artists. However, they are careful to ensure that these accounts are such that
explanations for low levels of support do not endanger their own identities as arts
professionals.
5.5 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter began with a discussion of how arts professionals' sense of self might
be empirically explored. It was argued that, in cases where social identity is related
to issues of low status and bias, discourse analysis represents a valuable analytic
perspective from which to make sense of identity. A review of different
approaches to discourse analytic research was offered, with a particular emphasis
on the study of accounts. The analysis of interview data which followed showed
that the arts professionals interviewed displayed a number of accounting practices
in making out a sense of self By carefully constructing the accounts which they
offered in response to questions about women's art and women artists, they were
able to offer answers which demonstrated that, whatever the general status of
women in the arts may be, they themselves were not biased or prejudiced towards
women's arts. In this sense, their accounts can be seen as masterpieces in
discursive constructions of identity.
The accounts which the subjects offered varied depending on whether the subject
was male or female. This appeared first in connection with women artists. Men
interpreted the question about women artists as a question relating to their own
practices and whether those practices were discriminatory. In their replies, they
showed that they regarded admissions of discriminatory events as accountable
affairs, but did not treat expressions of non-discrimination as similarly accountable. .
Women did not interpret the same question in terms of their own discriminatory or
non-discriminatory practices. But they did display an orientation to the question
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which revealed that they understood it to be addressing the wider question of
women artists' status. In their replies, they provided carefully crafted accounts
which located the explanation of women artists' problematic status within either
socio-historical contexts or within psychological properties of women artists. The
outcome of these accounts is that potential implications of bias in the arts
profession were diffused.
A similar gender disparity arose in connection with women's arts events as
accountable. For men, it is an accountable issue when they offer a negative
evaluation of women's arts events. It is not a similarly accountable issue when
they express support for women's arts events. For women, it is an accountable
issue when they express support for such events but it is not an accountable issue
when they reject such events. The suggestion here has been that men's rejection
accounts are specifically designed to avoid imputation of negative bias against
women artists. Women's acceptance accounts, on the other hand, are specifically
designed to avoid imputation of positive bias towards women artists.
In summary, then, it appears from these interviews with arts professionals that they
do perceive a relationship between their own identities as arts professionals and the
way they are perceived to deal with women's art. In their accounting practices,
they address the perceived low levels of support which the arts establishment
provides for women artists. They are careful, however, to ensure that these
accounts are so designed that explanations for such low levels of support do not
endanger their own identities as arts professionals.
The preceding analyses have dealt with issues of identity which centre on a single
categorisation: the subject's role as arts professional. However, one of the
strengths of the discourse analytic perspective is that it offers a method of dealing
with multiple, overlapping categorisations. According to discourse analysts, one of
the features of accounting practice is that people not only provide 'versions' of
particular categorisations, they may also, if the local context requires it, provide re-
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formulations of such categorisations which blur or remove apparently clear
distinctions between one category and another. In Chapter Six which follows, the
arts professionals can be seen to perform exactly this sort of re-negotiation in order
to meet a particular goal: the presentation of self as arts professional and as a
creative or artistic person. In the second part of Chapter Six, this sort of category
re-formulation account is also seen in the different context of women artists
explaining their role in the breaking-up of a women's arts group.
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NEGOTOTIATING AN IDENTITY: CREATIVITY IN
ADMINISTRATION AND DEALING WITH A GROUP SPLIT
6.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter, it was demonstrated that subjects are able to deploy
discursive procedures in order to maintain an unbiased version of their identity as
arts professionals. Although the empirical approach taken was the fine grain
analysis of episodes of discourse, the results of Chapter Five are, in a sense,
sympathetic to both discourse analytic and self-categorisation approaches to
identity. The subjects display a unified version of self, characterised as 'arts
professional' and then attend to potential difficulties related to esteem which the
categorisation might be seen to apply. However, one of the main arguments in
favour of the discursive approach to identity (Antaki, Condor and Levine, 1996;
Wetherell and Potter, 1992) is that the nature of identity is not always as unitary,
within a given context, as social identity theorists and self-categorisation theorists
might suggest. Accordingly, it is interesting to note cases where the discursive
evidence suggests that people adopt a notion of identity which is more fluid or
dependent on the immediate local context than might be easily encapsulated within
either social identity theory or self-categorisation theory.
In the present chapter, the theme, 'fluid or context dependent identity' is pursued
by analysing two data sets. The first data set, analysed in section 6.2, comprises
the responses of arts professionals to the interview item which asked arts
professionals if they saw themselves primarily as artists or as administrators. The
second data set, analysed in Section 6.3 derives from interviews with subjects who
originally were members of the same formally constituted women's organisation.
The organisation had very recently suffered a major schism the result of which was
that members re-distributed themselves across two organisations: Women in
Action and Women into the Future. To reflect this change in the circumstances
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surrounding the interview component of the research, an additional question was
added to the interview protocol (see Appendix V), in which members of the two
organisations were asked to discuss issues relevant to the break-up of the original
organisation and the formation of the two new organisations.
Thus, partly by design and partly as a result of circumstances, the interview period
of the study provided an opportunity to explore one of the issues related to identity
which marks out a clear theoretical difference between the social identity or self-
categorisation approach and the discourse analytic approach. This is the question
of whether people do display through accounts a fluid sense of self. A 'fluid' sense
of self draws on categorisations of self and identity which are context-dependent
and flexibly constructed to suit local goals. The 'fluid'. sense of self can, therefore,
be distinguished from the determinate sort of categorisation which is the mainstay
of social identity theory and self-categorisation theory. The question is answered
in section 6.2 where data taken from interviews in which subjects provide accounts
of themselves is presented. Section 6.3 which follows presents data taken from the
second set of interviews in which subjects present versions of the 'out-group' and
of themselves in relation to that 'out-group' in providing explanations for the split
in the Women in Action group.
6.2 The Creative Administrator
The data in the following extracts are taken from subjects' responses to the
question 'Do you see yourself primarily as a practising artist or as an
administrator'. Now it might be supposed that the question refers to two broad
types of people and that subjects would have little difficulty in categorising
themselves as belonging to one or other type. This is, for example, one of the
central assumptions of self-categorisation theory: that people classify themselves
according to relatively clear categories within specific contexts. The picture would
seem even clearer because all of 'the subjects identified themselves at the start of
the interview as being employed in an administrative role. Moreover, as the first
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set of examples shows, some responses fit this 'simple categorisation' model
relatively well:
Pat primarily 1 see myself as an administrator facilitator if you like
Rob primarily as an administrator
Fay 1 am an administrator 1 would love to be an artist but 1 don't have the
wherewithal or the time to do it 1 am definitely an administrator
However, in other cases, subjects can be seen to offer replies in which, although
the response is apparently similar, the subject provides a blurring of the
'artist/administrator' categorisation. This discursive work turns on the way the
subject orients to the question. A number of the subjects demonstrate through
their responses that they view the 'administrator' label as in some way implying
'non-creative person'. This is perhaps not surprising, since a common stereotype
of the adminitrator is of a boring person who spends his or her working life in a
succession of dull and mundane 'office' chores. In their responses to the
artist/administrator dichotomy question, the subjects show that they are aware of
this possible interpretation of the 'administrator' label by spontaneously
introducing into their answers accounts of themselves which demonstrate that they
are, in fact, creative people.
To achieve this, the subjects deploy one of several different discourse strategies.
The first takes the form of an '1 am an administrator ~.. but' account, in which the
subject accepts categorisation as an administrator (or accepts non-categorisation as
an artist), but then proceeds to offer extra information to undermine the potential
inference that he or she is not a creative person. The second strategy focuses on
an 'Administration is creative' account and is employed by some subjects to argue
that the subject, in virtue of his or her job as an administrator, is a creative persoll.
The third strategy involves a 'Too busy to be an artist' account in which the
subject explains that although he or she is an administrator, he or she is still in
principle artistic but is currently too busy to take part in artistically creative work.
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'1am an administrator ... but' accounts
Examples of this first form of account are shown below. The common theme in
these accounts is that each subject begins by accepting the artist/administrator
distinction but then augments this with a self-description which emphasises
creativity.
Jon T these days professionally entirely as an administrator although I am still
involved from time to time in usually the amateur or semi-professional
theatre companies as director devisor
JonC I am an administrator primarily although I do also perform I am a singer
and a choral conductor so I perform quite often
Sam I wouldn't consider myself to be an artist but I wouldn't necessarily
exclude a creative consciousness
Ivy I see my job as having a creative side to it in terms of how I would put
together exhibitions and present them but I don't practise as an artist
In all four replies, the subject accepts the 'administrator' label either explicitly or
implicitly by rejecting the 'artist' label. However, the subject accompanies this
with the inclusion of further information which functions to moderate the
artist/administrator distinction on offer. Jon T. and Jon C. accept the
'administrator' categorisation but supplement this with the extra description of
themselves as involved in artistic work at vaguely specified times ('from time to
time' and 'quite often'). Sam suggests that not being an artist does not preclude 'a
creative consciousness'. Ivy claims that her administrative job has 'a creative side'.
What these examples demonstrate is that the subjects orient to the category
'administrator' in a specific way: being classed as an administrator might be taken
to be the same thing as being classed as non-creative or not involved in artistic
work. Having interpreted the question in this sense, each subject amends his or her
own self-categorisation by including extra information about creativity or artistic
interests: In this way, each subject is able to display that the two categories of
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'artist' and 'administrator' are not as sharply defined as might have been thought in
that being an administrator is consistent with being a creative or artistic person.
'Administration is creative' accounts
Other subjects challenge the artist/administrator distinction by means of a more
complex form of account. Here, subjects offer a reformulation of the
artist/administrator distinction which undermines the assumption that the two
categories are either mutually exclusive or comprehensive in the following ways:
The subject offers some challenge to or reformulation of the artist/administrator
distinction which is employed in the original question.
The subject formulates a 'creative administration' account in which a description of
the subject's administrative tasks is used to demonstrate that administration
involves creativity.
The subject uses this account to provide a picture of himself or herself as a creative
person.
Una it's interesting because I think I originally thought of myself as an artist
and its hard to get rid of that I mean I thought of myself originally as an
actress and I still think I can do that and I still do sometimes but now I
suppose I'm a mixture it's quite a nice job from that point of view
because I create projects and carry them through so I have a creative
part but I also have to administer
Bee well I arn not really a practising artist in the sense of a visual artist or a
performance artist my role is neither an administrator or a manager in
the same context it's quite a difficult scenario my post is creative in as
much as a lot of the work that we do is laid down in a plan through
the leisure plan and also we have an arts policy and that arts policy has
to be translated into creative outlet my role is obviously to administer
the success of the arts policy as best I can, to manage the tearn that do
that but I see my role as being creative an ideas person as well as
management and administration
Una's response to the question is to challenge the apparent mutual exclusivity
involved in the artist/administrator distinction. She describes herself as belonging
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to both categories simultaneously ('I suppose I'm a mixture'). This perspective is
supported by Una's 'creative administration' description of her administrative job
as including the requirement to 'create projects'. She then concludes by
suggesting that it follows from this description that she has 'a creative part' .
Bee's response is to deny that she is an artist, but to limit this denial to certain
senses of the word ('not really a practising artist in the sense ofa visual artist ... ').
She then also denies that she is 'an administrator or a manager' and suggests that
'it's quite a difficult scenario'. Having challenged the apparent simplicity of the
artist/administrator distinction, she then offers a 'creative administration'
description of her job, claiming that her 'post is creative' and that it involves
translating policy 'into creative outlet'. Her eventual conclusion is that she is
'being creative as an ideas person'. What both of these formulations provide for
the subjects, then, is the ability to question the exclusive or comprehensive nature
of the 'artist/administrator' distinction by claiming, on the basis of a description of
job or post, to be both.
The following extracts show more extended versions of the same type of account.
Ken I don't think artist in the discipline in the artistic discipline sense that
you paint you play music you act or you write or things like that I think
creative might be a more appropriate word in that I think it is vital that
people who organise or plan I suppose administrate is the way they
approach that creative in the smaller artistic or narrow artistic sense in
that they know if they are running a music centre how the music works
and why it is important instruments are played in a certain way or why it
is important that things are recorded in the acoustics and they
understand the technical aspects of the discipline or how an actor needs
time to learn lines or whatever it may be and creative as well in the
more general sense in making connections between the wider aspects of
life why theatre in the first place what its role is in the community how
it relates to education how it relates to philosophy and ideas how a
society should be run should a theatre be subsidised is it a priority for a
district or regional council to have arts as part of its remit should it do
that at arms length these kinds of questions I think are one which are
creative and philosophical questions that I think you have to be able to
address very freely and in a free-wheeling sort of way if you are going
. to be able to make a go of it really as an arts organiser arts manager or
leisure manager or whatever you want to call it so I think while it is not
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purely artistic it is creative in understanding the discipline you are
working with and creative in relating that to the public sphere if you like
Len I see myself as a creative administrator I think my job is to try and
bridge the administrative systems that are absolutely necessary to
institutional survival and indeed sometimes personal survival and the
modes and working of creative artists in whatever sphere whether it is
visual or theatre or what have you are always trying to mediate that gap
cover for the institutional requirements yet leave room for creative
talent and development perhaps you can't do that unless you have a
little bit of the artist somewhere inside yourself in order to keep
questioning and brokering that the relationship between the sort of
administrative and authority structures when fundamentally the arts are
un-authoritarian and anarchic
Jim this job here all the jobs I have done I have always been fired by the
knowledge that my best skills lay administratively but my interest also
very much lies in the art if you like as well I see them both as going
together it's that old cliche administrators always say this that
administration can be creative too and within (name of a theatre
company) I suppose because of the nature of this company we tend to
work very much as a collaborative team so I have got much more of a
, creative input here and I suppose I act as a kind of producer in some
ways for the shows so I have quite a large influence on the work we do
in all areas of it in terms of our casting for example in terms of the plays
we choose obviously the theatre director has the final say in the
choosing but I am very much involved partly through my interest and
partly because I think I should be as well as part of my job
Kay I would say that I am an arts administrator as well in a local authority
setup however it doesn't really give much of an indication as to what I
see my job as or I see myself actually doing I find that my work as a
manager is very like the demands on any manager within the public
sector and that's one whole other aspect of my work the arts bit can be
quite a dilemma on occasion because you are not delivering a
straightforward service like environmental health where they keep the
streets clean and people know exactly what it is they want and what to
expect and it's not straightforward a local authority job in the sense that
you are responsible to the tax payers and that's it and because anyone
working as an administrator or arts manager has a responsibility to arts
and artists and that can be quite a dilemma as you often find yourself in
a position of people not actually wanting your product or not seeing it
as something of a majority interest and it is forever juggling the issues
or the ethics almost of what you are doing with public money are you
just serving straight demands or are you somehow taking a patronising
.role and saying this is good for people or it is not so it is quite a difficult
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one there is a lot of ethical issues there involved so I don't see myself
straightforwardly as a manager or an artist but somehow as a
combination of them all
Ken begins his response by providing a reformulation of the 'artist' category'.
There is 'a sense' in whichKen could be said not to be an artist. He then contrasts
this 'narrow artistic sense' with what he describes as being 'creative'. So just as
with Una and Lynn, Ken's begins his response by providing a re-working of the
meaning of the categories contained in the initial question. He then uses the
'creative administration' account to demonstrate that his administrative job has
creative elements.. The creative administrator has to 'know how the music works'
and know 'how an actor needs time to learn lines'. In addition, the administrator is
creative in 'making connections between the wider aspects of life'. He then uses
this account to support his claimthat the administrator must be 'free-wheeling' and
'creative in understanding ... and relating that to the public sphere'.
Len begins his response with a direct challenge to the idea that the
artist/administrator distinction is a genuine dichotomy by describing himself as a
'creative administrator'. He then develops a 'creative administration' account by
means of the extended 'bridge' metaphor which ends with the claim that the
administrator has to 'cover for the institutional requirement yet leave room for
creative talent'. Len then uses this 'creative administration' account to draw the
conclusion that for someone to accomplish this, 'you have a little bit of the artist
somewhere inside yourself. Thus, like Ken, Len is able to use his job description
to draw a conclusion about being a creative person.
Jim also begins with a critique of the supposed distinction between artist and
administrator. He claims that he sees them as 'both going together' and that
'administration can be creative'. He then moves on to provide a 'creative
administration' account of his job, claiming that the theatre company works 'as a
collaborative team' and that he has an influence on casting and choosing plays.
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This description provides an explanatory backdrop to his claim that 'I have got
much more of a creative input here'.
In the final example, Kay begins with a caveat about the artist/administrator
distinction. She describes herself as an arts administrator but notes that this term
'does not give much of an indication as to what I see my job as'. She then
provides a 'creative administration' account of her job in which she points out that
arts administration is 'not delivering a straightforward service'. Instead, she
argues, the arts administrator has 'a responsibilityto arts and artists' and says that
she finds herself 'saying this is good for people' which involves 'ethical issues'.
She then uses this account to conclude that she is neither a manager nor an artist
but 'somehow a combination of them all'.
'Too busy to be an artist' accounts
The third and final form of accounts which people deploy in answering the
question of whether they are artists or administrators involves acceptance of the
'administrator' label. To this extent, it is similar to the earlier 'Yes I am an
administrator ... but' account. However, unlike either of the earlier accounts, in
the 'too busy to be an artist' account, the subject does not claim currently to be in
some way artistic or creative. Instead, she provides a description of her current
administrative job to demonstrate that while she is, in principle, an artist, in
practice her administrative workload is so heavy that it prevents her from
performing any artistic work.
Bet Fundamentally as an administrator and manager given the nature of the
job here now which has changed so dramatically in the time that I've
been here going from what was at least on paper fairly mundane
administrative post to becoming what is for all intents and purposes a
managing director there is a lot more responsibility and a lot more
involved in the job it also requires in the region of sixty to seventy
hours a week work and it just simply doesn't allow the opportunity of
any of my own artistic activities to take place before I moved to
Edinburgh I was involved in a band and also a dance ensemble which
was my way of keeping in with those sorts of activities and it was very
very satisfying and I hope eventually I'd be in a position to spare the
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time to take up some more activities again but at the moment I am
primarily a manager
Eva I would like to see myself as a practising artist but obviously more of
my time is taken up doing administration so that tends to stay within the
mind and override you when you are trying to do your own work and it
has deadlines and obviously becomes a priority but I still think of myself
as an artist designer and again the problems that occur with that with
trying to do your own work eating into your time it's all sort of having
to switch from one side of the brain using your design artist of the brain
and then back to management administration side and to suddenly cut
from one to the other is quite a difficult thing to do
Jet Doing this job is actually divided an awful lot of life's time than I
thought I would have expected to do all the work when I was teaching
I thought I didn't do a great deal of my own work I left college and
went straight into being a lecturer but since I have come back the two
and a half years I have been doing this job it has been a lot heavier job
that I would have expected it at first but I have got very involved in it
and I don't don't get a lot of time of my own I still see myself as a
practising artist but I think that part of the creative side of me is put
into creating exhibition and things like that as well and organising things
I don't see it as being a completely separate activity
Bet begins her description of her administrative job by claiming that it has 'changed
so dramatically' from a mundane job to a job with 'a lot more responsibility' which
requires 'sixty to seventy hours a week'. She then uses this description to
conclude that the job 'simply doesn't allow' her to carry out artistic activities.
Thus, although she describes herself as having been 'involved in a band and a
dance ensemble' she admits that she is 'at the moment' primarily a manager. By
depicting her job as responsible and time-consuming, she is thereby able to admit
that she is an administrator while, at the same time, suggesting that it is only the
requirements of herjob which prevent her from being involved in artistic work.
Eva begins her response by explicitly claiming to be a practising artist. However
she then goes on to describe her job as involving 'more and more time ... taken up
with administration'. The effect of this, she says, is that administration may 'stay
within the mind and override you' when attempting to perform artistic work.
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Because administration eats into time, she finds herself trying to 'switch from one
side of the ... and then back' which she describes as a 'difficult thing to do'.
Like Bet and Eva, Jet pictures her administrative job as onerous, being both time
consuming and 'a lot heavier job than 1 would have expected'. The consequence
Jet draws is that because of the nature of her job she does not 'get a lot of time of
my own'. Interestingly, Jet concludes her response by briefly adopting a 'creative
administration' account. She claims that her 'creative side' is involved in creating
exhibitions and that she therefore does not see a clear distinction between
administration and creativity.
So what these analyses demonstrate is that the subjects are able to deal in a
constructive manner with questions which directly address their identities as arts
administrators. The question posed to them offered an explicit choice between
being an artist and being an administrator. In response, the subjects generate
replies which make use of either the 'I am an administrator ... but' account or the
'creative administrator' account or the 'too busy to be an artist account'.
Theoretically, this means that, for the subjects, self-categorisation labels such as
'administrator' are not entities with fixed properties. Rather, they are flexible
components of talk which allow the individual to perform discursive work in order
to tailor the categorisation to suit his or her context-specific needs.
The conclusion drawn in the discussion will be that the analyses provided
demonstrate that social categorisation are not the objective, fixed entities which
social identity theory and self-categorisation theory might suggest. Before entering
that discussion, however, it is worthwhile examining the nature of the flexibility of
social categorisations more fully. The preceding analysis showed that two
apparently inconsistent self-categorisations such as 'artist' and 'administrator' can
be adapted to allow for a consistent formulation of self which contains elements of
both categories. This, however, is not the only way in which people can
demonstrate the flexibility of their social categories. Potter and Wetherell (1992)
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have demonstrated that a similar flexibility can occur when people develop
characterisations of other groups. In the analyses which appear in the following
section, there is evidence of flexibility in the way two groups of people characterise
one another. The characterisations arise in the context of asking people to explain
a group split.
6.3 Explaining a group split
When the present study was envisaged, a number of those involved either as
potential questionnaire subjects or as potential interview subjects belonged to a
women's arts organisation. This organisation, Women in Action, whose aim was
to promote women artists and women's art, had secured funding from a number of
public bodies to present a series of high profile women's arts events at a major
international arts festival. However, at a certain point in the group history,
disagreements among group members arose which resulted in bifurcation of the
group. Thus, during data collection phase of the study, the Women in Action
group fragmented into two smaller groups, Women in Action and Women into the
Future, which were, to some extent, competitors as advocates for women's arts.
As a result, at the time of interview each subject belonged to one or other of a pair
of competing women's art groups: Women in Action or Women into the Future.
In response to this unforeseen development, it was decided to approach a number
of those involved in order to gain from them accounts of how they saw the group
split. The group-split data provided the opportunity to explore the extent to which
discursive flexibility arose in contexts where people were providing
characterisations of another group and of themselves in relation to that group.
The data presented below represents responses to the question 'How do you
explain the split'. This question invited subjects to account for the schism in
Women in Action. In their responses, the subjects provide explanations of this
occurrence. These responses are grounded in characterisations of members of the
group to which they do no_t belong and characterisations of their own group in
relation to that other group. The out-group characterisations which Women in
187
Chapter Six
Action Members and Women into the Future members provide are quite different,
and yet the fundamental explanation for the split, blaming members of the other
group, is the same in both cases. In providing these explanations, the subjects
demonstrate the flexible way in which different accounts of others can be used in
the performance of the same social action: establishing blame.
A simple 'gloss' on the explanations presented below would be that all of the
subjects offer the same response. This apparent 'same' response could be
described as the following. The split occurred because one sub-group within the
original Women in Action group wanted to appoint a full time administrator rather
than run the group's activities via a committee and the other sub-group did not. In
consequence, those who did want to appoint a full-time administrator left Women
in Action and forming a competing group called Women into the Future.
However, analyses of the accounts provided demonstrates that this apparent
similarity masks a more fundamental distinction between two quite different forms
of explanation. The remaining Women in Action members mention the issue of a
full-time administrator but deny it was the cause of the split. Instead, they locate
the problem as a difficulty in the relationship between young and old members of
the original Women in Action. The Women into the Future members, on the other
hand, claim that the full-time administrator issue was the cause of the split and
describe the difference between the two sub-groups as a difference between busy
professional working women and women with impractical plans.
Women in Action Members
The first pair of extracts is derived from interviews with members of the Women in
Action group.
Kim a lot of it seemed to centre around the issue of an administrator or not
an administrator I think that was in a lot of words a red herring or you
know it was just something a convenient hanger to hang on the more
basic or fundamental differences between the two groupe that
eventually became Women in Action Women into the Future so once
problems started to arise differences started to occur a meeting Was
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called the first major meeting of the three that happened to try and
thrash out these differences and come to some kind of agreement
between these two seemingly opposed factions I think to put it
simplisticallythe women who actually came along to Women into the
Future tend to be older tended to be in professional academic jobs and
on the opposite side the women tended to be younger obviously all
generalisation tended to be students tended to have a more so called
radical approach to the structure of the organisation and what I term
the grownups on the other side grownups particularly I think it was
either in the first or the second meeting one of these women who
actually went over to Women into the Future actually referred to us as
the girls you know during the course of a debate well if the girls would
just tell us exactly what it is they want you know we were put down as
children these were the grownups who knew what they were what they
were doing
Pat I remember at one of the meetings you know the women were talking
about getting a co-ordinator and the older women seemed to be
dominating it all the time and almost patronising the younger women's
views the younger women seemed to be Women in Action I felt really
patronised and they were talking about how we should get a co-
ordinator who would deal with all the bureaucracy which is fair enough
but then I remember I pointed out how good it would be for us a
younger woman to learn how to do these things and I was completely
patronised and I felt really degraded in way one of those women spoke
back to me I mean it was like oh dear you can learn to do that yourself
you can go in and see she just spoke to me as if I was a child and
reinforced a lot of things that I was fighting against
Kim begins her reply by referring to the issue of whether Women in Action should
have appointed a full-time administrator. She describes this as only the apparent
cause of the split: 'it seemed to centre around the issue ... that was ... a red
herring ... a convenient hanger'. She then introduces what she views as the real
cause of the split, which was 'more basic or fundamental differences' between two
groups. She then offers a characterisation of these two groups in terms of a
young/old distinction and in terms of occupation. Having established this
distinction, Kim then provides an adult/child reformulation of it: 'what I term the
grownups on the other side'. The point of this reformulation is to highlight the
way in which 'the grownups' treated the other group members as children: 'one of
these women ... actually referred to us as girls'. Kim then concludes her account
by pointing out that they were 'put down' by 'the grownups'.
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Pat's response to the question about the split is similar in content to that offered by
Kim. She begins by referring to the issue of the full-time administrator
appointment and later points out that this was not a genuine cause of the split:
'they were talking about ... a co-ordinator ... which is fair enough'. She then
draws a young/old distinction between the protagonists in the debate. As was the
case in Kim's account, the older women are depicted as not treating the younger
women as adults: 'the older women seemed to be dominating .. and patronising the
younger women's views'. She explains that as a result of the discussion she felt
patronised and degraded and concludes by introducing the same adult/child
reformulation which Kim employed: 'she spoke to me as if I was a child' and
points out that this was what she was fighting against.
What this account achieves for Kim and Pat, then, is to establish that the apparent
cause of the split, debate over whether to employ a full-time administrator, was not
the actual cause. Instead, problems arose because the older women treated the
younger women as children in a patronising way. In this way, both Kim and Pat
employ the same characterisation of the older women as patronising to explain the
eventual split.
Women into the Future members
The following extracts are responses made by members of Women into the Future
to the same question about why the split occurred. In these responses, the subjects
refer to the full-time administrator appointment issue. However, in these
responses, this is identified as the real cause of the split. Each subject then offers a
characterisation of the members of the two groups to supplement this causal
account. The reason the split occurred was that those who objected to the
appointment were not professional working women and therefore had impractical
ideas about matters of organisation.
Liz I would say it's political it took the form of a disagreement about
organisation but I think in fact that comes down to a political split a
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disagreement about the best way of organising ourselves whether the
crunch came over whether we should have or even apply to have a paid
up administrator in the organisation and the people and the women who
were lining up some of those saying yes we should turned out to be the
ones who actually went off to break away and form a separate
organisation Women into the Future and the ones who said they didn't
want a paid administrator remained in Women in Action in part I think
it has to do with the difference between the sorts of women who are
working in the performing arts would be clear that they would like an
administrator because they never knew from one month to the next
where they would be going to be even if they were going to be in the
country it would therefore be a lot more difficult for them to organise a
voluntary rota to keep the organisation going also I think the women
who wanted a full time administrator there were a good number of us
who as well as being the performers were in full-time jobs already like
myself and who felt that it wasn't feasible to keep the organisation we
planned to become going on this voluntary basis
Joe there came the point where we had a major disagreement as to how best
to achieve the aim there were those of us who wanted someone to be
actually doing the work that was going to be paid and recognised et
cetera setting up projects which would enable other women to work
and it seemed to me that those of us who were actively working and
involved in setting up projects were the ones who felt we did not have
the time to run an umbrella organisation as well we wanted an umbrella
organisation which would support we would input into such an
organisation but we didn't actually want to be going to meetings and
really I think that where we diverged practically was that the ones who
stayed as Women in Action felt that it should be democratic to the point
where at every single individual who was involved in any way in any of
the projects should be a member of the management committee and I
personally felt that this was totally impractical
Zoe I think, you see, a lot of it was an age thing as well a lot of the split was
most of the women who went to Women into the Future were older
more experienced professionals I myself felt in the middle I felt halfway
in the middle of both groups which became apparent to me when I
moved to Women into the Future that most of the people in Women in
Action had masses of enthusiasm time most of them were unemployed
just out of art school full of enthusiasm very political very political I
mean they didn't want men to be allowed to come to the meetings or
attend lot of things the things that were happening which I didn't
particularly agree with but the enthusiasm was there Women into the
. Future I found was much more it was supposed to reflect women who
were already working in the arts but professional so there were huge
arguments at the stage where we were all arguing about whether there
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should be a committee whether there shouldn't be a committee whether
everybody should be allowed all along to make decisions and at the
time it seemed to me that what Women in Action wanted was
absolutely unworkable that nothing you could get done if everything
was just going to be open and discussed for ever and ever
Liz suggests that the 'crunch' in relation to the split occurred over the question of
the full-time administrator. She explains that the debate involved 'the difference
between the sorts of women' and describes those who were 'working' as needing
an administrator for practical reasons. She concludes by suggesting that the
alternative of organising 'a voluntary rota' was not a feasible option. Joe's
response follows a similar pattern. She begins by identifying a major disagreement
about whether there should be someone employed as an administrator ('someone
to be actually doing the work that was going to be paid'). She then identifies those
who 'were actively working' as the people who did not want the alternative of 'an
umbrella organisation'. She then characterises those who remained within Women
in Action after the split as those who thought that 'every single individual
... should be a member of the management committee' and concludes that this was
an 'impractical' idea. Zoe begins her response with an extended description of the
differences between the two groups of protagonists in which the Women into the
Future members are described as 'more experienced professionals' while their
opponents are described as 'unemployed just out of art school'. She then
introduces the issue of the debate about whether the group should be organised by
a committee and concludes that her opponents' idea of having a committee which
included everyone was 'absolutely unworkable'.
The value of this form of explanatory account for Liz, Joe and Zoe is that it allows
them to offer an explanation of the split. As with Kim and Pat, the blame for the
split is laid at the door of the opponents. However, whereas Kim and Pat blame
the Women into the Future members (because of their patronising attitudes), Liz,
Joe and Zoe blame those who remained in Women in Action, because of their
unrealistic and impractical suggestions. It follows, then, that both groups can be
seen to employ the same strategy in providing an explanation of the split. A
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negative characterisation of the opposing group is offered which is such that it can
be seen to be 'obvious' that the split must take place.
The suggestion made earlier was that people flexibly deploy characterisations of
other groups, and of their own group in relation to another group, in order to
achieve specific goals within the local discursive context. The explanations offered
by the Women in Action Members and the Women into the Future members shows
that this is exactly what takes place. Some of the theoretical consequences of this
finding are discussed below.
6.4 Summary and Discussion
The goal of this chapter was to extend the analysis which was presented in Chapter
Five. In that chapter, it was demonstrated that people deploy flexible accounting
practices in order to preserve a positive 'version' of the self These accounting
practices allow the individual to deal with local discursive contexts in which they
might otherwise appear to be biased or prejudiced. The present chapter sought to
explore whether similar accounting practices are used when the local discursive
context is more complex. The first data set demonstrated the way individuals deal
with multi-category contexts by re-negotiating the group category boundaries
'artist' and 'administrator' so that they could, in some senses, be seen to be both
administrators and artistically creative. The second data set demonstrated the way
people provide specific interpretations of the two categories 'Women in Action'
and 'Women into the Future' in accomplishing a blaming of the opposing group.
The outcome of the preceding sections is, then, that there is empirical evidence in
support of the view that people construct their social identities through the. use of
flexible discursive practices. This claim need not be taken to imply that empirical
evidence which supports self-categorisation theory is wrong. Nothing said earlier
involves denial of the commonplace fact that some categorisations can become, or
be made to become (e.g. through experimental manipulation), salient. But
sometimes the notion of 'salience' is insufficient to explain the way in which people
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use categorisations in talk. It is, therefore, worthwhile examining briefly the
differences and similarities between the social identity theory perspective on
identity adopted in Chapter Four and the discourse analysis perspective adopted in
Chapters Five and Six.
In social identity theory, the categories people use in developing a sense of self
based on group identity are assumed to be objective, external features of the social
world. For example, in Chapter Four it was assumed that whether one belonged to
the group 'feminists' or the group 'women' was an objective property which
allowed people to be characterised as belonging to one group or another. In part,
this relied upon the idea that by adopting specific procedures, these categorisations
would be made salient to the subjects and that they would characterise themselves
in terms of feminism and gender. Many everyday social settings seem to achieve
the same effect: being in a church, for example, may be likely to make someone's
membership of a religious group salient just as being at a political rally might make
membership of a political group salient. However, it was noted in Chapter Four
with reference to the 'double categorisation effect' that group memberships seem
to 'interact' with one another. And this chapter has demonstrated that the meaning
of a particular category seems to be fluid and flexible. This suggests that
categorisation is not always a simple affair. And so it may be that the simple
notion of salience 'triggering off an identity will not cover all possible situations.
In a specific context, many social categorisations may be (more or less)
cognitively available, but the categorisation, or categorisations, which end up being
chosen may not be predictable merely on the basis of salience.
Indeed, examination of how people talk about characterisations, as revealed by the
analyses of the arts professionals' interviews provided in this chapter, shows that
people expend a lot of effort in a conversation negotiating which identities are
relevant. Moreover, they also expend effort in providing very specific meanings
for the categories being used: meanings which help them to establish a specific
point in the local conversational context. So what the empirical analysis of
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discourse demonstrates is that, when issues of self-categorisation arise, usually
these are managed by discursive techniques which need not rely on estimations of
the salience of social categories. Instead, self and other categorisations are
accomplished by quite ordinary, everyday techniques of interaction in which
explicit debate about salience or otherwise of identity is absent.
The fact that people may use self-categorisations flexibly is sometimes taken (for
example Wetherell and Potter, 1992) to be a major criticism of the social identity
approach. However, in the normal experimental context, in which salience of
identity is explicitly manipulated, the notion that one or other identity has become
salient is unproblematic. In Chapter Four, for example, it appears unproblematic to
claim that the procedure of asking people to answer questions taking into account
whether they are men or women and whether they are feminist or not was a
procedure which made those identities salient. On the other hand, there do seem
to be specific contexts in which people seem able to re-negotiate the boundaries
between multiple potential categorisations and to re-negotiate the range of possible
meanings which attach to those categorisations. One example of this is that
subjects in the present study were able to describe themselves as in some ways
being both administrators and creative artists. Another example was the way in
which people spontaneously developed group categorisations of opponents in
accomplishing blame for the Women in Action split.
What this suggests is that in a conversational context, where an identity is clear and
unproblematic, it may be possible to think of people as being generally influenced
and thinking of themselves in terms of that identity. However, there may be other
conversational contexts where this is less true, especially those contexts in which
people perceive. a threat to their identities such as the arts professionals' concern to
avoid appearing prejudiced or r~sponsible for a group split. In these sorts of
contexts, it seems likely that people will adopt a more sophisticated outlook on
their characterisations of self and others. And the consequence of this more
sophisticated approach may well be that they adopt a more creative and flexible.
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approach to the social categories which are cognitively available to them within
that context.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The thesis began, in Chapter One, by pointing out that there have been few social
psychological studies of women artists and women's art. It was suggested that,
nevertheless, social psychology can make a valuable contribution to an analysis of
public responses to cultural forms and the artists who create them. The need for
such an analysis was highlighted by a review of recent writings on women's art.
This revealed a widespread belief among art historians and cultural theorists that
women's art is systematically undervalued in our society. Two specific research
questions were then identified. The first was: if people believe that women artists
and their work are valued less than male artists and their work, where do these
beliefs come from? The second was: what effect do these public beliefs have on
the sense of self or identity of those whose job includes support for, and the
promotion of women artists and women's art?
The claim was made that social psychology represents a discipline which can
provide an answer to these questions and that the arguments would be based on
solid theoretical foundations. It was argued that beliefs such as those which people
hold about women artists and their work can be construed as stereotypical beliefs
and that the origin of such beliefs could be explained by exploring the origins of
stereotypical beliefs. It was also argued that the existence of such stereotypical
beliefs implies consequences for the arts professional's identity and may even be
understood as a threat to the arts professional's sense of self.
Chapters Two, Three and Four focused on the issue of stereotypical beliefs and
their origins. Chapter Two provided a review of current theoretical approaches to
the stereotype and to an associated theoretical construct, the attitude.
Stereotypical beliefs were described as mental 'short-cuts' which function by
allowing the perceiver to characterise the stereotype target in terms of a set of
traits and predicted behaviours merely as a result of attributing a category label to
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that target. The review of literature demonstrated that contemporary
understanding of the stereotype process reveals it to be more complex than had
previously been supposed.
The discussion in Chapter Two then moved on to a consideration of attitude
theory. It was pointed out that both the three-component view of attitudes and
uni-dimensional expectancy-value models of attitudes, typified by the theory of
reasoned action, agree in separating out evaluative and cognitive aspects of
attitudes. The argument was then put forward that the cognitive component of
attitudes can be understood as stereotypical beliefs. It was concluded that people's
beliefs about women artists, and the cognitive component of their attitudes
towards women's art, could both be regarded as stereotypical beliefs. This meant
that the original research question, concerning the origin of people's beliefs about
women artists and their work, could be recast within a more general question: the
question of where stereotypical beliefs, in general, come from.
Chapter Three then presented a discussion of the origins of stereotypical beliefs.
The suggestion was made that stereotypical beliefs derive either from the influence
of social groups upon the individual, especially via the acquisition of a group-based
social identity, or from the particular stereotyped view of the world which a person
acquires through the development of a personal identity. Early studies of the
effects of group membership were shown to have demonstrated that individuals'
actions and judgements are affected by such membership. Attention was then
turned to the issue of inter-group interaction and it was seen that such interactions
encourage the formation of group-based categorisations of the self and of others.
The development of social identity theory was identified as a milestone in
providing a theoretical account of how group membership, within inter-group
situations, can engender stereotypical ways of thinking about members of the in-
group and members of the out-group. Some time was spent detailing recent
empirical evidence that early social identity accounts of in-group favouritism and
generalisation from samples to whole groups require to be enhanced. However,
the general conclusion drawn was that membership of social groups, and the social.
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identities which come with such membership, represent one important source of
stereotypical beliefs.
It was then pointed out that social identity theory (and its later variant, self-
categorisation theory) emphasise the importance of distinguishing between social
and personal identity. This was taken to mean that a complete account of the
origins of people's stereotypical beliefs about women artists and women's art
required an understanding of the contribution made by personal identity. Since the
subject under discussion is women artists and women's art, it was assumed that
aspects of personal identity which influence thinking about gender-related issues
would be particularly important. After an acknowledgement of the debate between
Bern and Spence and Helmreich, the conclusion drawn was that Bern's gender-
schema approach was an appropriate perspective to adopt in the present study. In
particular, Bern's claim that people view the world differently depending on their
sex-role categorisation was taken as an important determinant of stereotypical
beliefs associated with gender.
By the end of Chapter Three, the conclusion could be drawn that there are two
distinct sources of stereotypical beliefs: social identity and personal identity, with
the latter being construed, in the present context, as sex-role categorisation.
Having already identified people's beliefs about women artists and the cognitive
component of their attitudes to women's art as stereotypical beliefs, the theoretical
prediction was formulated that the origin of people's beliefs about women artists
and their attitudes towards women's art would be seen to be associated with social
identity and personal identity. It was this prediction which was pursued in Chapter
Four.
Chapter Four set out to test the relationship between identity and belief by
formulating the hypothesis that social and personal identity influence people's
beliefs about women artists and women's art in a stereotypical fashion. The.
method selected for testing this hypothesis was the analytic survey, and three
stereotyping factors or independent variables were identified: 'whether someone is
feminist or not', 'their gender' and 'their sex-role categorisation'. Sex role
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categorisation was 'measured' using the Bern Sex Role Inventory, while gender
and feminism were 'measured' via a specially designed survey instrument which
comprised statements about women artists and their work with which subjects
expressed agreement or disagreement.
The results of the analytic survey showed that a wide variety of beliefs about
women artists and women's art, held both by the 'general' public and by arts
professionals, were associated with subjects' social and personal identities, as
operationalised by the measures of feminism, gender and sex-role categorisation.
To this extent, these beliefs can be construed as stereotypical beliefs whose origins
lie in social and personal identity. Accordingly, the conclusion drawn in Chapter
Four was that the hypothesis stated at the start of the chapter was supported by the
evidence. In the context of beliefs about women artists and women's art, people
appear to have stereotyped views and attitudes which arise from social and
personal identity.
In addition to this confirmation of the hypothesis, the survey data showed that
stereotyping effects of this sort can have an additive effect, in that the influence of
one salient social identity may be compounded or increased by the influence of the
other salient social identity or by sex-role categorisation. This 'double category
effect' was seen to be an important determinant in a number of the responses
subjects made to the survey instrument statements. In addition most subjects
denied that they employed different standards when considering the art of men and
the art of women. However, more than half of the subjects expressed the belief
that other people did employ different standards. Moreover, well over half of the
subjects expressed the belief that women artists were disadvantaged, relative to
men artists. This finding, which is consistent with the opinions of the art theorists
which were discussed in Chapter One, led into consideration of the second of the
research questions originally identified in Chapter One: the question of what effect
such beliefs might have on those whose job includes the support of women artists
and the promotion of women's art. It was this question which formed the central
theme of Chapter Five.
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In Chapter Five, it was argued that in order to assess how arts professionals deal
with the undervalued status of women artists and women's art, a switch in
methodologies was required. The results of the analytic survey in Chapter Four
show that people are unwilling to express explicitly prejudiced views about women
artists, even if they do believe that other people hold such views. Moreover, social
psychological studies of prejudice have discovered that modem expressions of
prejudice often have a subtle or disguised form. Accordingly, it was decided that
in order to understand how arts professionals make sense of themselves as people
who have responsibility for the support of women artists and the promotion of
women's art, direct questioning by means of the survey technique would be
insufficient. In particular, one area of interest was to explore precisely how arts
professionals negotiate the seemingly incompatible requirements of sharing the
public's beliefs about women artists and women's art while, at the same time,
avoiding to appear prejudiced. It was argued in Chapter Five that the
methodology most suited to this task is discourse analysis. One important aspect
of the discourse analysis approach is the claim that when people use language to
characterise their social world, they do so in a constructive fashion. The position
taken in Chapter Five was that this notion captures exactly the sort of identity-
construction task in which arts professionals might be expected to engage.
Chapter Five presented a number of analyses of interviews with arts professionals.
These revealed that arts professionals did indeed adopt a variety of discourse
strategies in order to display a specific sort of 'unbiased' identity. The analyses
showed that men and women relied upon different forms of account. In talking
about their role in supporting women artists and women's art, men displayed a
concern with whether their own practices might be considered to be
discriminatory. They treated admissions of discriminatory events 'accountable' in a
way in which they did not regard expressions of non-discrimination. Women
displayed an orientation to the same issue which showed that they understood it in
terms of the wider question about the status of women artists. In providing
accounts of the low-status nature of women's art, they referred to socio-historical
contexts and psychological properties of women artists as 'explanations' for this
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status. What these accounts managed to achieve for the subjects was that both
men and women were able to deal with the problematic status of women's art
without seeming personally prejudiced against women artists. Similar accounting
practices were seen in the arts professionals' responses to questions about women's
arts events. The conclusion drawn was that the arts professionals did recognise a
relationship between the way they are perceived to deal with women's art and their
own sense of self as arts professionals.
By the end of Chapter Five, then, the original research questions outlined in
Chapter One had been answered. Firstly, people's beliefs about women artists and
women's art stem, in a stereotypical fashion, from social and personal identity.
This helps to explain why women's art is undervalued as art theorists claim. This
explanation is also supported by the results of the analytic survey in Chapter Four,.
Secondly, arts professionals displayed a concern that they themselves may be
appear to be prejudiced against women's art. They were shown to construct
accounts in discourse which deal with this potential threat to their identities.
However, these accounts dealt only with a single categorisation: the subject's role
as an arts professional. But it has been pointed out that discourse analysis also
reveals the way people provide 'versions' of a particular categorisation to suit a
local conversational context. At other times, they may provide 'reformulations' of
such categorisations which blur or remove apparently clear distinctions between
one category and another. This raises the further question of whether the arts
professionals' accounts demonstrate this flexibility in the use of categorisations.
The question is particularly important since, in a sense, it marks a boundary point
between traditional social identity theory and discourse analysis approaches to
identity.
The analyses of Chapter Six revealed that the arts professionals were adept at
performing this sort of category 'reformulation' in order to preserve a positive
sense of self as more than merely an administrator. Their accounts showed that the
apparently clear distinction between being 'an administrator' and being 'a creative
artist' was not, in fact, a simple one.. In addition, a second set of interviews
revealed that some of the arts professionals were able flexibly to re-negotiate the
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categories 'Women in Action' and 'Women into the Future' in accomplishing a
blaming of the opposing group. The subjects were able to create pictures of the
typical member of the opposing group from which the inference could easily be
drawn that it was the opposing group which caused the break-up of the original
group.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these findings. The study represents a
successful attempt to bridge the analytical gap between stereotypes and attitudes.
By treating stereotypical beliefs as the cognitive component of attitudes, it proves
possible simultaneously to study people's stereotypes of social groups and the
attitudes which are associated with those stereotypes. In addition, the study
demonstrates that, at least in part, stereotypes and attitudes have common social
origins. Moreover, the study also identifies two aspects of social life which appear
to function as the origin of stereotypes and attitudes: social identity and personal
identity. To this extent, the study has sought to form some theoretical linkage
between the social cognition of stereotypes and attitudes and the social psychology
of self and identity.
The study has also attempted to forge new theoretical links within the social
psychology of identity by outlining a perspective from which traditional social
identity theory and discourse analyses of identity can be viewed as compatible.
The suggestion here has been that in 'simple' cases of salient social identity, the
traditional social identity theory approach is appropriate, whereas in cases where
self-categorisation boundaries are fluid or flexible, discourse analytic methods may
be more fruitful to the researcher. Moreover, within the confines of traditional
social identity theory, the study has demonstrated that social identity and personal
identity, as represented by sex-role categorisation, jointly act upon subjects' beliefs
via the 'double category effect'. At the same time, the study represents an
empirical confirmation of Bern's view that the stereotypical outcome of sex-role
categorisation is moderated by the stereotyping effects of belonging to different
social groups.
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At the more applied level, the study also offers an informed view of the current
status of women artists and women's art. It is clear from Chapter Four that
people's views on these matters are influenced by stereotypes. It is also clear that
a large portion of the general public and of arts professionals feel that one
consequence of this stereotyping process is that women's art is undervalued. This
represents an empirical support for the claims made by arts theorists which were
discussed in Chapter One. Unfortunately, the finding that social and personal
identity can be regarded as the origin of such stereotypical views leaves a
somewhat gloomy prospect for women artists and women's art. If the social roots
of society's under-valuation of women artists and women's art run as deep as the
most basic influences on identity, it means that the task of changing society'S view
of women artists and their work is a daunting one. The need for a fundamental re-
think of women's role in the artistic world is highlighted by the discourse analytic
evidence presented here that arts ,professionals themselves employ sophisticated
discursive strategies to avoid appearing prejudiced when they are critical of women
artists and their work. The conclusion to be drawn from the data is that a
fundamental change is required in the way in which society, both men and women,
think about women's place in the Arts.
A more positive note may be struck by considering the extent to which the present
study highlights avenues for future research in this area. To the extent that the
study represents a successful application of the theories and methods of social
psychology to the issue of women's art, this opens up new vistas on scientific
research in this area. For example, one approach which is likely to be fruitful is the
study of how social and personal identity influence not only beliefs about women
artists and women's art but also evaluations of that art. The present study has
focused entirely on the cognitive component of attitudes towards women's art, but
it would be valuable to discover the extent to which the findings here apply to the
evaluative component of attitudes. It would also be useful, in the future, to adopt
a more interactive approach to the twin methodologies represented by Chapter
Four and by Chapters Five and Six. In particular, it may be 'that discourse analyses
offer valuable means of teasing out the complex relationships which are
represented in certain of the three-way interactions which were noted in Chapter
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Four. In addition, the social identity and personal identity origins of stereotypical
beliefs which were considered in Chapter Four were restricted to three: feminism,
gender and sex-role categorisation. Future research might benefit from a more
extensive list of possible contributory factors to the formation of stereotypical
beliefs.
What this means is that, to some extent, the current position of women artists and
their work within the arts world is uncertain. Women artists seem to suffer from
stereotype induced views and attitudes which undervalue their work. On the other
hand, the picture is brighter in that there is now a clear perspective on how
research in this area might fruitfully be conducted in the future, with the hope that
where better understanding occurs, fairer and more equitable treatment will follow.
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APPENDIX I
SURVEY INSTRUMENT
WOMEN ARTISTS, WOMEN'S CULTURAL/ARTISTIC
PRODUCTS AND WOMEN'S ARTS EVENTS
For multiple choice items, place a cross or tick under your selection e.g.
Strongly Agree Cannot Disagree Strongly
Agree Decide Disagree
... ........ ...x ..... ... ... ..... ........... ...........
For other items, separate instructions will be given.
Section 1
(a) It is more difficult for a woman to receive recognition as an artist than it is for a
man.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(b) Women artists should support other women artists.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strong)y
Disagree
(c) Women's art should deal exclusively with women's issues.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(d) All women have the potential to be artists.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(e) Some art forms are potentially more effective than others in making statements
about women
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(f) Women's arts events 'marginalise' the possible contribution of women's
cultural/artistic products to mainstream arts.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
If your response to the above item is 'strongly agree' or 'agree' do you
consider this 'marginalisation' to have negative consequences for:
women's cultural/artistic products
11 mainstream arts
yes ..
No ..
yes .
No ..
Section 2
(a) Women's art should be:
revolutionary .
11 innovative
III neutral
IV other
(Please tick only 1item. If you tick 'other', please qualify below.)
.......................................................................................................
(b) Women's art should perform an educational function for women.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(c) Women's art should perform an educational function for men.
Strongly Agree Cannot Disagree Strongly
Agree Decide Disagree
... ,....... ... ........ ........... '" ........ ...........
(d) So far as art is concerned, only women's art can raise women's
consciousness.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(e) Women's art will always be more than mere entertainment.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
If your response to the above item is 'strongly agree' or 'agree' please list
what you consider to be the 3 most effective art forms.
1
2
3
(f) Women's art is only truly relevant to women ifit contains 'social comment'.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree
(g) Women's art can help men to understand women.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
(h) Being creative helps a woman to feel good about herself
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(i) Being creative with other women, helps a woman to feel good about
herself.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
G) Being creative helps women to feel good about themselves only if they
themselves are satisfied with the outcome/product.
Strongly
Agree
Section 3
Agree Strongly
Disagree
Cannot
Decide
Disagree
(a) Women's art can comment on the world of men as well as on the world of
women.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
(b) Men's art can comment on the world of women as well as on the world of
men.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
(c) Women interpret art differently from men.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot Disagree Strongly
Decide Disagree
.,......... ... ... ..... ........... ...........
(d) A woman's age affects the way she interprets the social and political
content of women's art.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot Disagree Strongly
Decide Disagree
........... '" ........ ........ ~.. '" ........
. (e) A woman's social class affects the way she interprets the social and political
content of women's art.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Disagree Strongly
Disagree
Cannot
Decide
(f) A woman's ethnicity affects the way she interprets the social and political
content of women's art.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(g) A woman's sexual orientation affects the way she interprets women's art.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(h) How would you define feminism?
(i) Do you regard yourself, according to your own definition as a feminist?
yes .
no .
(please tick yes or no)
Section 4
(a) Women's art and men's art should be judged on the basis of the same
aesthetic criteria.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree·
(b) The public applies different standards when evaluating the art of women
and the art of men if the sex of the artist is known in advance.
Strongly Agree Cannot Disagree Strongly
Agree Decide Disagree
........... ... ······f· ........... ... ........ ...........
(c) Women's art should be evaluated by means of both
aesthetic criteria and social/political criteria.
11 Women's art should be evaluated by means of
aesthetic criteria alone.
11 Women's art should be evaluated by means of
social/political criteria alone.
IV It is unnecessary to evaluate women's art at all
(please tick only I item)
(d) It is difficult to define 'Women's Art'
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(e) How would you define 'Women's Art'?
Section 5
(a) In general women artists and women's arts events receive adequate funding
and support from bodies such as the Arts Council and local authorities.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(b) Women artists should adopt a more 'businesslike' approach to attracting
sponsorship.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(c) Women's art and women's arts events represent a 'bad risk' for sponsors.
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
Disagree Strongly
Disagree
(d) Women's art should benefit from positive discrimination as regards funding.
Section 6
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Strongly
Agree
Agree Cannot
Decide
yes ......
yes .
This is the end of the questionnaire.
Age
Sex
Occupation
I am a member
of Women 2000
Iam a member of
Women in Profile
Disagree
no .
no .
Strongly
Disagree
I should like to take his opportunity to thank you very much for your help.
APPENDIX II
VALUES OF CRONBACH'S ALPHA FOR FIVE MULTI-ITEM
SCALES, DERIVED FROM THE STUDENT SAMPLE AND THE
ARTS PROFESSIONALS SAMPLE
Cronbach's Alpha for the five sub-scales used witbin survey instrument
Scale Scale Name Scale Items 'Student' 'Arts
Number Alpba Professional'
Alpha
1 Women's Art is Educational 2b, 2c, 2g 0.75 0.84
2 Women's Art includes Social 2d,2£* 0.52 0.61
Comment
3 Creativity and Feeling Good 2h,2i* 0.74 0.76
4 Art is Non-gendered 3a, 3b 0.84 . 0.83
5 Women's Interpretation of 3d, 3e, 3£* 0.77 0.88
Art IS Influenced by
Demographic Factors
* denotes scales from which items originally intended for inclusion were dropped
following recommendations in the SPSS RELIABll..JTY output. Scale 2 was
originally intended to include Statement 2e, Scale 3 to include Statement 2j and
Scale 5 to include Statement 3c.
APPENDIX III
Thematic Structure of Survey Instrument
Chapter Quest. Section Sub-theme Quest.
Section Section Theme Item
4.5 I Inclusion Collectivity lb Id
4.5 I Inclusion Exclusivity lc,If
4.5 I Inclusion Generality le
4.6 2 Usefulness Education Scale 1
4.6 2 Usefulness Social Comment Scale 2
4.6 2 Usefulness Creativity Scale 3
4.7 3 Social Influences Gender Scale 4
4.7 3 Social Influences Demography Scale 5
4.8 4 Prejudice --------- 4a. 4b la
4.9 5 Business and -------- 5a-5d
Finance
APPENDIX IV
THE BEM SEX ROLE INVENTORY
BEM INVENTORY
Developed by Sandra L. Bem, Ph.D.
Name Age Sex _
~"one No. or Address _
Date 19 _.
If a student: School Yr. in 5chool _
01 RECTION5·,
)n the opposite side of this sheet, you will find listed a number of personality characteristics. We would tike you to
use those characteristics to describe yourself, that is, we would like you to indicate, on a scale from 1 to 7, how
rue of you each of these characteristics is. Please do not leave any characteristic unmarked.
~)(ample: sly
Write a 1 if it is never or almost never true that you are sly.
Write a 2 if it is usually not true that you are sly.
Write a 3 if it is sometimes but infrequently true that you are sly.
Write a 4 if it is occasionally true that you are sly.
Write a 5 if it is often true that you are sly.
Write a 6 if it is usually true that you are sly.
Write a 7 if it is always or almost always true that you are sly.
~"us, if you feel it is sometimes but infrequently true that you are "sly," never or almost never true that you are
'malicious," always or almost always true that you are "irresponsible," and often true that you are "carefree,"
hen you would rate these characteristics as follows:
Sly I~ I I Irresponsible 171
iii :i =ea==re=fr=ee=========:i=.s:·iII iviaiicious
.. Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc.
• 3803 E. Bayshor. Road· Palo Alto, CA 94303
)Copyright. 1978, by Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc. All rights reserved. Duplication of this form by any process is a violation of
~ecopyright laws of the United States except when authorized in writing by the Publisher.
2 3 4 5 6 7
Never or
almost
never true
Usually
not
true
Sometimes but Occasionally
infrequently true
true
)efend my own beliefs
\ffectionate
onscienrlous I
ndependenr I
iympathetic I
~oody Ii
ssertive
iensitive to needs of others I
~enable I..
itrong personality
Jnderstanding
~alous I I
'crceful I I
cm passiona te
'ruthful
fave leadership abilities
ager to soothe hurt feelings
ecretive
'1illing to take risks
Often
true
Adaptable
Dominant
Tender
Conceited
Willing to take a stand I
Love children I
Tactful !., I,
Aggressive
.
i
Gentle II
Conventional !i
Self-reliant II
Yielding Ii
I
Helpful I
I
Athletic
i
Cheerful I
Unsystema tic I,
,
Analytical I
Shy
I
Inefficient
'4,l ..,. "".".;""" ~"'I :I,.
b Class
R.S.
s.s.
ss diff.
Usually
true
Always or
almost
always true
Flarterable
Theatrical
Self-sufficient
Loyal
Happy
Individualistic
! Soft-spoken
Unpredictable
I MasculineI
, Gullible.!
1 SolemnI
i
! CompetitiveI
Childlike
I
Likable
i
,
Ambitious!
! Do not use harsh language
!
i
! Sincere
I
i Act as a leader
I
I Feminine
f Cr; ",,.I".'! _..
*
APPENDIX V
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
Can you tell me about how you come to be working in your present post?
(Warmup)
Do you have a position in relation to women artists?
What is your position in relation to women's arts events?
Do you see yourself primarily as an artist or an administrator?
How do you explain the split between Women into the Future and Women in
Action? (Only applies to relevant group members.)
